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FACULTY COMMENT
REVISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL ORDER ............................

Philip C. Jessup

In this Comment, Philip C. Jessup, a member of the International Court of
Justice from 1961 to 1970, examines developments in the international legal
order since the writing of his A Modern Law of Nations in 1945. The more
encouraging developments have not yet saved mankind from "the scourge
of war," but have borne fruit. Judge Jessup explores specific examples from
both the national and international arenas. He then discusses "the importance of the International Court of Justice as a developer or clarifier of
rules of international law." Because the Court plays such an important role,
Judge Jessup regrets the fact "that some states have sought to evade their
proper part in arguing cases before the Court," especially in cases involving
a request for provisional measures of interim protection. He cites the case
of the United States hostages in Iran as the latest example of the failure of
a state to "do its duty." Judge Jessup's conclusion, however, is optimistic:
"The functioning of the United Nations and its organs and conferences
gives justification for the conviction that revisions of international law will
continue to develop in such a way as to meet the needs of our international
society."
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SOUTH AFRICA'S "INDEPENDENT" HOMELANDS: AN

EXERCISE IN DENATIONALIZATION

..............

John Dugard

11

The South African Government's policy of apartheid or separate development has achieved considerable notoriety over the past thirty years. Since
1976, South Africa has resorted to the fictional use of statehood and nationality to resolve its constitutional problems and to deprive all Blacks in the
country to their South African nationality. Professor Dugard traces the development of the homelands policy and describes the creation of the "independent" homelands. His primary focus, however, is on the denationalization of South African Blacks and on the important role of denationalization
in the ideology of separate development, issues he describes as "central to
the political future of South Africa."
OIL POLLUTION BY OCEAN VESSELS-AN ENVIRONMENTAL
TRAGEDY: THE LEGAL REGIME OF FLAGS OF
CONVENIENCE, MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS,

AND COASTAL STATES ................

Paul Stephen Dempsey

Lisa L. Helling
The dramatic growth in the use of flags of convenience by the maritime
industry has become an issue of international concern. A variety of fac-
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tors-including labor, tax, and environmental interests which impose higher
operating costs-have pressured fleet operators to opt for vessel registration
in those countries that impose only a minimum of regulation. Consequently,
ships bearing a flag of convenience are often characterized by their poor
conditions, inadequately trained crews, and frequent collisions. The authors
discuss the international legal regime that allows convenient vessel registration, the effects that poorly regulated fleets have on the environment, and
current multinational agreements that establish higher safety standards.
They propose a multilevel regime to effectively deter continued environmental pollution by ocean vessels.
LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

...

Rex

J. Zedalie

89

During recent sessions of the Tokyo Round, a majority of developed and
developing nations concluded agreements which reflect their desire to solve
many particularly troublesome problems caused by non-tariff barriers and
international trade in agricultural commodities. Reviewing established
GATT principles which have been enshrined in various provisions of the
U.S. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the author assesses the domestic impact of the Tokyo Round agreements on both the import and export of
agricultural commodities. He concludes that the codes of conduct which
have emanated from the recent multilateral negotiations will substantially
contribute to the expansion of agricultural trade.
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FACULTY COMMENT

Revisions of the International Legal Order
PHILIP C. JESSUP

Thirty-five years ago, I attempted "to explore some of the possible
bases for a modern -law of nations."' In particular, two points were singled
out as keystones of a revised international legal order.
The first is the point that international law, like national law,
must be directly applicable to the individual. It must not continue to
be remote from him, as is the traditional international law, which is
considered to be applicable to states alone and not to individuals. The

second point is that there must be basic recognition of the interest
which the whole international society has in the observance of its law.
Breaches of the law must no longer be considered the concern of only
the state directly and primarily affected. There must be something
equivalent to the national concept of criminal law, in which the community as such brings its combined power to bear upon the violator of
those parts of2 the law which are necessary to the preservation of the
public peace.

It was a time for the burgeoning of a new international legal order.
The Charter of the United Nations had just been signed at San Francisco.
The Charter provided for a reconstituted International Court of Justice.
It charged the General Assembly of the United Nations with the duty of
"encouraging the progressive development of international law and its

Philip C. Jessup served on the International Court of Justice from 1961 to 1970. Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, Columbia, 1946-1961; Visiting Professor, Harvard, 1938-1939; Storrs Lecturer, Yale, 1956; Cooley Lecturer, Michigan, 1958;
Lecturer, Hague Academy of International Law, 1929, 1956. Assistant to Elihu Root, Conference of Jurists on the Permanent Court of International Justice, Geneva, 1929. Member,
United States delegation, United Nations Conference on International Organization, San
Francisco, 1945. United States representative, various sessions of the Security Council and
the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1948-1953. United States Ambassador-atLarge, 1949-1953. President, American Society of International Law, 1954-1955.
In this Comment, the discussion of the role of the International Court of Justice in
developing international law is based in part on the writer's Foreword to Dr. Jerome B.
Elkind's forthcoming book, A Functional Approach to Interim Protection, to be published
by Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands. The writer acknowledges
with thanks the publisher's permission to use this material.
1. P. Jassup, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 2 (1946).

2. Id.
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codification." s In 1947 the General Assembly discharged this obligation
by creating a commission which drafted a statute for the International
Law Commission that has functioned admirably. The world-wide interest
in that development of international law has led to publication of translations of my little book into German, Korean, Japanese, and Thai. Many
national societies of international law now flourish. More than a hundred
law schools in more than twenty countries participate annually in an international law moot court competition under the auspices of the American Society of International Law. Important new journals of international
law like this Denver Journal are now being published.
All of this ferment has not yet saved us "from the scourge of war"
but it has borne fruit. I suggest simply two examples, one from the international and one from the national arena.
When the American diplomatic and consular personnel in the United
States Embassy in Teheran were taken hostage by a group of Iranian
militants with the approval of one who claimed to be their spiritual and
political leader, the outrage was not "the concern of only the state directly and primarily affected"; it was denounced by the entire international community whose members felt and recorded the conviction that
all were threatened by this breach of the time-honored rules of international law. Although it has sometimes been argued that customary international law is the creature and weapon of the "imperialist" states, all
states felt injured by the illegal acts in Iran.
Look at the record:
The hostages were seized on November 4, 1979.
On November 20, the President of the United Nations General Assembly, Salim A. Salim of Tanzania, issued a statement which called for
the release of the hostages and said:
The President is convinced that the call for the release of the hostages
represents the collective concern of the international community who
clearly feel strongly that the sanctity of diplomatic premises and diplomatic personnel must be respected, without any exceptions, at all
times .... It is crucial that international law and practice governing
the treatment of
diplomatic missions and their agencies be scrupu4
lously observed.
On November 27, Sergio Palacios de Vizzio of Bolivia, the President
of the United Nations Security Council, said: "I must emphasize that the
principle of the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and establishments
be respected in all cases in accordance with internationally accepted
norms." 5
On December 4, 1979, the Security Council unanimously adopted a

3. U.N. CHAirsn art. 13(1)(a).

4. 34 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6096 (1979).
5. 34 U.N. SCOR (2172d mtg.), U.N. Doc. 8/13616 (1979).
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Resolution reaffirming "the solemn obligation of all States parties to both
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 19616 and the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations of 19637 to respect the inviolability of
diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions," and calling
upon "the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of
the Embassy of the United States of America being held in Teheran, to
provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country." s It is
important to note the composition of the Security Council which acted
unanimously since here indeed was a cross-section of the international
community. The states represented were Bolivia, Bangladesh, China,
Czechoslovakia, France, Gabon, Jamaica, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, and Zambia.
It is true that the international community as such did not bring "its
combined power to bear upon the violator."' On January 13, 1980, when
the Security Council voted on a resolution which would have imposed
sanctions on Iran, the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union and
lacked the approval also of four other states.1 0 But none of these retreated from the earlier affirmation of international law and the call on
Iran to release the hostages.
My second example has to do with the status of the individual in
international law. The case shows that it is now recognized that states
owe duties not only to other states but also directly to individuals.
In an action which may well be considered to have come before its
time, the Congress of the United States in 1789 enacted a law which provided that the federal courts would have jurisdiction where an alien sues
for "a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States."" In a recent case, Paraguayan citizens brought an
action in a district court alleging that "defendant, acting under color of
his authority as a Paraguayan official, tortured and killed Joel Filartiga, a
Paraguayan national, and that this conduct was a tort in violation of the
'
law of nations."'

6. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
7. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S.
No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
8. S.C. Res. 457, 34 U.N. SCOR (2178th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/OR/34 (1979).
9. For a discussion of the possible responses under international law of the world community to the actions of an outlaw nation such as Iran, see chapter 7, The Legal Regulation
of the Use of Force, in Jzssup, note 1 supra.
10. U.N. Doc. S/13735 (1980).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
12. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). This quotation and others to
follow are taken from the magnificent Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae
in this case. (Memorandum reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 585 (1980)). The Memorandum was prepared in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State with the
concurrence of the Department of Justice. Only those aspects of the case which deal with
the definition of international law are treated here.
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According to the amicus curiae memorandum of the Department of
State which was solicited by the court of appeals after the district court
held it had no jurisdiction:
The district court dismissed the complaint because it believed
that the torture of a foreign citizen by an official of the same country
does not violate the law of nations as that term is used in 28 U.S.C.
1350. If Section 1350 reached only those practices that historically
have been viewed as violations of international law, the court's decision would very likely be correct. Before the turn of the century and
even after, it was generally thought that a nation's treatment of its
own citizens was beyond the purview of international law. But as we
demonstrate below, Section 1350 encompasses international law as it
has evolved o6ver time. And whatever may have been true before the
turn of the century, today a nation has an obligation under international law to respect the right of its citizens to be free of official torture ....

[Clustomary international law evolves with the changing

customs and standards of behavior in the international community ....

This evolutionary process has produced wide recognition

that certain fundamental human rights are now guaranteed
to individ13
uals as a matter of customary international law.
This official position of the United States will go down in the history
of international law as an epochal event. It is the realization of the first
keystone of a revised international legal order which I envisioned thirtyfive years ago. From the point of view of the proof of international law,
the assertion by the State Department is even more important than the
fact that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
agreed with the State Department, holding that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international
law of human rights, regardless of the nation14
ality of the parties."

No attempt is made in this Comment to discuss or outline all the
various ways in which international law is developed. The literature on
that subject is extensive. The attempt is made here to stress the importance of the International Court of Justice as a developer or clarifier of
rules of international law whether the rules be found in international conventions or in the more elusive customary law. The influence of the Court
in this role is great and can be recognized without asserting that the judgments of the Court constitute "sources" or "evidence" of international
law. That problem, which at times seems to be involved in semantic distinctions, has recently been well explored by Professor Nawaz. 1
Because the Court is playing an important role, as particularly exem13. 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 585, 587-89 (1980).
14. 630 F.2d at 878. For those who wish to follow in detail the evolution of the law of
human rights, there is now available the magisterial volume by Messrs. Myres McDougal,
Harold Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
15. Nawaz, Other Sources of InternationalLaw: Are Judicial Decrees of the International Court of Justice a Source of InternationalLaw?, 19 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 526 (1979).
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plified in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases' s where it had to interpret the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,17 it is regrettable that
some States have sought to evade their proper part in arguing cases
before the Court. The case of the Hostages,18 aspects of which are discussed above, is the latest example of a state's failure to do its duty by
appearing in Court, especially in a case where there is a request for provisional measures of interim protection. One regrets especially that France,
which with the United Kingdom had been perhaps the most important
supporter of the Hague Courts, abandoned that role when made a defendant in the Nuclear Tests cases' which will be mentioned later.
The International Court of Justice, like its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, is authorized by Article 41(1) of its
Statute to "indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective
rights of either party." This is potentially one of the most important and
actually one of the most controversial functions of the Court. It is thoroughly analyzed in a forthcoming book by Dr. Jerome B. Elkind of the
Faculty of Law of the University of Aukland, New Zealand. 0 Orders for
interim protection, as they are commonly called, may take the form of
simple exhortations to "ensure that no step of any kind is taken capable
of prejudicing the rights claimed . . or of aggravating or extending the
dispute submitted to the Court." This was the type of the Permanent
Court's order in the dispute between Belgium and Bulgaria.2 Or the order may involve an elaborate plan for regulating the situation pending
final judgment as was the case in the action of the International Court of
Justice in the Anglo-Iranian Oil dispute."3
Orders for interim protection have been sought from the Permanent
Court of International Justice in six cases and from the International
Court of Justice in seven cases. The request for such an order was denied
by the Permanent Court in four cases and by the International Court in
three cases.' " The issue which is still the subject of differing opinions is
16. (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v.
Netherlands), [1969] I.C.J. 3.
17. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471,

T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
18. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United
States v. Iran), 35 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/13989 (1980); Communique No. 815, May 24,
1980. The action was commenced by the United States on Nov. 29, 1979. On Dec. 16, the
Court ordered Iran to release the American hostages being held in the U.S. Embassy in
Teheran. The Court's final judgment was delivered on May 24, 1980.
19. Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J. 253; (New Zealand v.
France), [1974] I.C.J. 457.
20. J. ELKIND, A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO INTERIM PROTECTION (forthcoming).
21. Id.
22. The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria Case (Belgium v. Bulgaria), [1939]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79, at 194, 199.
23. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89.
24. For a discussion of the power of the I.C.J. and the P.C.I.J. to grant or deny interim
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whether any such orders are "binding" in the sense that judgments are
binding under Article 60 of the Statute and Article 94 of the Charter. In
chapter six of his valuable study, Dr. Elkind weighs the pros and cons
and soundly concludes that such orders are binding.
In only one of the seven cases in the International Court of Justice
did the party named as respondent appear and argue its position; this
was the Interhandel Case, 5 in which the United States defended its objection against an appeal by Switzerland. In other cases, the respondent
has communicated to the Court its objection to the jurisdiction through
letters or telegrams. Compliance with Article 38 of the Rules of Court
would have required the respondents to appear and file a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction as has been done in many other cases. There
have been arguments concerning the finality with which the Court must
determine its jurisdiction before proceeding to issue an order. The refusal
to appear in court or to appoint an agent as required by the Rules may be
due to fears that the Court might extend its use of the doctrine of forum
prorogatum and hold that the respondent, by appearing, had consented
to the jurisdiction. Such an overly cautious attitude had been traced to
the language used by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) Case:
And there seems to be no doubt that the consent of a State to the
submission of a dispute to the Court may not only result from an express declaration, but may also be inferred from acts conclusively establishing it. It seems hard to deny that the submission of arguments
on the merits, without making reservations in regard to the question
of jurisdiction, must be regarded as an unequivocal indication of the
desire of a State to obtain a decision on the merits of the suit. .... 2
One would suppose that the clause "without making reservations in

regard to the question of jurisdiction" was sufficient safeguard, but Legal
Advisers are cautious and the subject has been debated.27 It is particularly in cases where interim measures of protection are being considered
that states (or their Legal Advisers) are reluctant to do anything which
may subject them, almost immediately, to adverse judicial process; where
it is a matter of judgment on the merits, months and months often elapse
before all pleadings are filed and oral hearings held and judgment delivered after the Court's deliberations. But the telegraphic or postal substitute for a memorial has frequently contained arguments of a substantive
nature.28 In this writer's opinion, the Court should not, as it has, refer to
protection, see J. ELKIND, note 20 supra, and E.

MCWHINNEY, THE WORLD COURT AND THE
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw-MAKING PROCESS 98-103 (1979).

25. (Switzerland v. United States), [1959] LC.J. 6.
26. (Germany v. Poland), [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 12, at 4, 24.
27. See C. JzNKs, THE PROSPeCTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 135-35 (1964); 1 S.
ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 344-46 (1965).
28. See, e.g., Letter from the Republic of France, May 16, 1973, 2 Nuclear Tests Cases,
11978 I.C.J. Pleadings 347-48; Letters from India, May 23, 1973 & June 4, 1973, Trial of
Pakistani Prisoners of War, [1976] I.C.J. Pleadings 117-18, 139 (while refusing to appoint an
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or answer such evasive pleadings. However, the Court traditionally, and
not without some justification, has been mindful of the fact that the parties involved are sovereign states and entitled to some latitude in procedural matters.
Article 40(2) of the 1978 Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen proceedings are instituted by means of an application, the name of the agent
for the applicant shall be stated. The respondent, upon receipt of the certified copy of the application, or as soon as possible thereafter, shall inform the Court of the name of its agent." 9 Before the Court adopted the
1978 Rules, it was suggested to the Court that to avoid fears of forum
prorogatum, Article 67 of the 1972 Rules, dealing with Preliminary Objections to the jurisdiction, might well include a provision to the effect that a
preliminary objection limited to the question of the jurisdiction of the
Court will not be considered as an acceptance or recognition of the jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 36 of the Statute.30 Such a provision

agent or to appear, India in fact kept up a stream of correspondence with the Court, answering Pakistan's arguments as they were made); Letter from Iran, Dec. 9, 1979, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran, [1979] I.C.J. Pleadings, C.R.
79/1, Public Sitting, Dec. 10, 1979, at 10-11.
By a telegram dated August 25, 1976, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Turkey transmitted "the observations of the Turkish Government on the Request
of the Government of Greece for provisional measures" to the Registrar of the International
Court of Justice. The Secretary-General noted therein that:
[o~n the assurance which was given by the President of the International Court
of Justice to the Turkish Ambassador at The Hague during their informal conversation on 18 August 1976, it is understood that the presentation of the attached observations to the International Court of Justice shall not imply any
commitment by the Turkish Government as to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf QGse (Greece v. Turkey), [19761 I.C.J. Pleadings 576. On
August 30, 1976, the Registrar replied, stating that "due note has been taken of the statement" regarding the assurance of the President of the Court. Id. at 579.
29. Rules of Court, art. 40(2), adopted Apr. 14, 1978, reprinted in DocuMENTS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTIcE 233 (2d ed. S. Rosenne 1979). Article 40(2) amended article 38(3) of the original Rules of Court, adopted on May 6, 1946. Article 38(3) read: "The
party against whom the application is made and to whom it is notified shall, when acknowledging receipt of the notification, or failing this, as soon as possible, inform the Court of the
name of its agent."
30. Article 36 of the I.C.J. Statute reads:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer
to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of
an international obligation.
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would have been comparable to the treatment of the like problems arising
in suits against foreign states in national courts. When that question was
studied by the Harvard Research Project on the Competence of Courts in
Regard to Foreign States, it was stated that "a specific appearance for the
purpose of pleading immunity as a State will not be a basis for making a
State a respondent." 1 The problem has also been met in the United
2
States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
Attention should be paid to the type of situation for which interim
protection has or will be asked. It is not only the Great Powers which
have sought interim protection against the small. In the Permanent Court
of International Justice, Belgium sought protection against China and
Bulgaria, and Norway asked for protection against Denmark. 8 In the International Court of Justice such help has been sought by Switzerland,
Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, and Greece." The first case in which
the International Court of Justice gave an order for interim protection
raised the issue of alleged damage to the interests of a foreign enterprise
by nationalization of its properties in the host state. Since the Barcelona
Traction Case" was decided by the Court in 1970, doubts have been
raised about the validity of the established international law of state re-

Article 67 of the 1972 Rules, renumbered article 79 in 1978, was not changed in the
1978 amendments.
31. Harvard Research Project, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26
AM. J. INT'L L. 455, 543 (Supp. 1932).
32. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976), has merged
the immunity and jurisdictional issues in actions against foreign states. United States law
recognizes a right of special appearance to contest jurisdiction, provided the specially appearing party does not argue the merits of the complaint. See Baker v. Gotz, 408 F. Supp.
238 (D. Del. 1976); Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 52
Cal. App.3d 964, 125 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1975); Boye v Mellerup, 229 N.W.2d 719 (Iowa 1975);
Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 189 So.2d 336 (1966).
Thus, a foreign state may appear specially to raise the claim of sovereign immunity. It
would only waive that claim implicitly by filing a responsive pleading without raising the
defense of sovereign immunity. See Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction:Toward a
Uniform Body of Law in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211,
232-33 (1979).
33. See, e.g., Order of Jan. 8, 1927, Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865,
Between China and Belgium (Belgium v. China), 119271 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8, at 6-8 (see
also Order of Feb. 15, 1927, making previous order inoperative, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8,
at 9-11); Order of Dec. 5, 1939, The Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v.
Bulgaria), [1939] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79, at 194; Order of Aug. 3, 1932, Case Concerning
the Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Norway v. Denmark), [19321
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 48, at 277.
34. Order of Oct. 24, 1957, Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), [1957]
I.C.J. 105; Orders of June 22, 1973, Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J.
99, (New Zealand v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 135; Order of July 13, 1973, Case Concerning
Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), [1973] I.C.J. 328; Order of Sept. 11,
1976, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3.
35. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belgium
v. Spain), Judgment, [1970] I.C.J. 4.
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sponsibility and diplomatic protection. In Barcelona, the separate opin-

ions of Judges Padilla Nervo s and AmmounI particularly called atten-

tion to the possible evolution of the law in the light of alleged abuses of

diplomatic protection and the increased awareness of the problems of the
developing countries-the "Third World." The proposed "New Inter-

national Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation" has been analyzed with balance and
thoroughness by Professor Garcfa-Amadorss and cannot be discussed in
detail here. In my opinion, the basic law of state responsibility has not

yet been revised or altered although it has been well examined by the
International Law Commission.39 If the International Court of Justice is

again asked for interim protection against the feared results of nationalization, it might hesitate to go as far as it did in the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company Case.'0 On the other hand, in the Case Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran,'1 the Court's unanimous interim order of December 16, 197942 and final judgment of May 24,

198048 rest on impeccable rules of international law and on crystal-clear
treaty bases of jurisdiction. Hesitancy in such a case would be highly
unlikely. .
As

illustrated

by

the

now

pending

case

of

Continental

Shelf-Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," disputes about the location of
oil deposits in the seabed may arise between two Third World states as
well as between other states. Interim protection might be sought if the
resource was threatened where there is an imbrication of a single geological structure, of the type which I discussed in my separate opinion in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases."4 As arguments of the parties in that
case pointed out, the same problems can arise where a river basin re-

source is to be shared."6 The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty between India
36. Id. at 244-67.
37. Id. at 287-334.
38. Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Order: A New Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, 12 LAW. AM. 1 (1980);
see also Schachter, The Evolving InternationalLaw of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976).
39. See [1978 2 Y.B. INT'L. COMM'N, Part 2, at 74, containing a discussion of the work

of the Commission on state responsibility and the texts of the previously approved draft
articles on state responsibility.
40. [1951] I.C.J. 89. In that case, the Court ordered interim measures of protection for
the United Kingdom against Iran. The Court ordered that Iran should permit the AngloIranian Oil Company to continue operations and that the Iranian Government should not
interfere, by executive, legislative, or judicial process, with those operations pending final
judgment. (Final judgment was entered at [1952] I.C.J. 93.)
41. 35 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/13989 (1980).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. I.C.J. Communique No. 78/7, Jan. 12, 1978, cited in (1978] BULL. LEGAL DEV. 20.
Malta and Libya have agreed to submit a similar dispute to the I.C.J.
45. [1969] I.C.J. 3, 67, 81-82.
46. Id.
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and Pakistan serves as an example. 47 Such situations might well justify an
order by the Court for provisional measures. Even the invocation of such
protection from the Court may lead the parties to reach an agreement on
preserving the status quo until the merits of the claim are finally
adjudged.
As noted in the Resolution of the Security Council in the case of the
Hostages," the community interest in the rule of diplomatic immunity
was registered in two great multilateral conventions, signed at Vienna. 41
The developments in the law of human rights are being registered in international conventions, both regional and global. As stated by Professors
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, "agreements between states play a most
important role in the development of customary international law."50 The
International Court of Justice could make a significant contribution if
national courts were authorized to ask that Court for advisory opinions
on the interpretation of multipartite conventions. Such references would
tend to provide uniformity in the interpretation of such agreements. The
idea has been advocated before51 and is now gaining support from resolutions introduced in the Congress by Senator Cranston and by Representatives Bingham and Pritchard."3
As suggested in A Modern Law of Nations, there has been a trend in
the use of the term "law-making treaties" which "supports the view that
. ..there is a growing acknowledgement of a basic community interest
which contrasts with the traditional strict bilateralism of law."'" The
functioning of the United Nations and its organs and conferences gives
justification for the conviction that revisions of international law will continue to develop in such a way as to meet the needs of our international
society.

47. Indus Waters Treaty, India-Pakistan, Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 125.
48. Note 8 supra.
49. Notes 6 & 7 supra.
50. M. McDOUGAL, D. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, supra note 14, at 266-67.
51. See P. JEsSUP, THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 76 passim (1970); Jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 350 (1964).
52. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of Sen. Cranston);
126 CONG. REC. E3684-85 (daily ed. July 30, 1980) (statement of Rep. Bingham on expanding utilization of the World Court by national courts). Rep. Bingham included in his
remarks the text of a letter written by me in support of the proposal.
53. P. JESsUP, supra note 1, at 133.
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South Africa's "Independent" Homelands:
An Exercise in Denationalization
JOHN DUGARD

The South African Government's policy of apartheid or separate development has achieved considerable notoriety over the past thirty years.
To most informed persons the term apartheid conjures up a discriminatory legal order in which personal, social, economic, political, and educational rights are distributed unequally on the basis of race. Recent developments on the apartheid front are less notorious. Since 1976, the South
African Government has resorted to the fictional use of statehood and
nationality in order to resolve its constitutional problems. New "states"
have been carved out of the body of South Africa and been granted independence, and all black" persons affiliated with these entities, however
remotely, have been deprived of their South African nationality. In this
way the government aims to create a residual South African state with no
black nationals. The millions of Blacks who continue to reside and work
in South Africa will be aliens, with no claim to political rights in South
Africa. In this way, so the government believes, Blacks will be given full
political and civil rights in their own states and a hostile international
community will be placated. A number of studies have examined this exercise in political fantasy from the perspective of statehood in international law.' Although the present study will trace the development of the
homelands policy and describe the creation of "independent" homelands,
© 1980 by John Dugard
John Dugard is Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies
at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1958,
University of Stellenbosch; LL.B. 1965, LL.D. 1980, Cambridge University.
1. In 1978 the word "Black" replaced "Bantu" as the official term to describe the African people of South Africa. Second Black Laws Amendment Act 102 of 1978. This creates
certain difficulties as the "non-white" people of South Africa-viz African, Colored, and
Indian-generally prefer to use the word "Black" to describe all such peoples. In this study,
however, the term "Black" is used to describe the African people alone as this is the term
used in the statutes and official documents which are featured prominently in this article.
Sometimes the word "Bantu" is used in an historical context.
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the main focus will be upon denationalization and upon the important
role it plays in the ideology of separate development. Since this issue has
already given rise to much bitterness in South Africa, it is essential that
the international community appreciate more fully an issue which threatens the already fragile racial peace that exists in South Africa.
I.

HOMELANDS POLICY AND IDEOLOGY

The National Party Government of South Africa is clearly and firmly
opposed to the sharing of political power in a unitary South Africa. On
the dther hand, it accepts the fact that both internal and external forces
require the extension of political rights to Blacks. Hence, it has developed
the homelands policy by which Blacks will be given political rights in
their own "states" and Whites will retain exclusive political control over
the remaining part of the Republic of South Africa, comprising eightyseven percent of the original territory of South Africa.
The homelands policy evolved slowly in the early years of National
Party rule, accelerated after 1959, and reached its peak in 1976 on the
granting of independence to Transkei. At that stage, and indeed until the
retirement of Mr. B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister in 1978, the final goals
were clear: all homelands would become independent states; the entire
black population of the Republic would be granted political rights and
citizenship in these independent states; and, consequently, there ultimately would be no black citizens of the Republic of South Africa requiring accommodation in South Africa's political order. The "purity" of this
ideology has been abandoned by the Government of Mr. P.W. Botha.
There is now talk of a constellation or confederation of states in southern
Africa in which Blacks will possess the nationality of the proposed confederation while exercising their citizenship rights mainly within black
member states of the confederation. Moreover, the permanency of the
black urban population appears to have been recognized at long last as a
political fact. Mr. Botha's plans are at present confined largely to rhetoric, however, and the institutional structure of 1976 still dominates the
statute book. This accounts for the difficulty in describing the present
homelands policy.
For a clear understanding of homelands policy and ideology as reflected in the present legal order, it is necessary to examine the evolution
of this policy in the context of the internal and external forces which have
shaped it.
A.

The Period 1948 to 1976
Race separation has been a dominant feature of policymaking in
South Africa since the advent of the white man. On occasion this resulted
in separate areas being set aside for exclusive occupation by Blacks. But
until recent times there was no suggestion that separate states should be
created for Blacks. On the contrary, the historical trend in South Africa
in the first part of this century was towards unity and expansion in statebuilding, as evidenced by the Union in 1910 and by the attempts, albeit
unsuccessful, on the part of successive South African governments to in-
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corporate the High Commission Territories (comprising Basutoland,
Bechuanaland, and Swaziland), South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia into a greater South Africa.
When the National Party came to power in 1948 it promised, and
practiced, more separation and more discrimination. The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951,1 which provided for the establishment of tribal, regional,
and territorial authorities, was certainly aimed at strengthening the
power of tribal authorities in the "reserves," as the homelands were then
known, but there was still no hint of territorial fragmentation of South
Africa.
National Party spokesmen argue that the notion of independent
homelands was a logical evolutionary consequence of apartheid or separate development. A more realistic explanation, however, is that this radical change in direction was a result of the new international order and its
expectations.
Toward the end of the 1950's it had become clear that the baaskap
(boss-ship) form of apartheid could no longer be retained as official
policy. The government was compelled to produce a new version of apartheid in line with contemporary international standards or to accept the
inevitability of a common society. It chose the former. In 1959 the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act4 was introduced to pave the way
for "self-governing Bantu units." At this stage there seemed to be no certainty that self-government would lead to independence, though the
Prime Minister, Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, did tell Parliament that "if it is
within the power of the Bantu and if the territories in which he now lives
can develop to full independence, it will develop in that way." 5 This act
was premised heavily on the principle of self-determination of nations, a
principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and constituting
the cornerstone of the powerful decolonization movement. Thus, in introducing this legislation, Dr. Verwoerd informed Parliament that "the
choice of separate Bantu development" was "in line with the objects of
the world at large." 6
In the early 1960's, external pressure intensified as a result of the
Sharpeville tragedy (which led to the first Security Council resolution on
apartheid) and of the institution of legal proceedings against South Africa
over South West Africa before the International Court of Justice. Consequently, the new idealism of self-development, inherent in the notion of
self-government for "Bantu national units," was emphasized with new
vigor. At the same time Dr. Verwoerd admitted that it was a policy that
had been imposed as a result of external pressure. In 1961 he told Parliament that South Africa was compelled to choose between sacrificing

3.
4.
5.
6.

Act 68 of 1951.
Act 46 of 1959.
101 House of Assembly Debates, col. 6221, May 20, 1959.
Id. col. 6236.
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apartheid completely or making concessions within the framework of the
policy of separate development by allowing the different "Bantu nations"
in South Africa to develop into "separate Bantu states." Then he added:
That is not what we would have liked to see. It is a form of fragmentation which we would not have liked if we were able to avoid it. In
the light of the pressure being exerted on South Africa there is, however, no doubt that eventually this will have to be done, thereby buying for the white man his freedom and his right to retain domination
in what is his country .... If the Whites could have continued to
rule over everybody, with no danger to themselves, they would certainly have chosen to do so. However, we have to bear in mind the
new views in regard to human rights,. . . the power of the world and
world opinion and our desire to preserve ourselves. 7
The next step in the evolution of self-development and the appeasement of world opinion was the hurried granting of self-government to
Transkei in 19638 in order to provide evidence before the International
Court of Justice of the sincerity of South Africa's intentions under its
separate development program. In the proceedings before the Court in
1965 relating to the dispute over South West Africa, South Africa referred to the constitutional development of Transkei as evidence of its
intention to grant independence to the different ethnic groups in South
Africa.' In his testimony before the Court, Dr. Eiselen, one of the architects of the policy of separate development, cited as an example of the
government's homelands policy the "legislation... passed by Parliament
so that the Transkei is now an independent part of South Africa, still
belonging in certain ways to the Republic of South Africa but independent in most ways."10 Constitutionally, it was a gross exaggeration to describe the Transkei of 1965 as "independent in most ways," but this
statement illustrates quite clearly the purpose that Transkeian self-government was meant to serve.
The pace of separate development slowed down considerably in the
mid-1960's. This was probably due to the death of its creator, Dr. H.F.
Verwoerd, and to the technical victory achieved in the South West Africa
Cases, which removed the fear of an adverse judgment enforceable by the
Security Council of the United Nations.
In the late sixties and early seventies new international forces
prompted a further acceleration of self-government for "Bantu national
units." Protests against apartheid at the United Nations continued unabated, and the Security Council first exercised jurisdiction over South
West Africa in 1968, but the South African Government had now decided
to outmaneuver the United Nations by means of its "outward policy,"
which was primarily aimed at winning friends in Africa. While the stick

7. 107 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 4191-93, Apr. 10, 1961.
8. TRANSKM CONST. Act 48 of 1963.
9. Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 6.
10. 10 South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. Pleadings 103.
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of world opinion had been responsible for the initial move toward selfgovernment for black nations, it was the carrot of African support and
"dialogue" which led to an acceleration of this policy. South Africa
dropped its rigid refusal to discuss domestic policy and indicated that
dialogue with African leaders included discussion of South Africa's racial
policies. If such discussions were to be meaningful, however, it would become necessary for self-development to be presented in a more positive
manner."' The notion of self-government for Black nations was thus
revived.
The first step was the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970,1
which provided that every Black who was not a "citizen" of a self-governing territory would become a "citizen" of the territorial authority area
to which he was attached by birth, domicile, or cultural affiliation. Then,
in 1971, came the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act,"3 which empowered the government to grant constitutions substantially similar to that
conferred on the Transkei in 1963 to territorial authorities, after consultation with them. Although no provision was made for the granting of
independence to homelands in this 1971 Act, both its preamble and the
White Paper accompanying it affirmed the intention of the government to
lead the homelands to self-government and independence.
After 1971 the homelands advanced rapidly toward self-government:
by January 1977, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu,
Qwaqwa, and KwaZulu had become self-governing. Meanwhile, in 1974,
the Transkei indicated that it would opt for independence, and constitutional planning to that end was soon set in motion.
B. The Period 1976 to 1978
In 1976 Transkei was granted independence. Prior to the granting of
independence to Transkei it was generally believed that international recognition of the homelands was of fundamental importance to the South
African Government. Transkeian independence was primarily aimed at
the assuagement of world opinion. Recognition must, therefore, have constituted one of the main objectives of independence, in much the same
way as recognition is viewed as essential to the creation of an independent Namibia.
Although the General Assembly of the United Nations had already
called upon its members to refuse recognition to Transkei or to any other
homeland before 1976,'1 it seems that both Transkei and South Africa
believed that recognition would be forthcoming, at least from South Africa's Western friends. This is evidenced by the fact that the South Afri11. Barratt, South Africa's Outward Policy: From Isolation to Dialogue, reprinted in
SOUTH AFRICAN DIALOGUE 543, 559-61 (1972).
12. Act 26 of 1970, now termed the-Black States Citizenship Act.
13. Act 21 of 1971, now termed the Black States Constitution Act.
14. G.A. Res. 3151G, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 32, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A.
Res. 3411D, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 37, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
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can Department of Foreign Affairs set about training Transkeian diplomats for posts in the main Western countries before independence. To
many familiar with the international scene this appeared to be misplaced
optimism, but it was a gamble that might have succeeded had the new
state of Transkei been structured in such a manner that it would not look
like a means of achieving the ultimate goal of separate development: a
South Africa in which there are no black South Africans, but only black
"guest workers" linked through the bond of nationality to a number of
black mini-states carved out of the original boundaries of South Africa.
This is why the nationality issue assumed such important dimensions in
the pre-independence period. If Transkeian nationality had not been
compulsorily extended to all persons connected with Transkei, however
remotely, it might have been possible to view Transkeian independence
as a simple achievement of statehood. But once South Africa set the denationalization of all persons ethnically or culturally linked with Transkei
as the price for independence, the goal of recognition became impossible.
Transkei was not recognized by any state other than South Africa.
Moreover, both the General Assembly1" and the Security Council1 6 condemned Transkeian independence and called upon states not to recognize
Transkei. This was obviously a disappointment to the South African Government, but as a result of the experience, it appears to have dropped all
interest in recognition. Consequently, there was little talk of recognition
at the time of Bophuthatswana's independence in December 1977, and
the subject was not raised at all when Venda became independent in
1979. One must conclude, therefore, that while recognition remains a top
priority for Namibia, the South African Government has abandoned all
such hopes for its own homelands.
Despite the failure to secure international recognition of the homelands, support for this policy continued up to the end of the Vorster
Administration. Indeed, in the twilight months of this administration, the
most extreme formulation of the homelands policy was enunciated by Dr.
C.P. Mulder, in his capacity as Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. On February 7, 1978, Dr. Mulder stated in Parliament:
[I1f our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black
people are concerned, there will be not one black man with South
[E]very black man in South Africa will evenAfrican citizenship ....
tually be accommodated in some independent new state in this
honourable way and there will no longer be a moral obligation on this
Parliament to accommodate these people politically."
C.

Homelands Policy under Mr. P.W. Botha
It is difficult to describe the extent to which Mr. P.W. Botha remains

15. G.A. Res. 31/6A, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
16. S.C. Res. 402, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Dec. 1976) 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32
(1976).
17. 72 House of Assembly Debates, col. 579, Feb. 7, 1978.
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committed to the homelands policy of his predecessors. The following evidence suggests that the Vorster homelands policy still prevails.
1. A "Twelve-Point" policy plan, announced by Mr. Botha in 1979
and approved by National Party Provincial Congresses, appears to confirm the homelands policy, albeit in highly ambiguous language. Points
two and three of this plan affirm:
(2) The acceptance of vertical differentiation with the built-in principle of self-determination on as many levels as possible.
(3) The creation of constitutional structures for the black nations to
make possible the highest degree of self-government, within States
that have already been consolidated as far as is practicable. 8
That these points are in line with the policy of his predecessor was confirmed by Mr. Botha himself in Parliament on April 30, 1980.1"
2. The Status of Venda Act" conferred independence on Venda on
September 13, 1979 on the same terms as Transkei and Bophuthatswana.
From this it appears that the denationalization of all persons ethnically
or linguistically linked to a homeland still remains the price for
independence.
3. Dr. C.P. Mulder's statement of February 7, 1978 remains unaltered, despite many demands, particularly from black leaders, for its
repudiation. Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof, the Minister of Co-operation and Development and Dr. Mulder's successor, has on occasion expressed guarded
criticism of denationalization, but he has yet to repudiate Dr. Mulder's
statement. In any event, such rhetoric can hardly be taken seriously in
the light of the enactment of the Status of Venda Act, which confirms the
policy of denationalization on the ground of race. In passing, it might be
mentioned that in February 1979, Dr. Schalk van der Merwe, then Minister of Health, questioned the correctness of Dr. Mulder's statement when
he said, first, that he could not foresee the day when there would be no
black South Africans, and second, that no black man would be forced to
give up his citizenship.2 It would, however, be wrong to attach too much
significance to this statement as Dr. van der Merwe has not been closely
involved with black administration and cannot be said to have been pronouncing on government policy on the occasion in question.
4. The Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Constitution of 198022 and the legislation flowing from this report"' make no
provision for Black participation in the central political process of the

18. The "Twelve Points" are fully set out in House of Assembly Debates, cols.
3278-79, Mar. 21, 1980.
19. House of Assembly Debates, col. 5149, Apr. 30, 1980.
20. Act 107 of 1979.
21. 79 House of Assembly Debates, col. 972, Feb. 19, 1979.
22. Republic of South Africa Commission of Inquiry on the Constitution, Interim Report 6 (Chairman, Hon. A.L. Schlebusch, M.P.) (unpublished pamphlet).
23. Rm. S. AFR. CONST., 5th Amend., Act 101 of 1980.
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Republic. This legislation creates a nominated President's Council, with
advisory powers, whose membership is confined to Whites, Coloreds,
Asians, and Chinese. By implication, Blacks are still expected to exercise
their political rights only in independent or self-governing homelands.
At present there appears to be a lull in the implementation of the
homelands policy. This may be ascribed to a number of factors. First,
there is currently no self-governing homeland willing to opt for independence. Ciskei, which was widely believed to be the next in line for independence, appears to be reconsidering its position in the light of the
Quail Commission Report which labelled independence an "unattractive
option" unless a number of strict conditions are met. These included the
condition "that citizenship on satisfactory terms is negotiated which gives
non-resident Ciskeians the choice of either Ciskeian or South African status or both. '24 Second, aspirant independent homelands appear to have
been deterred from opting for independence by the failure of Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, and Venda to secure international recognition."5 Third,
the South African Government is awaiting the report of a commission of
inquiry on the consolidation of the homelands, under the chairmanship of
Mr. H.J.D. van der Walt, M.P., before pressing ahead with the creation of
new independent homelands. As the Prime Minister has indicated that
the government is prepared to consider a consolidation involving more
land than that set aside in the 1936 Land Act, this commission's report
may have far-reaching implications.2"
It is not impossible that the Botha Government is reconsidering the
homelands policy in the light of altered circumstances. Mr. Botha has
spoken repeatedly in the past months of a "constellation" of states for
southern Africa, but as yet he has declined to spell out the full implications of such an arrangement.27 Such a constellation or confederation of
states is, of course, compatible with a policy of acceleration of independence for self-governing territories. This was emphasized by Mr. van der
Walt, Chairman of the Consolidation Commission, in May 1980. Speaking
during the vote on the Department of Co-operation and Development, he
said:
The stated policy and priorities of the Government are to develop the
various national States into full-fledged States .... The National
Party has a specific policy, a policy which amounts to a division of
power ....
[W]e cannot share power in a unitary State in South
Africa. Therefore the National Party's policy of the division of power
gives rise to the Black national States.

24. CISKEI COMMISSION, THE QUAIL REPORT 127 (1980). But see Postscript to this article, page 36 infra.
25. Id. at 120-23.
26. 33 SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA 302 (1979).
27. For a general discussion of this proposal, see THE CONSTELLATION OF STATES
Bretenbach ed. 1980).
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The effect of the National Party's policy . . . will require a further thorough investigation into the confederal approaches in order to
achieve what we would like to achieve. We shall have to determine
what that would involve for us. If that is indeed our policy, the system
of a constellation of States on a confederal basis could only develop to
its full potential if we were dealing with independent States in which
everyone sharing in that option is equal.18
This statement must, however, be compared with statements by Mr. P.W.
Botha himself suggesting that the government might be prepared to accept a confederation comprising independent homelands and a South Africa which would include non-independent homelands.2 This suggests
that some form of participation may yet be envisaged for Blacks attached
to non-independent homelands in the South African political system itself, a possibility that derives some support from the recent recognition
on the part of the government of the permanency of the urban black community in the Republic.
The above examination of the present situation shows that it is at
least possible that the Botha Government is not irrevocably committed to
the pursuit of the Verwoerd/Vorster homelands ideology envisaging a
South Africa in which there are no black nationals with claims to participation in the Republic's political system. On the other hand, the homelands legislative structure, which has been augmented since 1978, continues to show support for this ideology. In these circumstances the outside
observer can only conclude that Dr. C.P. Mulder's statement of February
7, 1978 continues to reflect long-term National Party policy.

II.

HOMELANDS INDEPENDENCE

To date three homelands have become independent: Transkei (1976),
Bophuthatswana (1977), and Venda (1979). In all three instances the
30
same procedure has been followed for the granting of independence.
The South African Parliament passed a statute providing for the independence of the territory with effect from the day of independence; and
the legislative assembly of the territory itself enacted a constitution
which became effective on the date of independence. The three independence-conferring statutes were substantially similar in content, but the
constitutions adopted by the new states varied in form and substance.
A. Independence-ConferringStatutes
The standard form of independence-conferring statute is the concise
Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976, which served as a model for subse28. House of Assembly Debates, cols. 5737-38, May 7, 1980.
29. House of Assembly Debates, col. 250, Feb. 6, 1980; House of Assembly
Debates, cols. 5162-63, Apr. 30, 1980 (Mr. P.W. Botha); House of Assembly Debates,
cols. 577-78, May 7, 1980 (Dr. P.G.J. Koornhof).
30. For a discussion of this subject, see Dugard, Transkei Becomes Independent, 30
ANNUAL

SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW, 26 (1976); Booysen, Wiechers, van Wyk, &

Bretenbach, Comments on the Independence and Constitution of Transkei, [19761 S. AFR.
Y.B.

INT'L L.
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quent grants of independence to Bophuthatswana and Venda. It provided, inter alia:
1. Transkei is 'hereby declared to be a sovereign independent
State and shall cease to be part of the Republic of South Africa' (section 1);
2. Any law in force in Transkei prior to independence shall continue in force in Transkei until repealed or amended by the competent authority in Transkei (section 2);
3. All treaties binding on the Republic prior to independence of
Transkei and capable of being applied to Transkei shall be binding on
Transkei, but the Government of Transkei may denounce any such
treaty (section 4);S1

4. All agreements entered into between the Government of the
Republic and the Government of Transkei before independence shall
remain in force as international treaties (section 5);
5. Every person falling into certain defined categories shall be a
citizen of Transkei and shall cease to be a South African citizen (section 6).3'
B.

Homelands Constitutions

The Transkei Constitution"8 is modelled substantially on that of
South Africa. The President of Transkei has powers similar to those of
the State President of South Africa and is advised by an Executive Council composed of Ministers of State. He is not therefore an Executive President de jure, but since Chief Kaiser Matanzima became President of
Transkei in 1979 it appears that he has played an important de facto
political role which goes beyond that contemplated by the Constitution.
The Parliament of Transkei, which is declared to be a sovereign legislature, consists of the President and a single house designated as the National Assembly. The Assembly has 150 members, comprising 75 chiefs
and 75 elected members.
The Republic of Bopthuthatswana Constitution Act" differs substantially from that of Transkei. The Head of State is the President, who is
also executive head of the government. The legislature-the National
Assembly-comprises forty-eight nominated members, forty-eight elected
members, and three members designated by the President who must be
persons with special knowledge or experience, but need not be citizens of
Bophuthatswana. Significantly, the constitution contains a bill of rights
modeled on the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees equality before the law and the most fundamental human freedoms.

31. For additional treatment of the subject of succession to treaties, see Dugard,
Matters Affecting Succession, 30 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRIcAN LAw 26 (1976).
32. This citizenship provision is fully examined in section III infra.
33. REP. TRANsKE CONsT. AcT OF 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1136 (1976).
The Constitution is closely examined by Booysen et al., note 30 supra.
34. See Wiechers & van Wyk, The Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution, [19771
S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 85.
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The Republic of Venda Constitution Act"8 provides for an Executive
President and a National Assembly, the latter which is to constitute the
"sovereign legislative authority." The National Assembly is to comprise
forty-two nominated members (chiefs and designated members), fortytwo elected members, and three members nominated by the President by
reason of their special knowledge or experience. Like the Transkei Constitution, this constitution contains no bill of rights.
C. Treaties
South Africa entered into a number of agreements with each homeland prior to its independence. Broadly, these agreements" deal with
matters affecting agriculture, forestry, economic and industrial development, the accession of officials, the employment of the new ,state's citizens
in the Republic and vice versa, educational aid, defense, the supply of
electricity, health services, travel documents and ports of entry, mining
rights, postal and telecommunication services, welfare institutions, public
roads, transportation, air services, and railways. The non-aggression pacts
concluded with each independent homeland are of special interest. In
these agreements, the parties renounce the use of force in their relations
with each other and agree that neither party shall allow its territory to be
used as a base by any state, government, organization, or person for military, subversive, or other hostile actions against the other party. Extradition agreements have also been entered into between South Africa and
each independent homeland.8 7 These agreements follow the normal pattern and exclude the extradition of political offenders.
III. HOMELANDS AND CITIZENSHIP
A. Citizenship and Nationality
There is much confusion in South Africa today over the policies of
the South African Government with respect to citizenship. In part this
confusion results from the failure of legislation to draw a distinction between "nationality" and "citizenship." Neither the South African Citizenship Act 44 of 1949, nor the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970,
which together constitute the governing "citizenship law," draws any such
distinction, and both use the term "citizenship" where "nationality"
would be more correct.

35. The text is reprinted in CONSTrrTIONS OF DEPENDENCIES
TIES (A. Blaustein & E. Blaustein eds. 1977).

AND SPECIAL SOVEREIGN-

36. The agreements with Transkei are published in Government Notice 1976, Government Gazette 5320, Oct. 22, 1976 (Regulation Gazette 2384); Government Notice 2496, Government Gazette 5823, Dec. 6, 1977 (Regulation Gazette 2569); Government Notice 2014,
Government Gazette 6652, Sept. 12, 1979 (Regulation Gazette 2861).
37. Transkei: Proclamation R329, Government Gazette 5813, Nov. 25, 1977 (Regulation
Gazette 2565); Bophuthatswana Proclamation R375, Government Gazette 5846, Dec. 30,
1977 (Regulation Gazette 2582); Venda: Proclamation R210, Government Gazette 6652,
Sept. 12, 1979 (Regulation Gazette 2861).
38. For further views on this subject, see Barrie, A Legal View of Transkeian Recognition and So-called Statelessness, 33 POLrTKON 1 (1976); Dean, A Citizen of Transkei, 11
COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFa. 57 (1978); Heyne, A Transkeian Citizen of South African Na-
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Nationalitysa is essentially a term of international law and denotes
that there is a legal connection between the individual and the state. In
practice this means that a South African national may travel on a South
African passport and is entitled to protection by the South African Government if he is injured in another country. Citizenship, on the other
hand, is a term best used to describe the status of an individual who enjoys civil and political rights in a particular state.40 In South Africa,
Blacks are not really citizens since they do not exercise full civil and political rights in the central political process. In order to overcome this
injustice, the South African Government has resorted to the device of giving Blacks citizenship, that is, political rights, in the homelands.
The present situation can be summarized in the following way: all
white, colored, and Indian South Africans are South African nationals.
Similarly, all black South Africans who are not ethnically connected with
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, or Venda are South African nationals. Within
South Africa there are, however, different types of citizens: those who
exercise political rights in the central political process (Whites); those
whom the government plans to incorporate into the central political process (Coloreds and Indians); and those who have political rights in the
non-independent homelands (Blacks). From this it will be seen that nationality is a wider concept than citizenship. All South Africans are South
African nationals, but Blacks and Whites enjoy different citizenship
rights.
When a homeland becomes independent the persons connected with
it become nationals of the new state. This is in essence what happened
when Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda became independent. All
persons who had previously been "citizens" of these homelands, or who
were ethnically or linguistically connected with them, however remotely,
ceased to be South African nationals. By losing their nationality in this
way Blacks connected with Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda not
only lost their right to exercise the privileges of South African nationality
(such as diplomatic protection and passports), but in addition they lost
all claim to participate in the central political process in South Africa as

tionality, 26 TYDSKRIF viR HEDENDAAGSE RoMEINS-HOLLANDsE REG. 44 (1963); Norman, note
2 supra; Olivier, Bophuthatswana Nationality, [1977] S. APR. Y.B. INT'L L. 108; Olivier,
Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality, [1976] id. at 143; Venter, Bantoe Burgerskap en
Tuisland Burgerskap, 38 TYvSKRIF viR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINs-HOLLANDSE REG. 239 (1975).
39. For a clear analysis of the distinction between nationality and citizenship, see
Koessler, "Subject," "Citizen," "National," and "Permanent Allegiance," 56 YALE L.J. 58
(1946). See also P. Wis, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2d ed.
1979).
40. According to Koessler:
'Citizenship' in modern usage is not a synonym of nationality or a term generally used for the status of belonging to a state, but means specifically the possession by the person under consideration, of the highest or at least of a certain
higher category of political rights and (or) duties, established by the nation's or
state's constitution.
Koessler, supra note 39, at 63.
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full South African citizens at some future date. The main objection to
denationalization of the kind that occurred when Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda became independent is thus that Blacks become foreigners in South Africa with as little claim to participation in the political
process in South Africa as visiting Germans or Malawians. This objection
to homelands independence was eloquently stated by Bishop Desmond
Tutu shortly before Transkei became independent:
Overnight they will become foreigners in what for many of them has
been the land of their birth and be forced to adopt the citizenship of a
country that many do not know at all and in whose creation they have
played no part at all. They have contributed in their various ways to
the prosperity of this beloved South Africa and now it4 seems at the
stroke of a pen they will forfeit a cherished birthright.
An emotional argument, perhaps. But it captures the real mood of Blacks
toward independence and it is one that unites both urban and homeland
Blacks in their opposition to the National Party Government.
Government policy toward Coloreds, Indians, and Blacks in South
Africa appears to be as follows. Coloreds and Indians will be accomodated
in some new political dispensation which will give the appearance of po-

litical participation. Thus they will become full nationals and citizens.
Blacks, on the other hand, cannot be given political rights in South Africa
so they cannot become full citizens of South Africa. Consequently, they
must be forced to become nationals, with full citizenship rights, of some
new state. In the fullness of time, if government policy succeeds, all
homelands will become independent and there will no longer be any black
nationals in South Africa with claims to political rights. Blacks, particularly urban Blacks, will thus occupy the same position politically as, for
example, British nationals in South Africa who retain their British nationality and therefore cannot vote in South Africa."' This will allow the
South African Government to argue that there are no black South Africans, that all Blacks in South Africa are foreigners in much the same way
as there are foreign migrant workers from Turkey in Germany and from
Algeria in France. This will be the argument used to counter hostile attacks from the international community over the denial of political rights
to Blacks in South Africa.
B. Citizenship and the Independence-ConferringStatutes
All three independence-conferring statutes contain a provision (section 6) which reads as follows:
41. Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), May 1, 1976, at 6.
42. A denationalized black South African is in fact worse off than a British national.
While the latter may become a South African national by Naturalization, the former will
not be able to do so, since only a person who "is likely to become readily assimilated with
the European inhabitants of the Republic" is eligible for citizenship by naturalization. Sec.
4(c)(b) of the Aliens Act 1 of 1937, read with sec. 10(1)(c) of the South African Citizenship
Act 44 of 1949. See van Wyk, The Ebb and Flow of South African Citizenship, [1978] S.
AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 148.
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Every person falling in any of the categories of persons defined in
Schedule B shall be a citizen of the Transkei [Bophuthatswana,
Venda] and shall cease to be a South African citizen....
No citizen of the Transkei [Bophuthatswana, Venda] resident in the
Republic at the commencement at this Act shall, except as regards
citizenship, forfeit any existing rights, privileges or benefits by reason
only of the other provisions of this Act.
Schedule B varies according to the ethnic composition of each homeland.
Schedule B of the Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976 provides:
Categories of persons who in terms of section 6 are citizens of the
Transkei and cease to be South African citizens:
(a) every person who was a citizen of the Transkei in terms of any
law at the commencement of this Act;
(b) every person born in the Transkei of parents one or both of
whom were citizens of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(c) every person born outside the Transkei whose father was a citizen of the Transkei at the time of his birth;
(d) every person born out of wedlock (according to custom or otherwise) and outside the Transkei whose mother was a citizen of the
Transkei at the time of his birth;
(e) every person who has been lawfully domiciled in the Transkei for
a period of at least five years, irrespective of whether or not such period includes any period prior to the commencement of this Act, and,
on application in the prescribed manner, has been granted citizenship
of the Transkei by the competent authority in the Transkei;
(f) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa, is not a citizen of Transkei in
terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), and speaks a language used
by the Xhosa or Sotho speaking section of the population of the
Transkei, including any dialect of any such language;
(g) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa, and is not a citizen of the Transkei in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), and who is related
to any member of the population contemplated in paragraph (f) or
has identified himself with any part of such population or is culturally
or otherwise associated with any member of part of such population.

Schedule B of the Status of Venda Act 107 of 1979, which is substantially similar to that of Bophuthatswana, provides:
Categories of persons who in terms of section 6 are citizens of Venda
and cease to be South African citizens:
(a) every person who was a citizen of Venda in terms of any law at
the commencement of this Act;
(b) every person born in or outside Venda, either before or after the
commencement of this Act, of parents one or both of whom were citizens of Venda at the time of his birth, who is not a citizen of a territory within the Republic of South Africa and is not a citizen of Venda
in terms of paragraph (a);
(c) every person who has been lawfully domiciled in Venda for a period of at least five years, irrespective of whether or not such period
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includes any period prior to the commencement of this Act, and, on
application in the prescribed manner, has been granted citizenship of
Venda by the competent authority in Venda;
(d) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa, is not a citizen of Venda in terms
of paragraph (a), (b) or (c) and speaks a language used by members of
any tribe which forms part of the population of Venda, including any
dialect of any such language;
(e) every South African citizen who is not a citizen of a territory
within the Republic of South Africa and is not a citizen of Venda in
terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) and who is related to any member of the population contemplated in paragraph (d) or has identified
himself with any part of such population or is culturally or otherwise
associated with any member of such population.
Paragraph (a) in these schedules requires a special explanation. Prior
to Transkeian independence "every Xhosa-speaking Bantu person in the
Republic" not belonging to another homeland (for example, Ciskei) was a
"citizen" of Transkei in terms of section 7 of the Transkei Constitution
Act 48 of 1963. Similarly, before Venda and Bophuthatswana became independent, every person connected with the homeland in question by language, culture, or race became a "citizen" of that homeland in terms of
section 3 of the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970. Consequently,
prior to independence all persons linguistically or culturally connected
43
with the homeland were already citizens of the territory but nationals
of South Africa. On independence such persons became both citizens and
nationals of the homeland and ceased to be South African nationals.
The independence-conferring statutes carefully refrain from depriving persons of South African nationality on grounds of race. Instead they
4
prescribe language and culture as the criteria for denationalization."
There can, however, be no doubt that in practice they are intended to
apply to Blacks only as this accords with declared government policy.
Certainly there is no known instance in which a white, colored, or Asian
person connected with Transkei, Bophuthatswana, or Venda has been deprived of his nationality since the conferment of independence on these
states.
The Status of Bophuthatswana Act differs from the other two independence-conferring statutes in that it provides that a citizen of
Bophuthatswana may renounce his citizenship after independence on

43. This is made clear by section 3(4) of the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970,
which reads in pertinent part:
A citizen of a territorial authority area [homeland] shall not be regarded as an
alien in the Republic and shall, by virtue of his citizenship of a territory forming part of the Republic, remain for all purposes a citizen of the Republic and
shall be accorded full protection according to international law by the
Republic.
44. Olivier, Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality, supra note 38, at 152-54, emphasizes this point, but takes no account of the practical implementation of these statutes.
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conditions agreed upon between the governments of South Africa and
Bophuthatswana."' This measure, envisaging a reversion to South African
nationality, has been rendered largely unnecessary by a 1978 amendment
to the Black States Citizenship Act which allows a national of an independent homeland to recover his South African nationality by becoming a
citizen of a non-independent homeland." Reversion to South African nationality in such a case is, however, contemplated only as a temporary
measure which will continue until the homeland whose citizenship he has
acquired itself becomes independent. 7 By December 31, 1979, 1,474 persons had regained their South African nationality in this way.4 s
C. Denationalizationon the Ground of Race as a Violation of International Law
Although traditional international law regards both the conferment
of nationality and the withdrawal of nationality as falling within a state's
domestic domain, in recent times it has been authoritatively argued that

"denationalization measures based on racial, ethnic, religious, or other re4
lated grounds are impermissible under contemporary international law." '
This view is disputed by some South African writers.5 0 Nevertheless it is
a widely accepted emerging norm or customary rule which derives support from:
1. the widespread opposition to the 1941 Nazi decree which denationalized German Jews; 61
2. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 which
declares that 'no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality';
3. Article 5(d)(iii) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,' 8 in which states undertake to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race,
equality before the law, 'notably in enjoyment of the right to nationality'; and
4
4. Article 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
which provides that a 'Contracting State may not deprive any person
or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or
45. Sec. 6(3), Status of Bophuthatswana Act 89 of 1977.
46. Sec. 1 of the Black States Citizenship Amendment Act 13 of 1978, amending sec. 3
of the Black States Citizenship Act 26 of 1970.
47. 72 House of Assembly Debates, cots. 558, 560, 579, Feb. 7, 1978.
48. - House of Assembly Debates, Questions, col. 327, Mar. 10, 1980.
49. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: the Protection of
the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L.J. 900, 958 (1974). See also P. WEis, supra
note 39, at 123, 125, 126.
50. Barrie, supra note 38, at 34; Olivier, Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality,
supra note 38, at 147, 154.
51. Mann, The Present Validity of Nazi Nationality Laws, 89 L.Q. Rzv. 194, 199-200
(1973).
52. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
53. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 352 (1966).
54. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 29, 1961, art. 9, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 9/15 (1961). This convention has not entered into force.
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political grounds.'

As shown above, none of the independence-conferring statutes expressly provides for denationalization on the ground of race, but by implication they are designed to apply to Blacks only. And this is borne out by
their implementation in practice. Consequently, it is highly arguable that
the compulsory denationalization of some seven million persons" connected with Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda by the South African
legislature violates international law. Certainly this factor contributed to
the non-recognition of the homelands in question as independent states.
D. Homelands Independence and Statelessness
That contemporary international law disapproves of statelessness if
shown by attempts to prevent it through multilateral conventions. Most
important is the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness," which
was opened for signature in 1961 but has not yet come into force. Other
treaties are the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,"
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 6 and the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.69 South Africa is not a party to any of
the above conventions save for the Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons."
As far as the South African Government is concerned, statelessness
does not occur as a result of denationalization caused by homelands independence. This argument is premised on the fact that the independenceconferring statutes all confer the nationality of the newly independent
state upon persons deprived of their South African nationality." The
South African Government might even argue that in granting independence it has complied with the spirit of Article 10 of the Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness, which provides:
(1) Every treaty between contracting states providing for the transfer of territory shall include provisions designed to secure that no person shall become stateless as a result of the transfer ....
(2) In the absence of such provisions the contracting state to which
territory is transferred or which otherwise acquires territory shall confer its nationality on such persons as would otherwise become stateless as a result of the transfer or acquisition.
55. The 1978 population estimates for the three territories were: Transkei, 4,142,800;
Bophuthatswana, 2,219,600; and Venda, 473,200. 33 SURVEY OF RACE RRLATIONS IN SOUTH

71 (1979).
56. Note 54 supra.
57. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S.
117. This convention came into force in June 1960.
58. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
This convention came into force in April 1954.
59. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
60. Van Wyk, The South African Passport,[1976] S. AFR. Y.B. Iwr'L L. 212, 221.
61. See Olivier, Statelessness and Transkeian Nationality, supra note 38, at 154.
AFRICA
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Two arguments may, however, be raised in support of the view that
homelands independence results in statelessness. First, it may be argued
that a black person who has never lived in the independent homeland
lacks the necessary "genuine link" or "social fact of attachment" prescribed as a requirement for the bond of nationality by the International
Court of Justice in the Nottebohm case.6 2 Such a person would not become a national of the newly independent state, but would nevertheless
cease to be a South African national. Under international law he would
therefore be stateless. Second, independent homelands are inevitably
doomed to non-recognition. Consequently, third states will not recognize
their competence to protect their "nationals" abroad, as their very existence is denied. At the same time, South Africa is unlikely to exercise any
diplomatic protection over them. Thus for practical purposes, nationals of
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda are stateless. They are no longer
South African nationals and their own states are unrecognized. By promoting such a situation, in the knowledge that independence will not be
accompanied by recognition, it may be argued that the South African
Government is creating a large-scale situation of statelessness.
E. Privileges Retained by Denationalized Persons with Special Reference to "Section 10 Rights"
All three independence-conferring statutes provide in section 6 that
no citizen of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, or Venda, resident in the
Republic of South Africa at the time of independence, "shall, except as
regards citizenship, forfeit any existing rights, privileges or benefits."
This provision is generally viewed as preserving the so-called section
10 rights of denationalized Blacks. Section 10(1) of the Blacks (Urban
Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945'3 prohibits every Black from being in
any prescribed urban area for more than seventy-two hours unless:
(a) he has resided in that area continuously since birth; or
(b) he has worked continuously in that area for the same employer
for ten years; or he has lawfully resided continuously in that area for
at least fifteen years; or
(c) the Black is the wife, unmarried daughter or minor son of a male
falling under (a) or (b); or
(d) permission has been granted for him to be in the area by a labour bureau.
As employment opportunities outside the cities are limited, those Blacks
who qualify to remain permanently in an urban area in terms of section
10(1)(a), (b), or (c) constitute a privileged class. These rights are becoming even more precious as government policy makes its increasingly diffi-

62. (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.C.J. 4, 23. Weis states: "The tendency to assimilate de facto stateless persons . . . to de jure stateless persons, is further evidence of
the importance of the question whether the nationality which an individual possesses in law
is effective." P. Wzis, supra note 39, at 202.
63. Act 25 of 1945, as amended. Section 10 in its present form was first inserted in
1952.
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cult for rural Blacks to acquire section 10(1) rights. This is because rural
Blacks are generally admitted to urban areas by labor bureaus under section 10(1)(d) for one-year contract periods only and, although this contract period may be renewed, the technical interruption in employment
prevents a rural Black from acquiring rights under section 10(1)(b)." Section 10(1) is not constitutionally guaranteed, but it has acquired a special
status in the black community as it offers a semblance of security in an
insecure world. Hence the saving provision in section 6 of the independence-conferring statutes is of great importance.
Although section 6 does preserve the "section 10 rights" of Transkeians, Bophuthatswanans, and Vendans who were alive at the time of
independence, it does not extend its protection to the children of such
persons born in South Africa after independence. This is the result of a
1978 amendment" to the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act which
places the children of denationalized persons in the position of foreigners
in respect of their right to remain in urban areas. This enactment seriously undermines recent initiatives of the government to give greater security to urban Blacks.
In 1978 the government, which has vigorously opposed the granting
of freehold rights to Blacks in urban areas, introduced a major concession: home ownership on a ninety-nine year leasehold basis. According to
this scheme, Blacks who qualify to remain in urban areas in terms of section 10(1)(a) or (b) may obtain ninety-nine year leasehold rights to property in such areas. 6 This plan is designed to afford permanency of residence to black urban dwellers, but it has been seriously undermined by
the fact that the children of denationalized Blacks will apparently not be
able to take advantage of the lease. e7 As the veteran civil rights parliamentarian, Mrs. Helen Suzman, M.P., stated when this matter was debated in Parliament: "The child born after independence .. .is not a
South African citizen and therefore cannot enter or be in a prescribed
area. How can that person then acquire rights of leasehold when. . . that
person may not even be in the area?"" Government spokesmen insist
that it is not the intention of the government to deny leasehold rights to

64. Proclamation 74, Government Gazette 2029, Mar. 29, 1968 (Regulation 13(d)).
65. Sec. 2 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 12 of 1978 amending sec. 12 of Act 25 of
1945. For a discussion of the implications of this measure, see 72 House of Assembly
Debates, cols. 470, 519, 629, 639, 648, Feb. 6-8, 1978.
66. Sec. 6A of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, as introduced by
sec. 2 of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 97 of 1978. For further material on this
subject, see 32 SURVEY OF RAcE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRiCA 325 (1978).
67. Section 1 of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, as amended by
section 1(d) of the Blacks (Urban Areas) Amendment Act 97 of 1978, provides that a qualified person in relation to a right of leasehold means a black person qualified to remain in an
urban area in terms of section 10(1)(a) or (b) of Act 25 of 1945. As descendants of denationalized Blacks do not acquire section 10(1)(a) or (b) rights in terms of section 12(1) of Act 25
of 1945 it follows logically that they do not qualify for 99-year leasehold rights.
68. 74 House of Assembly Debates, col. 9252, June 13, 1978.
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the descendants of denationalized persons, 69 but they have consistently
refused to bring the law into line with declared intent."0 This problem
illustrates the dilemma posed by denationalization to "progressive" Nationalists determined to advance the position of urban Blacks. All reforms
aimed at improving the quality of life of urban Blacks relate to the granting of greater security of residence, yet at the same time these proposed
reforms are undermined by denationalization which inevitably promotes
the maximum degree of insecurity.
To date, the section providing for the non-forfeiture of "existing
rights, privileges or benefits" has come before the Supreme Court in only
one instance and was on this occasion interpreted generously. In Ex Parte
Moseneke, the Transvaal Provincial Division held that the bar to the
admission of aliens or persons not lawfully admitted to the Republic for
permanent residence to practice as attorneys in the Republic did not apply to a national of Bophuthatswana resident in Pretoria, as he did not
forfeit any existing rights, other than citizenship, when he was deprived
of his South African citizenship.
F. Privileges Acquired by DenationalizedPersons
Under international law a state is required to accord a certain minimum standard of treatment to aliens admitted to its territory. This
means that where a state has a low standard of justice towards its own
nationals, an alien's position is a privileged one.72 This "minimum standard of civilization '"7 is not an exacting one and has been described as
simply "the standard of the 'reasonable state,' reasonable, that is to say,
according to the notions that are accepted in our modern civilization. ' "'
Although the precise limits of this standard are not clear, it is accepted
that a state violates its international obligations, and thus incurs responsibility to the state of which the alien is a national, when it denies an
alien basic human rights on the ground of his race.75
While the "minimum standard of treatment" is scrupulously observed by the South African Government in the case of aliens from most
states, it is certainly not respected in the case of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda - and possibly Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.
The reasons for this are twofold.
First, most of South Africa's discriminatory laws apply to Blacks per
se and not to Blacks as South African nationals. In terms of the Population Registration Act, which governs race classification in South Africa, a
"black person" (previously "Bantu") is defined as a "person who is, or is
generally accepted as, a member of any aboriginal race or tribe of Af-

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. col. 9234 (Dr. C.P. Mulder); The Star (Johannesburg), Mar. 2, 1979, at 3.
74 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 9251, 9261, June 13, 1978.
4 S. APR. L. REP. 884 (1979).
J. BRixRLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 278 (6th ed. H. Waldock 1963).
L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
J. BRizRLY, supra note 72, at 279-80.
8 DIGESr OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 376 (M. Whiteman ed. 1967).

1980

DENATIONALIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

rica. "7' This definition is referred to in a number of discriminatory statutes. Other statutes contain their own definitions of "Black" but follow
the formula employed by the Population Registration Act. Thus most discriminatory laws apply not to black South African citizens but to any
persons who are members of any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa. The
following statutes, for example, affect black aliens as well as South African Blacks: the Blacks (Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 7 which obliges Blacks to carry identity documents (passes)
which must be produced on demand by a policeman; the Blacks (Urban
Areas) Consolidation Act,7 8 which regulates the residence rights of Blacks
in urban areas; the Education and Training Act, 7 9 which provides for separate schools for Blacks; and the Black (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act,80
which deprives Blacks of the right to obtain court interdicts pending a
determination of their legal rights affecting residence.
It is possible, however, that Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda
waived the protection against discriminatory treatment afforded by the
international minimum standard in their pre-independence agreements
with South Africa. In the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of Transkei relating to the
Employment of Citizens of Transkei in the Republic of South Africa, it is
agreed in Article 1 that:
No citizen of Transkei engaged in Transkei for employment in the
Republic of South Africa shall enter the Republic of South Africa for
the purpose of taking up employment unless
(a) he complies with the laws and regulations relating to the admission to, residence in, and departure from the Republic of South
Africa ....81
e
s2
Similar agreements apply in respect of Bophuthatswana and Venda.0
Another accord, the Agreement between the Government of the Republic
of South Africa and the Government of Transkei relating to the Movement of Citizens of Transkei and of the Republic of South Africa across
the Common Borders, provides in Article 1: "The movement to and the
sojourn in the Republic of South Africa of citizens of Transkei. . .shall
be governed by the laws and regulations governing the admission to, resi-

76. Act 30 of 1950, sec. 1. For a full description of the system of race classification in
South Africa, see J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGWs AND THE SouTH AFRIcAN LEGAL ORDER 59-63
(1978).

77. Act 67 of 1952, §§ 1, 3(1)(b)(ii), 13, 15.
78. Act 25 of 1945, §§ 1, 10, 12.
79. Act 90 of 1979.
80. Act 64 of 1956.
81. GN 1976, Government Gazette No. 5320, Oct. 22, 1976, at 16 (Regulation Gazette
2384). Emphasis added.
82. GN R2496, Government Gazette No. 5823, Dec. 6, 1977, at 22 (Regulation Gazette
2569).
83. GN R2014, Government Gazette No. 6652, Sept. 12, 1979, at 142 (Regulation
Gazette 2861).
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dence in and departure from the country .. "84 There are corresponding provisions in the agreements with Bophuthatswana"' and Venda. 8
These agreements are apparently intended to deal only with migrant
laborers in, and visitors to, the Republic of South Africa from Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, and Venda, but they are so widely phrased that it may
be contended that they constitute an agreement between South Africa
and her independent homelands to subject all the latters' nationals to
South Africa's discriminatory laws.
The second reason for noncompliance with the international minimum standard probably is that the new black states in southern Africa
lack the political power to insist on compliance with the standard by the
South African authorities. In order to appreciate this, one has only to
compare and contrast the treatment of American Blacks visiting South
Africa with that of Transkei Blacks in the Republic. In this respect it
should be recalled that the failure of the South African Government to
accord the minimum standard of treatment to Transkeian nationals contributed to Transkei's decision to break off diplomatic relations with
South Africa in 1978.87 More recently, Prime Minister George Matanzima
appealed to the South African Government to show the world that it recognized Transkei's sovereignty by treating Transkei nationals in the same
way as it treats other foreigners." South Africa and Transkei resumed
diplomatic relations in 1980.
It might be argued that nationals of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and
Venda are placed in a privileged position vis-&-vis other aliens in South
Africa by reason of the fact that they retain all their "rights, privileges or
benefits" that existed at the time of independence in terms of the independence-conferring statutes. This is an untenable argument, as the
rights, privileges and benefits that accrue to black South Africans fall
short of the international minimum standard of treatment by virtue of
their discriminatory nature. In any event, as shown above, there is so
much uncertainty as to the scope and duration of these "existing rights,
privileges or benefits" that urban Blacks can hardly draw much comfort
from them. The meagre scope of the "preferential treatment" accorded to
citizens of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda is apparent from the
statement made in 1978 by Dr. C.P. Mulder (then Minister of Bantu Administration and Development) to the effect that such persons enjoyed
"preferential treatment over foreign Blacks as to employment opportunities, extended right of entry, viz 14 days instead of 72 hours, admission to

84. GN 1976, Government Gazette No. 5320, Oct. 22, 1976, at 58 (Regulation Gazette
2384). Emphasis added.
85. GN R2496, Government Gazette No. 5823, Dec. 6, 1977, at 78-79 (Regulation
Gazette 2569).
86. GN R2014, Government Gazette No. 6652, Sept. 12, 1979, at 17 (Regulation Gazette
2861).
87. 12 S. AmR. REcoRD 34 (1978).
88. The Star (Johannesburg), Mar. 22, 1979, at 4.
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RSA through any place of entry while foreigners have to enter at specific
points which are manned by officials of the Department of the Interior,
etc."8 9 Such "preferential treatment" makes no attempt to exempt black
aliens from discriminatory and repressive laws and thus fails to meet the
requirements of the international minimum standard.
One must, therefore, conclude that denationalized Blacks from
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda are not accorded the minimum
standard of treatment required by international law. Consequently, they
get the worst of both worlds: loss of their "birthright" to participate in
the government and power processes of South Africa at some future date,
and denial of the standards of fair treatment which normally accrue to
aliens.
G.

Deportationof Aliens

A number of statutes confer wide powers of deportation of aliens
upon the South African Government. These powers may be, and indeed
already have been, used in order to remove political opponents who have
been denationalized as a result of homelands independence. The two
main statutory provisions which permit action of this kind are the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act and the Internal Security
Act.
Section 45 of the Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation
Act empowers the Minister of the Interior "if he considers it to be in the
public interest" to order the removal from the Republic of "any person
who is not a South African citizen."" The decision of the Minister as to
whether such removal is or is not in the public interest "shall not be subject to appeal or to review by any court of law and no person shall be
furnished with' any reasons for such decision." This provision has already
been invoked against a denationalized urban dweller from Transkei. In
August 1978 Mr. Pindile Mfeti, a trade unionist from Germinston who
had previously been detained without trial under the security laws for 366
days, was deported to Transkei "in the public interest."' 1
Section 14 of the Internal Security Act" permits the deportation of a
non-South African citizen who is convicted of certain offenses under this
act or who is deemed by the state president to be an undesirable inhabitant "because he is a communist." No prior notice to the person concerned is required in the latter case. To date there is no record of this act
having been invoked against denationalized persons. Although little use
has been made of the deportation weapon in respect of denationalized
Blacks, it remains a constant threat to the security of those denationalized urban Blacks who actively oppose the South African Government.

89.
90.
91.
92.

72 House of Assembly Debates, col. 542, Feb. 7, 1978.
Act 59 of 1972. Emphasis added.
The Star (Johannesburg), Aug. 2, 1978, at 5.
Act 44 of 1950 (formerly called the Suppression of Communism Act).
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H.

Dual Nationality
International law accepts the notion of dual nationality, according to
which an individual may possess the nationality of more than one state."
If the South African Government had applied this principle to homelands
independence and allowed persons connected with Transkei to retain
their South African nationality while at the same time becoming nationals of Transkei, it would have avoided much hostile criticism. "4 On the
other hand, that course would not have furthered the ultimate goal of a
South Africa with no black South African nationals. Hence such a solution was rejected.
More recently, there have been developments in several quarters
which suggest that the possibility of dual nationality has not been completely discarded. The initial impetus for this revival of interest in dual
nationality came from the report of the Quail Commission of Inquiry into
the future of the non-independent homeland of Ciskei. This report recommended that Ciskei should opt for independence only if "citizenship
on satisfactory terms is negotiated which gives non-resident Ciskeians the
choice of either Ciskeian or South African status or both."' "
The idea of a constellation or confederation of states for southern
Africa," which has figured prominently in the speeches of Prime Minister
Botha during the past year, carries with it implications for nationality.'
It has been suggested" that the government is considering a confederal
South African or southern African nationality in addition to homelands
nationality as a solution to the problem of denationalization which has
created so much bitterness among Blacks. Presumably some form of dual
nationality is contemplated in such a case, in terms of which Blacks from
independent homelands will retain their South African nationality or acquire the nationality of a Confederation of Southern Africa, while at the
same time becoming nationals with full citizenship rights of the independent homeland. This would be a recognizable form of dual nationality
and might be acceptable to Blacks-provided that it is not presented as a
final exclusion of Blacks from the South African body politic but rather
as a method for maintaining the link between such persons and South
Africa itself while a more viable political solution is planned. In this re-

93. 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTENATONAL LAw 685 (2d ed. 1970). Dual nationality gives rise
to a number of problems with the result that some states and jurists regard such a status as
undesirable. It is not disputed, however, that dual nationality is tolerated and permitted by
international law. See generally N. B A-YAAcov, DUAL NATIONALITY (1961); P. WEIS, supra
note 39, at 169-204.
94. As late as 1975 a leading academic lawyer, Dr. F. Venter of the University of Potchefstroom, stated that dual nationality was a possible solution in the case of urban Africans.
Venter, supra note 38, at 252.
95. THE QuAIL REPORT, supra note 24, at 127, para. 348(2).
96. For further information, see T)HE CONSTELLATION OF STATES, note 27 supra.
97. __
House of Assembly Debates, cols. 250-51, Feb. 6, 1980.
98. For the statement by the National Party Member of Parliament for Krugersdorp,
Mr. L. Wessels, M.P., see House of Assembly Debates, cols. 5835-36, May 7, 1980.
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spect it differs fundamentally from the concept of "associate citizenship"
which is currently being mooted by the right-wing faction of the National
Party. According to this suggestion denationalized Blacks will qualify for
certain revocable privileges, such as passports, but will be denied any expectation of political participation in the government of South Africa.
Neither the concept of "confederal nationality" nor that of "associate citizenship" has been fully spelled out so at this stage it is premature to
speculate as to the extent to which either resembles traditional dual
nationality.
Another factor which points in the direction of some form of dual
nationality is the government's declared intention of extending the powers of the elected black local government councils, known as Community
Councils. These councils, which have been established for Blacks in the
main urban areas of South Africa, provide evidence of the growing acceptance of the permanency of black urban residents and constitute recognition of the fact that the homelands governments cannot adequately
represent the interests of their "citizens" in the cities. Already nationals
of independent homelands who are resident within the area for which a
Community Council has been established enjoy the right to vote in Community Council elections." This is an anomalous situation as normally
aliens are denied the right to participate in local government as well as
national government. If the Community Councils are to become more
powerful it becomes still more anomalous to permit aliens, viz nationals
of independent homelands, to vote for and hold office in such councils.
On the other hand, if dual nationality were accorded to such persons
there would be nothing unusual about the exercise of citizenship rights in
local government in South Africa coupled with the exercise of full citizenship rights in an independent homeland.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The issue of nationality is central to the political future of South
Africa. If Blacks are accorded dual'nationality when "their" homelands
become independent, or are allowed to opt to retain South African nationality, this will amount to an acknowledgement that Blacks are to be
considered for political rights in the South African body politic, albeit in
the future. On the other hand, if the present policy of denationalization is
continued, this will be seen as evidence of a determination to implement
the homelands policy along the lines expounded by Dr. C.P. Mulder in his
notorious statement of February 7, 1978.11" The National Party is clearly
locked in debate on this issue. A committee under the chairmanship of
Professor Charles Nieuwoudt of Pretoria University has recently examined the matter, but the outcome of the committee's deliberations is
unknown. In the meantime, the verligte (relatively moderate) faction of
the National Party advocates some form of confederal nationality, while

99. Sec. 3(5), Community Councils Act 125 of 1977.
100. Text accompanying note 17 supra.
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verkramptes (reactionaries) within the party press for "associate citizenship," which from the available evidence seems to be nothing more than
denationalization in disguise. As the policy of denationalization is so fundamental to orthodox separate development ideology, any modification of
this policy will call in question the loyalty of the present government to
separate development (apartheid). This is why the future of separate development itself hinges upon the debate over the issue of nationality for
Blacks in South Africa.
POSTSCRIr
Ciskei, at present a self-governing homeland, recently elected to become independent. December 4, 1981 has been set for the inauguration of
the new "state." The independence-conferring statute has yet to be enacted and it is therefore not known what agreement has been reached
between the South African Government and the Ciskeian authorities on
the issue of nationality. Will Ciskeians be summarily deprived of their
South African nationality as has happened in the case of millions of
Blacks connected with Transkei, Bophutatswana, and Venda? Or will a
more equitable solution be found? The answer to these questions will not
only throw light on the future of separate development, but will demonstrate the extent to which the South African Government is prepared to
take cognizance of contemporary norms of international law governing
nationality.
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.

INTRODUCTION

The West depends on a thin and vulnerable string of tankers to
transport the narcotic fuel to which its wheels of industry are addicted,
and without which the West would most surely suffer an intense and
painful withdrawal. Not only does this excessive dependence of the industrialized world upon the oil of the Persian Gulf pose severe economic,'
political and foreign policy problems,' but it also creates vehement con-

1. The economic impact of the increased cost of OPEC oil upon the world economy has
been severe. The United States, with less than six percent of the world's population, consumes thirty percent of its energy; the nation's balance-of-payments deficit reached $14 billion in 1977, and exceeded $13.5 billion in 1978. The price surge of 1979 that placed the
OPEC per-barrel price at $30 will raise the U.S. cost of oil by an additional $18 billion. Fuel
import costs reached exhorbitant proportions in the 1980's, which reversed prior favorable
trends in our balance of payments, at a time when the U.S. embargo on sales to the Soviet
Union and Iran diminished export earnings. United States: The Long Awaited Slump Will
Finally Hit, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 4, 1980, at 57, 60. See Dempsey, Book Review, 9 GA. J. INT'L &
Comp L. 464, 464 (1979). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) predicts that the recent 60% increase in the price of imported oil will insure 12
months of economic stagnation for the U.S. and a correspondingly declining growth in other
western nations. This will, in turn, lead to increased inflation, increased unemployment, and
severe balance-of-payments problems. Achnacarry, Breaking the Saudi Connection, THE
NATION, Oct. 13, 1979, at 327-28. The medium term problem facing the world energy system
is the avoidance of financial crises. Major new shocks to the system such as sharp oil price
increases or prolonged economic recession may be beyond the capacity of the current world
economic system to absorb. J. SAW~mLL, K. OSHIMA, & M. MAULL, ENERGY: MANAGING THE
TRANSITION 67, 68 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SAWHNLL, OSHmMA & MAULL].

2. These are dangerous times. With the recent invasion and occupation of Afghanistan
by Soviet troops, the overthrow of the Shah by a vehemently anti-Western regime, the insecurity faced by Saudi Arabia, the general political instability which pervades Southwest
Asia, extraordinary increases in the price of OPEC crude, and the inability or unwillingness
of the Israeli government to satisfactorily resolve the Palestinian issue, the Middle East is
the tinderbox of the world. It is the region of the planet where the potential for direct
superpower confrontation (and the frightening thermonuclear possibilities arising therefrom) is greatest. See generally, Adelman, International Oil, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 725
(1978); Conant & Krater, International Dimensions of Energy, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 559
(1978); McKelvey, World Energy: The Resource Picture, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 597
(1978); McKie, Oil Imports: Is Any Policy Possible?, 18 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 731 (1978);
Mead, Political-EconomicProblems of Energy -

(1978); M.

A Synthesis, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 703

TANZER, THE POLITCAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL OIL AND THE UNDERDEVEL-
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cerns over the tragic consequences which have, and will continue to, adversely affect a fragile marine and coastal environment.
It is this environment which produces most of the oxygen and much
of the food the living beasts of the planet consume. Surely, the loss of
either would be even more devastating to Homo sapiens than the loss of
his precious fuel. Hence, it would seem that man would seek to ensure
that the massive quantities of fuel to which he has grown accustomed
would be transported in a manner which is least destructive of his
environment.
Garrett Hardin has succinctly described the environmental problems
associated with what may be the inherent tendency of man to waste that
over which he may assume only collective (as opposed to individual)
ownership as the "tragedy of the commons":
The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his
wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are
locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave
only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.'
Because our oceans cannot be fenced and hence made private property,
Hardin argues that "tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that make it
cheaper for the polluter to treat his pollutants than to discharge them
untreated."" This article will examine these coercive laws and taxing devices to discern whether they can prevent the possibility of having rational man make cesspools of our oceans. Specifically, it is the complex
legal labyrinth which has evolved to govern the transportation of oil by
sea and seeks thereby to protect our marine and coastal environment, to
which this article is addressed. The legal regimes which have exercised
jurisdiction over such pollution are three - flag states, coastal states, and
the international community - each of which has a separate, but nevertheless legitimate, interest in regulation.
The dramatic growth in the use of flags of convenience by the maritime industry since World War IIP has become an issue of international
concern, one for which the application of customary rules of international
law may be unsatisfactory. Essentially, a flag of convenience constitutes

OPED COUNTRIES (1969); M. WILLRICH, ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS (1975); R. KEOHANE & J.
NYE, POWER AND INDEPENDENCE 24-29 (1977); Dempsey, Economic Agression & Self-Defense

in InternationalLaw: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto,
9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253 (1977); Weaver, Our Energy Predicament, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, ENERGY 2 (Feb. 1981).
3. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in G. HARDIN & J. BADEN, MANAGING THE
COMMONS 22 (1977).
4. Id.
5. See UNCTAD, Committee on Shipping, Economic Consequences of the Existence or
Lack of a Genuine Link Between Vessel and Flag of Registry, 23, 26, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.4/
168 (1977) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD Report].
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"the flag of any country allowing the registration of foreign-owned and
foreign-controlled vessels under conditions which, for whatever the reasons, are convenient and opportune for the persons who are registering
the vessels."' The nations presently noted for granting flags of conve-

nience are principally those of the third world, with Panama, Liberia, and
the Honduras being among the most notorious.
Fleets of ships bearing these flags are characterized by their poor

condition, 7 inadequately trained crew, and frequent collisions, which have
too often resulted in disastrous oil spills, among the most significant of
which have been the Torrey Canyon,6 the Argo Merchant, and the
Amoco Cadiz.10 It is in this framework that the legal dilemma has arisen.
International law has long recognized the free access to and use of
the high seas by all nations. As the legal regime of maritime transportation has developed, ships have been ascribed a nationality, an attribute

which enables them to freely use and enjoy the oceans without being subjected to the jurisdiction of another nation anywhere on the high seas.
The abuse of this established regime of international law by flag of convenience ships, notably in the area of pollution of the sea by oil and other
hazardous substances, has given rise to a pressing need to regulate this
hitherto unrestricted use of the sea in order to protect the international
environment from irreparable injury. Such regulation has been attempted

both by international organizations and by coastal states. Nevertheless,
their success in preserving the marine environment has repeatedly been

6. B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 2 (1962). As the term suggests, the conditions of
registration are, above all, convenient for both the vessel owner and the registering state.
However, flags granted under these favorable conditions have gone by other terms as well,
such as "flags of necessity," "tax-free flags," "flags of attraction," etc. For a survey of the
various terms and the reasons for them, see id. at 4-6.
7. It is interesting to note that during the early 1960's, when the topic of flags of convenience had attracted the attention of several publicists, a large number of flag of convenience fleets boasted new vessels that were in better condition than the ships of established national fleets. However, in the intervening years, these ships have become rusting
hulks, but are still sailing the seas. Panama is even noted for accepting for registry ships
that are unacceptably old to other registering countries. Consequently, one advantage that
at one time could be ascribed to flag of convenience ships has become, in the course of
twenty years, a major disadvantage. See UNCTAD Report, supra note 5, at 27-31.
8. Juda, IMCO and the Regulation of Ocean Pollution from Ships, 26 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 558 (1977); Cusine, Liability for Oil Pollution Under the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, 10 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 105, 106-07 (1978); Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon"
Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DEN. L.J. 400 (1967).
9. Herman, Flags of Convenience - New Dimensions to an Old Problem, 24 McGnLL
L.J. 1, 2 (1978).
10. See In re Oil Spill by "Amoco Cadiz," 471 F. Supp. 473 (J.D.M.D.L. 1979); InterGovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) Maritime Safety Committee,
38th Sess., Doc. No. msc. xxxviii/21/Add. 1 (1978), reprinted in Oil Tanker Pollution:Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Government Activities and Transportation of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 268-70 (1978); For a brief account
of other major tanker spills, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssSNT, OIL TRANSPORTATION
BY TANKERS: AN ANALYSIS OF MARINE POLLUTrON AND SAFETY MEASUIRS 32-37 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OIL POLLUTION BY TANKERS].
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hampered by the traditional legal regime which has afforded broad protection to the activities of ships flying flags of convenience.
How does one balance the rights and interests of flag states to insure
freedom of commerce on the high seas, and to defend their customary
international legal rights of exclusive sovereignty over their vessels,
against the rights and interests of coastal states to protect the commercial
well-being of their tourism and fishing industries, as well as their aesthetic and environmental interests in being free of pollution? Should
there be a genuine link (i.e., an adequate legal relationship) between the
owner of the vessel and the state of registry? Should coastal states be
permitted to require that vessels serving their ports and traversing their
territorial waters comply with minimum standards of construction and
safety? Or should such obligations, if imposed at all, be the sole and exclusive responsibility of the world community acting under mutually
agreed principles embodied in multilateral conventions?
This article will examine the conflicting claims that have been
presented, to determine whether this conflict can be resolved within the
existing international legal framework, and to evaluate the methods that
have been adopted by the international community and coastal states to
deal with the serious environmental problems presented by flag of convenience ships. The principal focus will be on the U.S. commercial interests
in flags of convenience, balanced against the need to protect the nation's
coastal environment. The United States, perhaps more than any other
country, is in an anomalous position with regard to the conflict at issue. A
large portion of the U.S. tanker fleet is registered under flags of conve-

nience," particularly Liberian and Panamanian. 2 Such registry is sanctioned by U.S. law"8 and mandated by U.S. economic conditions.", An important purpose of registering under a flag of convenience is to avoid U.S.
regulation of safety, taxation, construction, and employment obligations.
However, recently promulgated environmental laws have been designed
to regulate the standards and activities of all vessels entering U.S. ports,
including those flying flags of convenience. Paradoxically, having sanctioned the transfer of many United States-owned vessels to flag of convenience registry, thereby losing direct control over the activities of those

ships, the United States is now attempting to invoke regulation indirectly
as a coastal state which it cannot impose directly as a flag state.

11. See UNCTAD Report, supra note 5, at 33. See also Oil Pollution Liability: Hearings on H.R.776, H.R.1827, H.R.1900, H.R.3711, and H.R.3926 Before the Subcomm. on
Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1977) (statement of O.R. Menton).
12. OECD Study on Flags of Convenience, 4 J. MAR. L. & CoMM. 231, 234 (1973).
13. Shipping Act of 1916, § § 9, 37, 41; 39 Stat. 730, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § § 808, 835,
839 (1976). For an explanation of the U.S. vessel transfer policy under the Maritime Administration, see B. BOCZsK, supra note 6, at 33-36.
14. See infra, notes 62, 63, 66-83, and accompanying text.
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OUR OCEANS IN DIRE STRAITS

Every year, one and one-half billion gallons of oil are spilled into the
oceans. While routine deballasting and cleaning operations are responsible for the bulk of the oil which has been lost or dumped at sea, it is the
major spills which have become the focus of world press and public
attention."5

15. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, COMPENSATION FOR

VICTIMS OF WATER POLLUTION, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1977). It is estimated that 80 to
85% of oil spillage is caused by intentional dumping. Id. See Roady, Remedies in Admiralty
for Oil Pollution, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 361, 362 (1977); and Bergman, No Fault Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, 5 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1, 7 (1973). For example:
NEW ORLEANS (UPI) - Crude oil oozed into the Mississippi River Thursday
from a 100-foot slit in the side of a Liberian tanker that collided with two
barges and erupted in flames on the foggy waterway.
The vessel was partially filled with 2.4 million gallons of oil, and 30,000 gallons
spilled out.
Flames up to 300 feet high rose from the tanker, which was moving upriver
several miles above the New Orleans French Quarter when the collision occurred. "The river was on fire for about a mile," said Arman Alleman, a
volunteer fireman in Marrero, La., a community across the river from New
Orleans. "Almost the entire river was on fire."
UPI, Crippled Tanker Leaks Crude, ROCKY MTN. NEWS Dec. 21, 1979, at 45, col. 1. The
above excerpts are taken from the account of a recent collision on the Mississippi River
involving an oil tanker. The inferno which resulted, however, is small in comparison to the
cataclysm which could potentially erupt from a collision with a fully loaded Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tanker.
If spilled on water in a large-scale accident, it is unlikely the water would
freeze. Instead, the water would continue to warm the floating LNG, vaporizing
it and forming a spreading cloud. Researchers currently disagree on the shape,
size, movement, and composition of the vapor cloud and the factors which will
affect it. It is believed that the concentration of LNG vapor within the cloud is
not homogeneous. At the edge of the cloud, where the greatest mixing with
ambient air occurs, the concentration of gas is lowest. At the core of the cloud,
the cencentration is highest. Where the cloud falls within the flammable limits
of 5 to 15 percent, the cloud may be ignited and burn back toward the source
of the spill. It is generally agreed that, if the vapor from a large LNG spill
ignites, it would be beyond the capability of existing firefighting methods to
extinguish it. Therefore, the key to reducing the hazard of an LNG fire is a
strong prevention program.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRANSPORTATION OF LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS 8 (1977).
This article continues to describe the only major incident to date involving an LNG spill:
That accident occurred at the first LNG installation in 1944. At that time, a
storage tank owned by East Ohio Gas Company in Cleveland ruptured, spilling
6,200 cubic meters of LNG into adjacent streets and sewers. The liquid evaporated, the gas ignited and where confined, exploded. The disaster remains the
most serious LNG accident anywhere in the world. It resulted in 128 deaths,
300 injuries, and approximately $7 million in property damage.
Id. at 8-9. LNG tankers such as those currently under construction by General Dynamics
have a capacity of 125,000 cubic meters. Id. at 15. Speculation as to the potential explosive
force of this large a quantity of LNG lies beyond the scope of this article; however it is
clearly awesome.
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The Cost of Oil Pollution - Major Oil Spills

The alarming number of collisions and other accidents involving
tanker ships has become, in recent years, a major topic of concern. The
potential for loss of life and property damage, as well as pollution damage
to the environment is clearly tremendous. This potential is magnified incalculably where a mishap occurs within a crowded harbor near a large
metropolitan area.
Major oil spills that have attracted substantial public attention date
back to the Torrey Canyon disaster of 1967 in which 117,000 tons of oil
were spilled into the English Channel, at a clean-up cost of some $5 million."6 Such disasters continued throughout the past decade. Among these
were: (a) the Santa Barbara Channel incident of 1969 (oil well blowout) in
which 13,888 tons of oil were spilled into the waters along the California
coast, at a cost of $8.5 million; 7 (b) the 1974 Metula sinking in the Strait
of Magellan in which 50,000 tons of oil were lost;"6 (c) the 1976 Chesapeake Bay spill in which 256,000 gallons were lost in Virginia inland
waters; (d) the Argo Merchant spill off Nantucket, Massachusetts, in
which 7.2 million gallons of oil were lost, costing $5.2 million to clean
up; 9 and (e) the sinking of the supertanker Amoco Cadiz, which dumped
69 million gallons of oil off the coast of Britanny in 1978.0 The last was

16. Gundlach, Oil Tanker Disasters 19 ENVmONMrNT 18 (No. 9 1977). Environmental
damage to the coasts of Cornwall and Brittany was extensive. It is suspected, however, that
the application of of untested detergents contributed significantly to the damage.
17. Id. The oiling of waterbirds received the greatest attention in the press. Overall,
however, the damage was not as great as initially expected. The spill occurred in the winter
when many organisms were dormant or at low population levels.
18. Id. at 19. The spill covered 1,000 sq. miles. No cleanup was attempted since the
spill occurred in a remote area.
19. Compensation for Victims of Water Pollution, note 15 supra. The sinking of the
Argo Merchant caused the largest spill in U.S. history. The 30,000 ton tanker had a long
history of structural problems. She sank 29 miles from shore in international waters.
20. Other major oil disasters at sea have included the following:
(a) On September 16, 1969 in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts, a "small oil spill" discharged 200,000 gallons of oil into the bay and its surrounding marshes. Studies of the spill
showed an expansion from five hundred acres originally affected to five thousand offshore
acres together with five hundred acres of marsh;
(b) In 1971 the Wafra lost 26,000 tons of oil off the coast of South Africa in the Stilbaii
oil spill, affecting at least nine miles of beaches;
(c) Two tankers collided outside of San Francisco Bay resulting in a loss of 1,000,000
gallons of oil; this spill affected beaches and wildlife sanctuaries for fifty miles;
(d) The Arrow lost 4.8 million gallows of oil off the coast of Nova Scotia in 1973, which
spread over one-hundred fifty miles of shoreline;
(e) The Mizushima oil spill in 1974 was the result of a rupture of a refinery storage tank
off the coast of Japan; the amount of oil spilled in this incident was approximately 43,000
tons;
(f) 40,000 tons of oil were spilled in the Straits of Magellan in 1974 in the Metula oil
spill - the spill affected over 1,000 square miles;
(g) One year later, near Oporto, Portugal, the Jakob Maersk spill washed 15,000 tons of
oil onto recreational beaches;
(h) One-hundred thirty miles of coastline were affected in the May 1976 wreck of the
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considered to be by far the worst shipwreck 1in history, the cost for
cleanup is estimated to have been $30 million." There, oil mixed with
water to form a thick chocolate-colored emulsion called "mousse." This
mousse-covered sea slopped ashore fouling beaches for 130 miles,
besmearing fisheries and seaweed harvests. It was estimated that there
was enough mousse on the Breton coast to fill 17,700 railroad cars. Only
fifteen to twenty percent of the 250,000 tons of crude oil spilled was recovered,22 the rest remains in the ocean.
It is understandably difficult to comprehend the magnitude of a spill

Uriquiola in La Coruna Harbor, Spain. 100,000 tons of oil were lost;
(i) In April of 1977 the Bravo 14 Platform, southeast of Norway, lost 28,000 tons of oil
and resulted in a slick covering an area seventy miles by forty miles;
(j) Later that year, in December, the Esso Bernicia incident off the coast of the
Shetland Islands affected ten kilometers of coastline;
(k) In November 1979 the Berma Agate excreted oil into the Gulf of Mexico, which oil
formed a slick over 10 kilometers long;
(1) One month later the Soe Alaska lost 100,000 gallons of oil affecting 1200 kilometers
of shoreline;
(m) In March 1980 the Tanio lost oil in the Brittany Channel, resulting in a 100 mile
long slick; and
(n) At the end of the same month, on March 24, 1980, the Ixtoc I Project, offshore in
Campeche Bay, lost 140 million gallons, 28.5% of which formed a slick along the Texas
coast.
See Wertenbaker, A Reporter at Large: A Small Spill, NEw YORKER, Nov. 26, 1973, at 68.
The incidents referred to in paragraphs (j) through (n) are described in the April 1979 to
the May 1980 issues of Marine Pollution Bulletin. See 10 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. (No. 4,
1979)(News Section) to 11 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. (No. 5, 1980) (News Section).
21. Keichel, The Admiralty Case of the Century 99 FORTUNE, Apr. 23, 1979, at 86.
Thirty million dollars is the limit of Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization's clean-up liability.
Obviously, as another result of the spills, extensive costs are incurred for cleanup and
retribution. The actual costs have ranged from the over $0.5 million spent in the Buzzards
Bay clean-up to the $133 million spent for control and cleanup in the more recent Ixtoc I
spill. Wertenbaker, supra note 20, at 53. Editorial, Ixtoc I Stopped, MARINE POLLUTION
BULL. 115 (No. 5, 1980). Subsequent to the Santa Barbara Spill, a judge fined each oil company $500.00 in criminal penalties, when $812,000 in fines could have been assessed pursuant to state statutes. In that same incident, $6 million was awarded in civil suits and $10.5
million was spent to clean beaches. The actual clean-up costs expended for workers, detergents and equipment, as shown above, are extensive, but almost always ascertainable. At the
other end of the spectrum, however, are those indeterminable costs. What is the cost of a
limpet, a cormorant, a sea otter? Efforts have been made to price the plant and animal life,
but the ascertainment of such costs is administratively not feasible. See Editorial, What
Price Pollution? 26 BIOSCIENCE 603 (1976). Cleanup of the Ixtoc I oil spill (the largest oil
spill in history) which spewed 3.1 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico cost $8
million. Counting Costs of an Oil Spill, NEwSWEEK, Aug. 4, 1980, at 8. Bermuda spends
$100,000 a year sifting the sands of its beaches to rid them of tar balls, the end product of
frequent tanker flushing. Roady, supra note 15, at 362.
22. Keichel, note 21 supra. Three auk species, guillonot, razorbill, and puffin were devastated, delcining from 3,000 breeding pairs to 500 in the Torrey Canyon disaster. The recent spill of the Amoco Cadiz probably means the end of the auk populations. See Bourne,
Amoco Cadiz Seems Likely To Exterminate the French Auks, 9 MARINE POLLUTION BULL.
145 (No. 5, 1978).

1980

OIL POLLUTION BY OCEAN VESSELS

of 50,000 to 200,000 tons of oil. Eldon Greenberg of the Center for Law
and Social Policy, testifying before a House Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, stated that a spill in South America of
over 50,000 tons covered seventy-five miles of coastline with crude oil one
to four inches deep.2s
B. Massive Destruction of Wildlife - "Death to All Dumb Animals" is
the Insane Decree of Man
As can be discerned from these statistics, the spil)s over the past
fifteen years have increased in frequency and magnitude, damaging a substantial area of coastline. What has not yet been adequately explored,
however, is the extensive biological injury suffered as a result of these
disasters. Birds have been killed in great numbers due to suffocation and
poisoning,' and have also suffered serious long-term damage due to
delayed toxic effects on the hatchability of eggs and chicks. 5 The Torrey
Canyon disaster in 1967 resulted in the loss of more than 25,000 seabirds,
most of which were killed by the toxic detergents used to break down the
slick.2 6 In the Santa Barbara blowout, at least 3,600 birds were killed.
Likewise, the Metula spill caused the death of 3,000 to 4,000 birds.2 7 The
oil in the Wafra incident was particularly lethal; "tens of thousands" of
Jackass Penguins on Dyer Island were drowned and poisoned.26 More
fatalities were reported in the San Francisco Bay Spill where ninety-four
percent of the 4,629 cormorants, grebes, ducks, and coots recovered and
treated were lost. A final estimate of the bird population killed in that
incident was 20,000.29 Another avian disaster made itself apparent in the
Esso Bernicia incident when 3,533 corpses of forty-eight species of birds
were found. 0 Oil spillage caused the death of a quarter of a million auks
in a single Newfoundland nesting colony."s Studies have shown that the
deaths of the birds were the result of oil coating their feathers, making
them less buoyant and, therefore, susceptible to drowning. Birds were
also poisoned when the oil was ingested or aspirated as they preened or
fed upon other affected animals.
The short-term effects may include the unpleasant smell of ship's

23. Oil Spill Contingency Plan; Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment,
Energy, and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1977) (Statement of Eldon Greenberg) [hereinafter cited as Contingency Plan Hearings].
24. Milne, The Last Survivors, 5 Ir'L WILDLIFE 12 (No. 5, 1975).
25. Grau, Roudybush, Dobbs & Wathen, Altered Yolk Structure and Reduced Hatchability of Eggs from Birds Fed Single Doses of Petroleum Oils, 195 SCIENCE 779 (1974);
Miller, Peakall & Kinter, Ingestion of Crude Oil: Sublethal Effects in Herring Gull Chicks,
199 SCIENCE 315 (1978).
26. J. SMITH, TORREY CANYON: POLLUTION AND MARINE LIFE (1968).
27. J. BAKER, AN OIL SPILL ON THE STRAIGHTS OF MAGELLAN, MARINE ECOLOGY AND OIL
POLLUTION (1976).
28. Milne, supra note 24, at 12.
29. Watkins, The Day the Birds Wept, 78 AUDUBON 21 (No. 1, 1976).
30. Richardson, Esso Bernicia Incident, 10 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 97 (No. 4, 1979).
31. Bergman, supra note 15, at 2.
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garbage and dead fish on the beaches, for many sea birds are scavengers.
Without them, the possibility of disease near our oceans is likely to increase."8 The long-term effects, as noted above, are demonstrated by decreased hatchability of the eggs produced by oil-affected birds, and high
chick mortality rates.
Floundering in the same sinking biological vessel are algae, plankton,
shellfish, fish, and large mammals. The Amoco Cadiz accident alone temporarily destroyed over 2,000 acres of oyster beds, which constituted onethird of France's commercial seafood market.33 Sixteen days after the
same spill the bodies of dead urchins littered one and one-half miles of
beach. 8 The Santa Barbara spill substantially decreased the surrounding
phytoplankton biomass, and large mammals and their young, including
seals, sea elephants, and one porpoise, were found dead, presumably from
oil poisoning. Also killed in this incident were shore plants and animals
which were smothered by the oozing oil. 5
The devastating effects of oil spillage on the marine environment differ with various factors. Erich Gundlach, together with a team of researchers for the Coastal Research Division Oil Spill Assessment Team
(University of South Carolina), determined that the extent of damage
caused by a spill depends upon its proximity to coastal areas, time of
year, weather, tidal conditions, wave activity, and toxicity of the spilled
crude oil. Vulnerability to extensive damage increases in coastal areas
where biological productivity is high, particularly in those areas where
wave action is diminished .3 Such findings are well substantiated by the
tragic environmental damage which resulted from the sinking of the
Metula in the Strait of Magellan and the sinking of a barge carrying
Bunker C oil in Chesapeake Bay. Victims of the Chilean episode included
mussel beds, marsh life, fish, and approximately 4,000 birds. The spilled
crude oil solidified in tidal flats and marsh areas into an asphalt-like strip
fifty feet wide along the rim of the flats. The effects of the disaster are
expected to remain visible for at least ten years.8 7 The Chesapeake Bay
disaster took even more victims - 30,000 to 50,000 birds. In addition, the
spill resulted in the destruction of many oyster beds. 38

32. Id.
33. Grove, Black Day for Brittany, NAT'L GEOG., July, 1978, at 133.
34. Editorial, Amoco Cadiz: A Lasting Disaster, 144 Sc. NEWS 85 (No. 6, 1978).
35. Holme, Effects of Torrey Canyon Pollution on Marine Life, OIL ON THE SEA 25
(1969).
36. Grundlach, supra note 16, at 21. In order of increasing vulnerability, the environments by classification are (1) exposed, steeply dipping or cliffed rocky shores, (2) eroding
wavecut platforms, (3) fine sand beaches, (4) coarse sand beaches, (5) exposed tidal fiats, (6)
mixed sand and gravel beaches, (7) gravel beaches, (8) sheltered rocky coasts, (9) sheltered

tidal fiats, and (10) salt marshes and mangroves.
37. Id. at 19. Vegetation in the area, of course, has been totally devastated.
38. J. REIGER, JUST ANOTHER OIL SPILL 145 (1977). James Hill, in describing the incident stated, "It was awful. As fast as the children brought the ducks, others would crawl up
on the beach to die. Some were so covered with gunk you couldn't tell the species."
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Perhaps the most disturbing description of wildlife devastation was
written by William Wertenbaker with respect to the spill of 700 tons of
fuel oil into Buzzards Bay, off the Massachusetts coast. Shortly after the
incident, piles of dead lobsters were washed upon the shore. "In scientific
generalities, the marine animal population of the area, in the course of
the next week or so, declined from about 200,000 animals per square metre to about two animals per square metre. 3'" 9 In one dredge, ninety-three
percent of all organisms were either dead or dying."0 One of the marshes
affected by the spill remained incapable of sustaining life for at least two
years subsequent thereto. The shellfish industry was closed twice due to
the oily taste of the fish, and a harvest which would have resulted in a
profit of $150,000 was foreclosed. The fishing industry also suffered a severe blow in the 'Uriquiolaincident when seventy percent of the edible
cockel were killed."1 A study has shown that polar bears are also adversely
affected by oil. Two bears died from kidney and liver damage as a result
of licking oil from their coats and paws."" These frightening statistics
demonstrate the biological devastation brought about by oil. "Interference at an extremely low concentration level may have a disastrous effect
on the survival of many marine species and on any other species to which
4
it is tied by the marine food chain." 3
C. The Long-Term Impact of Oil Spillage and Dumping tial Destruction of the Planet

The Poten-

Although the full environmental effects of tanker pollution are not
yet known, certain effects are obvious: the tarring of beaches, the endangering of seabird species, and the modification of benthic communities, to
name a few. In correspondence with the Senate Committee on Commerce,
the Cousteau Society has stated that the long-range effects of such spills
may be particularly devastating, warning that such spills affect the reproductive capacity of various species of marine life and also interfere with
the ocean food chain link by killing important food sources of otherwise
unaffected marine life."
Such warnings are now being substantiated by studies undertaken by
the scientific community. Most recently, in a study of the effects resulting
from the Argo Merchant oil spill, scientists found the killing of sand
launce larvae, an important food source for fish, to have affected the en-

39. Wertenbaker, supra note 20, at 49.
40. Bergman, supra note 15, at 3.
41. Gundlach, The Black Tide of La Coruna, 10
note 15, at 363.

OCEANS

56 (1977). See Roady, supra

42. Editorial, Polar Bear Deaths from Oil, 11 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 117 (No. 5,
1980).
43. Blumer, Oil Pollution of the Ocean, On. ON THE SEA 11 (1969).
44. Recent Tanker Accidents: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 95th
Cong. 1st Seass. 235 (1977) (letter to President-Elect Carter from the Cousteau Society and
the Union of Concerned Scientists). The letter, in discussing short range effects of oil spills,
noted that oil uptake by fish can make them carcenogenic to man.
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tire ecosytem of the area.4 5 Other disturbing reports have indicated that
oil spillage has caused decreased reproductivity in marine life,4 6 decreased

hatchability of eggs of various seabirds,4 7 has inflicted physiological and
behavioral damage on affected animals,4 8 and has had long-lasting effects

on phytoplankton and zooplankton survival.4'9 Taking into consideration
the extensive short-term damage which has occurred and the forecasted
long-term damage yet to be manifested, it has been predicted that the

oceans will soon become biological deserts.50 That forecast is particularly
disturbing in that the food chain, of which man is a part, has its significant beginnings in the oceans. "More is at stake here than birds or fish, of
course; rents are being made in the web of life upon which man depends,

and of which he is a part."511
One commentator has summarized the impact of continued oil pollution as follows:
Oil . . . coats the seaweed causing it to be easily torn free by
wave action, resulting in beach erosion. At the same time, some oil
begins to biodegrade, reducing the life supporting dissolved oxygen in
the water available to living organisms ....
The slick itself interferes
with phytoplankton photosynthesis, the food source for much of the
world's protein and a source of oxygen for the atmosphere. Interference with water evaporation may cause reduced water vapor in the
air with a proportionate decrease in rainfall.
In addition to genetic changes and deformities, observers have
reported increasing cancerous lesions of fish in areas of high oil
pollution,
raising the specter that oil pollution may induce cancer in
5
man.

2

Jacques Piccard has stated: "If nothing is done, all the oceans will be

dead before the end of the century."'

45. Contingency Plan Hearings, supra note 23, at 76. Among the wildlife affected by
the Argo Merchant spill included: blackback and yellowtail flounder and shellfish (adverse
effects on respiratory systems), cod and pollack embryos (increased mortality rate), and
plankton (contaminated with petroleum hydrocarbon).
46. Id.
47. Effects of Oil on Birds, 32 CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE 16 (1978); see also Grau, et al.,
supra note 25, at 779.
48. Aftermath of an Oil Spill: A Black Seven Years, 112 Sci. NEWS 84 No. 6, 1979).
This seven-year study was conducted following a No. 2 fuel oil spill into Buzzards Bay,
Massachusetts in 1969. Populations have not recovered to pre-spill levels and significant
behavioral aberrations are common in the survivors.
49. James, Xenobiotic Metabolism in Marine Species Exposed to Hydrocarbons, EN11 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE INTERAGENCY RESEARCH
MENT PROGRAM, 2d EPA RPT. No. 600/9-77-012 (1977).
50. Oil Is Pouring on Troubled Waters, TIME, Jan. 10, 1977, at 47.
51. Editorial, Pity the Birds, NATION, Feb. 8, 1971, at 166.
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52. Anderson, National and InternationalEfforts to Prevent Traumatic Vessel Source
Oil Pollution, 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 985, 992-93 (1976) [citations omitted].
53. Piccard, Dying Oceans, Poisoned Seas, TIME, Nov. 8, 1971, at 74.
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Oil Pollution - Its Cause and Cure
As has been indicated, there are essentially two sources of oil pollution from ships: (1) pollution from routine vessel operations, such as tank
cleaning, deballasting, and periodic discharge;5 and (2) tanker accidents,
such as collisions or running aground.5s Of the two, by far the greatest
amount of pollution is caused by routine operations."
In order to deal with the problem, there must be a sophisticated and
effective legal system governing the high seas, ports, territorial waters and
the contiguous zone. The objectives of this regime would be fourfold:
1. To prevent or minimize intentional discharges of oil from ships;
2. To prevent accidents which result in the discharge of oil into the
sea;
3. To establish procedures for dealing with pollution or the threat of
pollution from accidents; and
4. To establish procedures for assigning liability for damage arising
57
from pollution, and ensuring compensation to victims of the damage.
D.

The key to the prevention of oil discharge either from accidents or
routine operations lies in establishing minimum standards for construction and maintenance of vessels, training and licensing of crews, and information and navigational controls..A necessary corollary to establishing these standards is the creation of a legal regime that will effectively
enforce them. The types of modifications to vessel structure and operation that reduce pollution and improve safety" include: (a) fitting the
ship with a double bottom and a double hull; (b) constructing segregated
ballast tanks apart from cargo tanks; (c) implementing an inert gas system to reduce the danger of explosion; (d) using a load-on-top method of
54. Approximately 80-85% of all oil spillage is caused by intentional dumping. See note
15 supra.
55. Of the five to ten million tons of oil floating upon the seas in 1971, an estimated one
million tons were spilled as a result of tanker collisions and groundings. One third of these
accidents were the product of structural defects in the vessels involved. Carter, Amoco
Cadiz Incident Points Up the Elusive Goal of Tanker Safety, 200 SCENCE 515 (1978).
Moreover, concern over increased tanker traffic and the potential for an increasing
number of catastrophic tanker accidents is far from unfounded. From the 1950's until 1965,
the number of tankers ranging in size from 50,000 deadweight tons (dwt) to 199,999 dwt
increased from 1 to 471. By the early 1970's, the number of tankers measuring more than
200,000 dwt registered at 131. Today tankers twice the size of the Amoco Cadiz weighing
250,000 dwt are in use, and the number promises to increase as the Western world's dependency on oil from the Middle East climbs at a disturbing rate. Gundlach, supra note 16, at
18. The growth in both the use and size of supertankers began after the closing of the Suez
Canal during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. See Anderson, supra note 52, at 998.
56. On. TRANSPORTATiON BY TANiKES, supra note 10, at 27. As of 1975, approximately
1,000,000 tons of oil per year are dumped in standard operations, while 200,000 tons are
spilled through casualties. Id. at 1.
57. Mensah, International Environment Law: International Conventions Concerning
Oil Pollution at Sea, 8 CAsm W. Rs. J. INerL L. 110, 112 (1976).
58. OIL TRANSPORTATION sY TANKmts, supra note 10, at 1-7.
59. For further elaboration and analysis of these methods of pollution prevention, see
id. at 38-57.
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discharging ballast; and (e) limiting tanker size.
A large number of serious accidents resulting in disastrous spills are
attributable to inadequately trained crews. This problem may be resolved
by establishing minimum skill and training requirements for licensing of
tanker crews.60 In addition, adequate information and control systems
should be required to facilitate the operation of a massive tanker in an
unfamiliar port, or in unusual weather conditions. These systems may be
classified in the following categories: navigational aid, communications,
information, control, vessel traffic, and collision avoidance."' In the event
of the failure or nonimplementation of these preventive measures, there
must be a mechanism for cleaning up pollution when it does occur, and
allocating liability for the resulting damage. With these objectives in
mind, let us now examine the existing legal framework to discern whether
there is any promise for alleviation of the enormous tragedy described in
this section.
III. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
The Advantages of Registry Under a Flag of Convenience
The advantages derived by U.S. shipowners as a result of registry
under flags of convenience are numerous, and can be attributed both to
the competitive conditions of the world shipping trade, and the nature of
relevant United States legislation vis-&-vis that of flag of convenience
states such as Liberia, Panama, and Honduras. The attributes of flag of
convenience registry have been summarized as follows:
A.

1. Transfer to a foreign flag increases the market value of the ship.
2. Transfer reduces operating costs, particularly for wages and maintenance of good working conditions, due to lower standards permissible under foreign flags.
3. Transfer makes possible operating in world trade with easy currency conversion.
4. Transfer allows the owner to avoid United States Coast Guard
requirements governing the condition of the vessel.
5. The owner may effect repairs abroad at less cost than the same
repairs in the United States.
6. The owner can save money by avoiding United States income tax.
7. And ultimately, as a result of increased earnings, the owner's
financial ability to acquire new tonnage is improved. 6
All of these advantages are essentially financial in nature. By avoiding United States labor, tax, and regulatory laws through the use of flags
of convenience, the cost of transporting foreign oil is dramatically

60. Id. at 57-63.
61. Id. at 63-71. See generally, Greenwald, LNG Carrier Safety: A Guide to the System of Federal Regulation, 9 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 155 (1978).
62. Study of Vessel Transfer Trade-in & Reserve Fleet Policies: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Merchant Marine of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 140 (1957), reprinted in B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 29-30. See
Herman, supra note 9, at 4-5.
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decreased. 63
Decreased transportation expense, however, is not the only result of
widespread flag of convenience registration. The recent number of oil
spills involving flag of convenience tankers has led one publicist to conclude, regarding what he described as "The 'Argo Merchant' Syndrome,"
that, "these incidents have contributed to a general recognition of the
inadequacy of present international rules that allow ancient, poorly-repaired, ill-equipped or inadequately manned and navigated vessels into
ocean-borne trade service."" Data clearly indicate that losses and casualties of flag of convenience vessels exceed those of vessels registered in the
country of ownership.15 Hence, the need for stringent safety regulation by
coastal states of foreign as well as domestic vessels is manifest.
1. General Economic Considerations
The costs of ship construction, maintenance, and operation in the
United States are so high that a domestically registered vessel cannot
compete with foreign ships without substantial government subsidy. The
transportation of oil on the world market is intensely competitive, and
U.S. operating costs are as much as seventy percent higher than those of
foreign vessels. Hence, in the absence of government subsidization, U.S.owned oil tankers can remain competitive only by operating under flags
of convenience." In addition, U.S.-registered vessels are required to employ American crews, operating under American labor standards, wages,
and fringe benefits. This represents an economic disadvantage of ninety
to ninety-five percent to a nonsubsidized U.S. vessel owner.6 " Under a flag
of convenience, the shipowner may hire an alien crew with substantially
less maritime experience at a substantially lower cost.68 Finally, repair
costs performed in the United States average almost twice what they cost
abroad. Under U.S. law, a U.S.-registered vessel must have its repairs
performed in the United States, or pay an additional tax for having it
done abroad.69 The result of all of these factors is "to bring the high operating costs incurred by ships registered in the United States down to a
level nearer that of the general run in the countries of their foreign com63. Recent Tanker Accidents: Legislation for Improved Tanker Safety: Hearings on
S.182, S.568, S.715, S.898, Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 812-14 (1977) (Cost Appendix Tables in Statement of Lawrence
C. Ford. Lawrence Ford spoke for the American Petroleum Institute). See also Wittig,
Tanker Fleets and Flags of Convenience: Advantages, Problems, and Dangers, 14 TEXAS
INT'L L.J. 115 (1979) for a discussion of the economic motives for flag of convenience vessel
registration.
64. Herman, supra note 9, at 2.
65. See Proposed Amendments to the Energy Transportation Security Act of 1977:
Hearings on H.R. 1037 Before the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 294-96, 304 (1977) (Research report of Prof. R.S. Doganis, and Dr. B.N. Metoxas).
66. See B. BocZEK, supra note 6, at 27-32.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1466 (1976).
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petitors. In a sense, therefore, it is the removal of a handicap rather than

the gaining of an advantage.

.. .

In addition to the economic advantages of operating under a flag of
convenience, there are also a number of disincentives to U.S. registry. For

example, in order for a vessel to obtain United States registry, it must: (a)
be certified by the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation and be
constructed in the United States;7 1 (b) primarily employ an American
crew; 7' (c) have its repairs performed in the United States or face addiby American citizens or a cortional taxation;73 and (d) be wholly owned
7
poration chartered under American law. '
British law is not as stringent as U.S. law in its requirements for re70. Quoted in B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 31.
71. 46 U.S.C. § 11 (1976):
Vessels built within the United States and belonging wholly to citizens
thereof ... and seagoing vessels, whether steam or sail, which have been certified by the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation as safe to carry dry
and perishable cargo, wherever built, which are to engage only in trade with
foreign countries ... may be registered as directed in this title. Foreign-built
vessels registered pursuant to this title shall not engage in the coastwise trade
In 1946 the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation was abolished, and its functions
transferred to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. 46 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
72. 46 U.S.C. § 672a:
Nationality of crews (a) [A]II licensed officers and pilots of vessels of the United States shall be
citizens of the United States, native born, or completely naturalized.
(b) [U]pon each departure of any such vessel from a port of the United
States, 75 per centum of the crew, excluding licensed officers, shall be citizens
of the United States, native-born or completely naturalized ....
(d) The owner, agent, or officer of any such vessel, who shall employ any person in violation of the provisions of this section, shall be subject to a penalty of
$500 for each offense.
73. 19 U.S.C. § 1466(a):
Equipment and repairs of vessels (a) The equipment ... or the repair parts or materials to be used, or the expenses of the repairs made in a foreign country upon a vessel documented
under the laws of the United States to engage in the foreign or coasting trade
- . . shall, on the first arrival of such vessel in any port of the United States, be
liable to entry and the payment of an ad valorem duty of 50 per centum on the
cost thereof in such foreign country; and if the owner or master of such vessel
shall willfully and knowingly neglect or fail to report, make entry, and pay
duties as herein required, such vessel, with her tackle, apparel, and furniture,
shall be seized and forefeited.
See also id. § 1466(b).
74. 46 U.S.C. § 11:
Vessels .. . being wholly owned by citizens of the United States or corporations organized and chartered under the laws of the United States, or of any
State thereof, of which the president or other chief executive officer shall be
citizens of the United States and no more of its directors than a minority of
the number necessary to constitute a quorum shall be noncitizens, may be registered as directed in this title.
See also id. § 802.
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gistration, in that it does not require a national crew, or construction and
maintenance to be performed within the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth. The primary requirement for registration is that of British
ownership75 (which includes ownership by corporations established under
the laws of any of the British dominions, although foreigners may be
stockholders in such corporations). 76 As a result, British ships may be registered under the laws of Commonwealth countries (e.g., Bermuda or the
Bahamas),7 and many such ships have substantial foreign ownership.
The registration laws of flag of convenience states are much more
liberal, however, particularly with respect to ownership requirements. For
example, under the Liberian maritime code, the requirement that the vessel be owned by a citizen or national of Liberia may be waived if "the
owner of the vessel qualifies for, secures and maintains registration in the
Republic of Liberia as a foreign maritime trust or corporation and either
maintains at all times an operating office in the Republic or appoints a
qualified business agent in the manner prescribed by law. '7' Honduras
has no national ownership provision.7 9 Panamanian law requires whole or
partial ownership by Panamanian citizens, or foreigners domiciled in
Panama with*more than five years residence, or a company with its headquarters in Panama.s" In practice, U.S. shipowners, have formed Pana-

75. Merchant Shipping Act 1894, Part I, § 1:
Qualification for owning British Ship. A ship shall not be deemed to be a
British ship unless owned wholly by persons of the following description (in
this Act referred to as persons qualified to be owners of British ships); namely,
(a) . . .British subjects:
(b) ...

(c) ...
(d) Bodies corporate established under and subject to the laws of some
part of Her Majesty's dominions, and having their principal place of
business in those dominions:
Reprinted in 31 HALSauRy's STATUTES OF ENGLAND 74 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
HALSBURY'S STATUTES].

76. Now it appears to us that the British corporation is, as such, the sole owner
of the ship, and a British subject within the meaning of the Act ... notwithstanding some foreigners may individually have shares in the company, and
that such individual members of the corporation are not entitled, in whole or
in part, directly or indirectly, to be owners of the vessel....
It seems to us that the British corporation is to all intents the legal owner
of the vessel, and entitled to the registry, and that we cannot notice any disqualification of an individual member which might disable him, if owner, from
registering the vessel in his own name.
R. v. Arnaud, [18416 9 Q.B. 806, 817-18.
77. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 88-89.
78. LIBERIAN CODE OF LAWS, tit. 22 § 51 (1973), reprinted in UNCTAD Report, supra
note 5,at 10.
79. Honduras, Organic Act of the National Merchant Marine No. 55 of 2 March 1943,
§ 2, art. 5, reprinted in UNrrE NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAWS CONCERNING THE NATIONALITY OF SHIPs, 76, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/5 (1955).
80. Panama, Commercial Code of 22 August 1916, art. 1080, reprinted in id. at 129.
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manian subsidiaries to meet the ownership requirements.
2. Taxation
An accompanying attraction to the registration laws of flag of convenience states is the absence of income or corporate taxation on maritime
operations.8 1 A United States shipowner can couple this advantage with
favorable U.S. tax laws by creating a "foreign corporation" in the flag of
convenience state. Under section 883(a)(1) of the U.S. Internal Revenue
Code, "[e]arnings derived from the operation of a ship or ships documented under the laws of a foreign country which grants an equivalent
exemption to citizens of the United States and to corporations organized
in the United States" are exempt from U.S. taxation. Although Liberia
does not impose a national ownership requirement, many American companies create a foreign subsidiary in Liberia in order to take advantage of
this tax provision. This provision does not entirely exempt a U.S. shipowner from paying taxes on profits, since such taxes must be paid on
profits distributed as dividends to stockholders. However, it does enable
the shipowner to use the law to his advantage by waiting to pay the tax at
an advantageous time, or by using the profits to expand his fleet.
In addition to the absence of income and corporate taxation in flag of
convenience states, the registration fees and taxes of such nations are relatively insignificant. The registration fee ranges from $0.25 per net registered ton in Honduras, to $1.00 and $1.20 per ton in Panama and Liberia,
respectively. The annual tax is $.05 per ton in Honduras, and $.10 per net
ton in Liberia and Panama.s' While these fees are deemed moderate by
American shipowners, they represent a considerable source of revenue for
flag of convenience states.
3. Safety Standards
Finally, another traditional advantage to U.S. shipowners registered
under flags of convenience is that they have not been required to meet
the safety regulations imposed by the U.S. Coast Guard. It need not be
assumed that tanker owners, in registering under a flag of convenience,
would be motivated by the desire to operate substandard, high risk
ships. 3 Nevertheless, they could still operate ships which, while safe, do
not quite meet Coast Guard standards, and may thereby be operated
more competitively. However, as will be explained in detail below, the
ability of shipowners to serve U.S. ports with unsafe vessels has been significantly constricted by recently promulgated U.S. legislation."

81. Wittig, supra note 63, at 121 (1979).
82. These figures represent charges in the 1950's. Presumably they have increased
somewhat in the course of twenty years. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 57.
83. Flag of convenience vessels are subject to international safety standards. and it is
not in the best interests of owners to operate high-risk vessels. See Wittig, supra note 63, at
119 n.17. Furthermore, as will be seen infra, the new wave of domestic environmental legislation being put into effect by coastal states makes it imperative for vessels serving their
ports to operate safe vessels.
84. See text accompanying notes 234-65 infra.
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B.

United States Maritime Policy
Among the reasons for the growth in U.S. ownership of flag of convenience fleets is the United States' vessel transfer policy. In order to
prevent the U.S. Merchant Marine from becoming obsolete, the Maritime
Administration allows a United States owner to transfer a U.S.-registered
ship to foreign ownership and/or registry provided that the owner undertakes to replace the transferred vessel with a newly constructed vessel
which satisfies the size, design, speed, and capacity criteria of the Maritime Administration. The owner of the vessel transferred to foreign flag
registry must be a United States citizen or a corporation organized under
the laws of either the United States, Liberia, Panama or Honduras. The
registry and flag are also to be transferred to Liberia, Panama or Honduras." It can easily be seen that this policy promotes a new and modern
United States Merchant Marine, while unloading obsolete, substandard
vessels onto flag of convenience states.
There is considerable opposition to the practice of registering vessels
under flags of convenience by United States and international seamen's
unions and European maritime nations. The seamen's unions are generally concerned about the lower wages paid on flag of convenience ships
and the low standards for working conditions and safety that may be imposed with impunity on seamen. Labor organizations have been active opponents of flags of convenience: failing the abolition of these shipping
practices, they have attempted to make favorable U.S. labor laws applicable to workers on flag of convenience ships, and to create international
labor standards."
European maritime nations, notably the United Kingdom and Norway, are also concerned with the shipping policies of the United States
which promote the use of flags of convenience. 7 Since both of these nations rely heavily on the stability and success of their merchant fleet in
international commerce, they are disturbed by international practices
that make deep inroads into their shipping activities, and render them
incapable of effective competition without drastic change in their national
laws. The practice of using flags of convenience to utmost advantage is
directly attributable to the United States, and has fostered many tensions
in foreign relations. On the one hand, European nations fully understand
the advantages of flags of convenience and can appreciate a nation's de-

85. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 33-34.
86. For further analysis of the labor problems associated with flag of convenience ships
and attempts to minimize them see, inter alia, B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 156-87; Goldie,
Recognition and Dual Nationality - A Problem of Flags of Convenience, [1963] BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220, 227-54; McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea
and the Nationalityof Ships, 54 AM. J. INr'L L. 25, 30-34 (1960) [hereinafter cited as McDougal et al.]; Wittig, supra note 63, at 127-30. Efforts to extend the protection of U.S.
labor laws to seamen who serve aboard flag of convenience vessels have proven unsuccessful.
See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
87. For an account of the tensions that have evolved between Europe and the United
States over U.S. shipping policies, see B. BoczEa, supra note 6, at 81-90.
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sire to use them. On the other, the practice appears to them to be unconscionable and not in the spirit of international comity and use of the
seas for the benefit of mankind.
The basis of the dispute appears to lie in the structure of national
taxation laws. A major reason for resorting to flags of convenience is the
tax benefits that may be derived therefrom. Consider the experience of
two coastal states. Costa Rica, one of the traditional flag of convenience
states, signficantly reformed its vessel registration laws in 1958 to curb
abuses that were taking place. One of the aspects of the reform was an
increase in taxation. As a result, shipowners were discouraged from registering in Costa Rica, and the country has effectively ceased to be a flag of
convenience state." Conversely, there had been a long tradition of registering Greek-owned vessels under flags of convenience, due to heavy taxation, fears of nationalization, and outdated shipping laws. In 1953 there
was a general reform of Greek shipping laws, which provided major tax
benefits to shipowners registered under the Greek flag. The result has
been a return to the Greek flag by many Greek shipowners."
Although the essence of the dispute between European maritime
states and the United States is economic in nature, the political and strategic overtones should not be ignored. A major incentive to flag of convenience use by American shipowners is the structure of U.S. shipping and
taxation laws, which, in the interests of harmonious foreign relations,
should be amended to make American registry more attractive.90
C. The Legal Significance of a Flag of Convenience
An essential element in determining how to deal with the tragedy of
oil pollution at sea is to comprehend the concept of a flag of convenience
under international law. There are two fundamental principles of international law which are directly applicable to ships on the high seas. The
first involves the maxim that there shall be free use of the seas." As
stated in Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas,"9 "[t]he high seas
being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any
part of them to its sovereignty." A corollary to this principle is that a
state holds exclusive competence to grant nationality to ships. Article 5 of
the High Seas Convention provides, inter alia, that "[e]ach State shall fix
the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration
of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the
nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly .... "
Hence, an integral aspect of the right of a state to grant nationality is

88. Id. at 46-49.
89. Id. at 36-38; and McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 36 n.32.
90. B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 87-90; and McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 35-36.
91. See, inter alia, I. BROWNLm, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-36 (2d
ed. 1973); C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 47-86 (6th ed. 1967); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 588-94 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955).
92. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention].

1980

OIL POLLUTION BY OCEAN VESSELS

that such nationality will be recognized by other states. These basic principles of international law have become well established by state practice
and confirmed by bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, the
practice of granting flags of convenience has led to certain incursions into
these basic theories, such as the practice of effective United States control of certain flag of convenience ships, and the theory of the "genuine
link," which appears in Article 5 of the High Seas Convention. Moreover,
the status of flag of convenience states in the world shipping community
was hotly disputed by members of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) when it came time to choose the membership of the Maritime Safety Committee. The dispute ultimately was submitted to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.
These considerations will be discussed below, as they apply generally to
flags of convenience, and as they have risen to prominence as a result of
the extensive use of these flags.
1.

The Right of a State to Grant Nationality to Ships

It has become an established tradition to international law, first, that
a ship on the high seas must have a national character, and second, that
states have exclusive, unilateral competence to grant nationality. The

outward sign of nationality is the flag flown by the ship, which must be
supported by the necessary registration and documentation on board."s
However, the right to determine exactly what criteria must be met for a
ship to be entitled to nationality is a matter of domestic law of individual
states."

93. See generally B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 91-124; C. COLOMsOS,supra note 91, at

264-68; H. MEvERS, THE

NATIONALITY OF SHIPS

122-43 (1967); R.

RIENOW, THE TEST OF THE

NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL (1937); McDougal et al.,
note 86 supra.
94. This proposition was stated as an accepted principle in The Muscat Dhows case
between France and Great Britain; "generally speaking it belongs to every sovereign to decide to whom he will accord the right to fly his flag and to prescribe the rules governing such
grants .. " Award of the Tribunal, The Hague, Aug. 8, 1905, reprinted in SCOTT, HAGuE
COURT REPORTS 93, 96 (1916). The case of Lauritzen v.Larsen in the United States Supreme Court also accepted as a general principle that "[e]ach state under international law
may determine for itself the conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant
ship, thereby accepting responsibility for it and acquiring authority over it. Nationality is
evidenced to the world by the ships papers and its flag." 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
. The grant of nationality, therefore, gives a state jurisdiction over the ship on the high
seas, where no other sovereign may exercise that power, and also the right to protect the
ship on the high seas. Furthermore, the right to determine whether a ship has fraudulently
acquired nationality is an exclusive matter for the flag state. See The Virginius, (1873), 2 J.
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 895 (1906). As evidenced in several international conventions, the criterion for establishing the nationality of a ship is by registration. See, e.g.,
International Load Line Convention, art. 3(a), done at London, July 5, 1930, T.S. 858, 47
Stat. 2228, 135 L.N.T.S. 301: "[A] ship is regarded as belonging to a country if it is registered by the Government of that country." International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, art. 2, done at London, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S.
No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3: "The present Convention shall apply to sea-going ships registered
in any of the territories of a Contracting Government ...."
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Recognition of the Nationality of Ships

A necessary corollary to the right of a state to grant nationality to a
ship is that other states will conclusively recognize that nationality as evidenced by the flag. This grant has been called an act of state,"5 entitled to
recognition among sovereign equals; the rule has been praised as promoting order on the high seas." It follows that documentation by the proper
authority and registration are the only elements of nationality required
by international law to support recognition. 97 As has been indicated, the
requirements that may be imposed on a ship to be granted registration
are a matter of domestic concern, and this principle of recognition has
generally been followed in a number of treaties.9 s
Although the principles of nationality and recognition have long been
followed and supported, they have not been free from controversy. One
commentator has gone so far as to assert that a ship's nationality is but a
legal fiction, that registration does not afford nationality, and that nationality is not a valid basis for either recognition or the right of a state to
protect its ships." As the practice of using flags of convenience has
grown, with the concurrent growth in opposition to the practice, the idea
of requiring a "genuine link" between a ship and its flag state has developed. As will be seen, this has become a hotly discussed and much

95. See B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 93 for the proposition that granting nationality is
an act of state, conclusive for all purposes. But see Goldie, supra note 86, at 277-79, who
disputes this assertion, maintaining that it is an unwarranted extension of the doctrine.
96. See generally, B. BoczzK, supra note 6, at 106-16; Goldie, supra note 86, at 262-64;
Herman, supra note 9, at 8-9; McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 26-28, 53-66; Watts, The
Protection of Merchant Ships, [1957] Barr. Y.B. Imr'L L. 52, 56.
97. "[I]nternational law does not require that a vessel, in order to be considered of the
nationality of a certain State, be built in such State, be navigated by a crew who are nationals of such State, be owned in whole or in part by its nationals .... ." R. RIENow, supra note
93, at 116.
98. There is actually no correlation between ownership and nationality; the treaties and correspondence of States do not indicate the need for national ownership; and although some States refuse to consider as of their own respective
nationalities, vessels, the titles to which are not held by nationals, their practice indicates that they do not deny other States the privilege of dispensing
with this requirement.
Id. The United States has entered into numerous bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation which provide for reciprocal recognition of national ships based on registration. For example, article XV of the treaty between the United States and Liberia provides:
Merchant vessels and other privately owned vessels under the flag of either of the High Contracting Parties, and carrying the papers required by its
national laws in proof of nationality shall, both within the territorial waters of
the*other High Contracting Party and on the high seas, be deemed to be the
vessels of the Party whose flag is flown.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, United States-Liberia, done at Monrovia,
Aug. 8, 1938, 45 Stat. 1739, 1745 T.S. No. 956, 201 L.N.T.S. 163. See also Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, United States-Honduras, art X, Dec. 7, 1927, 45 Stat.
2618, T.S. No. 764, 87 L.N.T.S. 421. There is no comparable treaty between the United
States and Panama.
99. See Watts, note 96 supra.
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disputed concept.
3. The Genuine Link
The concept of the genuine link was originally proposed by the International Law Commission.'"0 The draft that was finally agreed upon and
presented to the Geneva Conference provided that:
Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality
to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right
to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they
are entitled to fly. Nevertheless, for purposes of recognition of the national character of the ship by other States, there must exist a genuine
link between the State and the ship.' 0'
This version of the concept of the genuine link was conceived shortly after the appearance of the Nottebohm decision by the International Court
of Justice, 03° which found a necessity for a "genuine connection" between
an individual and a State as a condition precedent to conferring nationality. The purpose of the genuine link concept in maritime law was to extend the application of Nottebohm from individuals to ships. Hence, in
order for the nationality of a ship to be recognized by other States, there
must be a "real and effective link" between the ship and the state whose
flag it flies. After considerable discussion both by the International Law
Commission and at the Geneva Conference, the concept was finally
adopted in Article 5 of the High Seas Convention: "There must exist a
genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must
effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical
1' 0 3
and social matters over ships flying its flag.
There is no definition of what constitutes a genuine link anywhere in
the text, principally because there is no agreement as to precisely what it
is.'" The requirement of a genuine link "for purposes of recognition" has
been dropped, but the vague terminology of effective exercise of jurisdiction has been added. A major reason for proposing a requirement of a
genuine link was dissatisfaction by many maritime states with the increasing and illegitimate employment of flags of convenience. It was contended that flag of convenience ships had essentially no meaningful link
with their states of registry, and that, therefore, other states should not
be required to recognize their nationality. 10 5
Both the positive and negative reaction to the genuine link controversy has been voluminous. Professor McDougal maintained that the concept was entirely unsupported by customary international law, that it
100. For the evolution of the concept by the International Law Commission and later at
the Geneva Conference, see McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 104-14; and B. BOCZEK,supra
note 6, at 232-86.
101. Quoted in McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 105.
102. Liechtenstein v. Guatamala, [1955] I.C.J. 4.
103. Note 92 supra. See Herman, supra note 62, at 11.
104. See McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 110-11.
105. See B. BocZEK, supra note 6, at 240-42.
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would in no way solve the problems supposed to exist; furthermore, carried to its logical conclusion, it would produce unnecessary chaos in an
already irrational system.1 06 In recommending that states should reject
the genuine link provision in Article 5, he asserted: "It is yet to be
demonstrated that any conceivable good for the common interest of peoples could attend the introduction of this new-found requirement of genuine link. . . .On the contrary, it would seem reasonably clear that the
only purposes it would serve are those of disruption, controversy and
anarchy.'07
Other writers, however, have maintained that not only does Nottebohm establish the need for a genuine link with respect to flags of convenience, but it also provides authority for concluding "that the mere
grant of nationality to individuals by some States does not bind others to
an unlimited obligation to recognize those grants. . . Recognition may
, . . be dependent upon a regime of the reciprocity or of the community
of law between the creating and recognizing States."' 0 8 It has also been
suggested that the necessary link, rather than being merely registration,
is in reality beneficial ownership. 10 ' Dr. Boczek concludes that:
[T]he Geneva conference has not solved the problem of the flags of
convenience and . . .it is not likely to reduce the tonnage of ships
sailing under flags of convenience. Article 5 does not take into account

106. The introduction into this rational process of decision of the new-found
contrivance of genuine link could do incalculable harm. It could make statelessness commonplace when so far it has existed only as an extreme rarity; it
could undermine, if not render worthless, an enormous number of bilateral
treaties of commerce and navigation, which require recognition of unilateral
competence to determine national character; it could result in assertions of an
unrestricted right of visit and search against vessels navigating on the high
seas suspected of the absence of a genuine link with the state whose flag they
otherwise lawfully fly; it could encourage arbitrary and uncontrollable discrimination by states against vessels of other states; it could create international
tension by authorizing unilateral interferences in matters hitherto regarded as
of strictly national competence, to wit: the comprehensiveness or appropriateness of a state's shipping legislation; . . .and so on, in realistic horribles in
expectation.
McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 114-15.
107. Id. at 115.
A foretaste of the wide possibilities for abuse which the doctrine of genuine link provides is afforded by a news item reporting the first concrete application of this innovation. The report states that the U.S.S.R. has issued an
order which imposes upon all ships flying supposed flags of convenience harbor
fees approximately three times higher than those applicable to vessels of traditional maritime countries. New York Times, Aug. 31, 1958, § 5, p. 11. Since it
is commonly known that 40 percent of these ships are owned by American
corporations, it is easy to see that the genuine link's first practical test has
taken place on the cold-war battlefield.
Id. n.280.
108. Goldie, supra note 86, at 268-69.
109. Watts, supra note 96, at 78-84. This position has been sharply criticized by McDougal, Burke, and Vlasic, and by Boczek.
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the criterion of ownership, confirming thus the established principle
of international law that foreign-owned vessels may be registered
under the flag of any state.110
In the final analysis, perhaps the concept of the genuine link has only
created a furor in academia, without having a significant impact on the
course of international law. It has been asserted that, in spite of the elusiveness of the genuine link theory, most ships do have the requisite link,
even those registered in such countries as Liberia."' Furthermore, in
terms of regulating flag of convenience ships and exercising jurisdiction
over them, it has been suggested that coastal states are well enough able
to provide adequate regulation. Thus, the existence of a genuine link is
pragmatically irrelevant. 1
Nevertheless, the concept of a genuine link is becoming ever more
firmly established. The provision of Article 5 of the High Seas Convention reappears in Articles 91 and 94 of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. 1 In addition,
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has conducted an extensive study on the consequences of the existence or lack of
a genuine link between a ship and its nation of registry. " The Conference recommended that there should be some definition of what constitutes a genuine link, suggesting as elements:
(a) the fact of registration;
(b) a substantial share of beneficial ownership in the vessel by nationals (individuals or legal entities) of the flag state;
(c) the principal place of business and effective management of the
legal entity which has beneficial ownership of the vessel should be in
the flag state; and
(d) the principal officers of the legal entity beneficially owning the
vessel should be nationals of the flag state.1 '
Hence, it may safely be concluded that the genuine link will remain a
concept in international law, in some form, for some time to come. However, it may equally be asserted that the existence of flag of convenience
states has also become firmly established. 1 At this point in time, the

110. B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 285 [citations omitted].
111. See H. MEYEs, supra note 93, at 275-99.
112. See Herman, supra note 9, at 3.
113. United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea; Informal Composite
Negotiating Text from the Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 (1977), reprinted in
16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1108 (1977).
114. UNCTAD Report, note 5 supra.
115. Id. at 20.
116. The Torrey Canyon incident provides an illustration of the difficulty of ascertaining wherein lies the genuine link. The ship was registered under a Liberian flag, owned by a
Bermuda corporation, which was a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, chartered to a British
oil company, and manned by an Italian crew. The accident occurred off the west coast of
England, and the events which followed the accident were handled by the affected coastal
states, Great Britain and France. See Cusine, supra note 8, at 106; Juda, supra note 8, at
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issue of whether the genuine link requirement will pose a significant constraint on the illegitimate employment of the flag of convenience shield
from liability remains unanswered.
4.

The IMCO Controversy

A dispute arose during the late 1950's within the membership of the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization concerning the
composition of its Maritime Safety Committee. Article 28(a) of the constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee provides in part: "The Maritime Safety Committee shall consist of fourteen Members elected by the
Assembly from the Members, governments of those nations having an important interest in maritime safety, of which not less than eight shall be
"I When it came time to elect the
the largest ship-owning nations ....
Committee, disagreement arose as to how to determine the eight largest
ship-owning nations, and whether, once determined, those eight members
were automatically on the Committee. According to Lloyd's Register of
Shipping Statistical Tables for 1958, the eight largest ship-owning countries, determined by gross registered tonnage, included Liberia in third
place and Panama in eighth."g A number of countries, opposed to flag of
convenience registry, asserted that Panama and Liberia were not really
ship-owning countries, that they were not adequately interested in maritime safety, and that, at any rate, they should not automatically be
elected to the Committee.'" Several other methods of determining the
largest ship-owning nations were proposed, and ultimately an election was
held in which neither Panama nor Liberia were elected to the Committee.
The validity of the election was challenged, and the dispute was submitted to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The
Court determined that "where in Article 28(a) 'ship-owning nations' are
referred to, the reference is solely to registered tonnage. The largest shipowning nations are the nations having the largest registered ship tonnage."'" Therefore, by not electing Liberia and Panama to the Committee, the Assembly failed to comply with the requirements of the IMCO
constitution.'
This decision strongly supports the relationship between registration
and nationality. However, there is some disagreement over the significance of the opinion. Professor Boczek asserts that it "will certainly be an
argument for the case of flag of convenience states not only in direct application to the constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the
IMCO... but also in the international legal situation of the flag-of-con-

558.
117. Quoted in B. BOCZEK, supra note 6, at 154.
118. Id. at 131.
119. For a general discussion and analysis of the case, see id. at 125-55.
120. Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion of 8 June 1960, [1960] I.C.J. 150, 170.
121. Id. at 171.
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venience fleets in general.""

On the other hand, Goldie maintains that

"[t]he IMCO advisory opinion was .

.

. a decision which turned'on a

question of treaty interpretation, not of the substantive rights of States
under general international law. ' ' The Court carefully avoided any political implications and made it clear that "any further examination of the
contention based on a genuine link is irrelevant for the purpose of answering the question which has been submitted to the Court ....
Nevertheless, the opinion unquestionably affirms the status of such flag of
convenience states as Liberia and Panama as equal members of the world
maritime community.
5. JurisdictionOver Ships
a.

1
On the High Seas"2

It is a well established rule of international law relating to jurisdiction that:
[Viessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of
the State whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom
of the seas, that is to say, the absence of any territorial sovereignty

upon the high seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction
over foreign vessels upon them.' s

This general principle has been embodied in Article 6 of the High
Seas Convention: "Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and,
save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties
or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the
high seas." The exceptional cases include such things as piracy, slave
trade, hot pursuit, and collisions."17 As will be seen below, certain international conventions dealing with oil pollution provide for intervention
on the high seas by nations other than the flag state.
In view of customary exclusive jurisdiction by the flag state, it is of
general international concern that flag of convenience states do not exercise effective jurisdiction over their registered ships on the high seas, in
part because they are incapable of doing so, and in part because effective
regulation of such ships by flag states would pose a disincentive for flag of
convenience registry.' s It is impossible for a flag of convenience state to
enforce any construction or safety standards on its ships because the
ships rarely sail into its national ports, and its navy is far too small to
police its massive merchant flag fleet."' As will be discussed in detail below, this problem may be minimized by regulations imposed by coastal
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

B. BOcZEK, supra note 6, at 155.
Goldie, supra note 86, at 271.
[1960] I.C.J. at 171.
See generally C. CoLoMBos, supra note 91, at 272-86.
The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 25.
I. BROWNLIE, supra note 91, at 249.
See UNCTAD Report, supra note 5, at 71-74; and MEaYxs, supra note 93, at 291-

98.
129. H. MEys, supra note 93, at 292-95.
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states.'"0
b. In Territorial Waters
When a ship enters territorial waters, or the port of a coastal state, it
is subject to that state's sovereignty and its concurrent jurisdiction over
it. 1"' Generally speaking, the coastal state's right to exercise jurisdiction is
limited to matters which have an effect on that state's interests, and does
not extend to the strictly internal management of the ship's affairs. However, as will be discussed, a coastal state does have jurisdiction to protect
its environment, and may lawfully impose environmental and safety obligations upon any ship that enters its territorial waters and uses its ports.
c. "Effective United States Control"
One of the customary rules of international law is that during times
1
of emergency, a state has the right to requisition ships of its registry. 2
However, the United States has also developed a theory that in times of
national emergency the government may requisition ships in which there
is beneficial ownership in United States citizens.183 In fact, a large portion
of the U.S. flag of convenience fleet has been included in mobilization
capability plans for American defense. 1" The power of the U.S. Government is based on the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, which provides that:
"Whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national
defense makes it advisable. . . it shall be lawful for the Commission...
to requisition or purchase any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens of the United States ...
135
The assertion of this right is based entirely on domestic law and is
against the weight of international law. In any cases where the U.S. has
directed the movements of a U.S.-owned ship of foreign registry, it has
been by virtue of the friendly acquiescence of the flag state. 8 If a situation were to arise in which both the U.S. and the flag state asserted a
right to requisition certain ships, the flag state would have the primary
right under international law. While this situation has not yet arisen, it is
not inconceivable; hence, the effectiveness of the doctrine of "effective
U.S. control" is open to question."s7
Another method of asserting jurisdiction over U.S.-owned ships
(which is somewhat related to the doctrine of "effective U.S. control") is
analogous to piercing the corporate veil. The basis of the claim is an assertion of jurisdiction over United States citizens and their activities, re-

130. Id. at 297.
131. See generally I. BROWNLmI, supra note 91, at 204; C. COLOMBOS, supra note 91, at
290-305; McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 84-88.
132. See McDougal et al., supra note 86, at 63, 65-66.
133. For an exposition and analysis of the doctrine of "effective U.S. control" see B.
BoczzK, supra note 6, at 188-208.
134. Id. at 190-91.
135. Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1976).
136. See B. BoczEK, supra note 6, at 194.
137. See id. at 202-08.
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gardless of where or under what guise they occur. An example is Gerradin
v. United Fruit Co.,l" which involved the application of the Jones Act " "
to a seaman's injury occurring on a ship on the high seas. The ship was
flying a Honduran flag, but was owned by U.S. citizens. In asserting jurisdiction, the court stated:
There can be no doubt about the power of Congress to impose
liability upon its own citizens for acts done on the high seas or at
other places outside its territorial jurisdiction ....
[I]t seems but a
slight disregard of the symbol of foreign registry to apply an ordinary
rule of torts to a shipowner who bears such an illusory shield.4 0
A logical extension of this rationale would allow American courts to enforce a multitude of U.S. statutes against U.S. shipowners, regardless of
the flag of registry or the location of the ship.
IV. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF
MARIrrIME OIL POLLUTION
A.

The Nature and Scope of the Problem
Pollution of the sea by oil is a multi-faceted problem of ever-increasing dimension, which requires a comprehensive regulatory regime if it is
to be adequately contained, and ultimately, eliminated. The tremendous
growth in the transportation of oil and the number and size " ' of tankers 48 has led to the necessity for establishing international standards for
all aspects of tanker operations. While the preceding discussion reviewed
the traditional notions of the law of the seas which placed the right and
obligation of regulating ships upon the flag state, contemporary experience has proven that this regime is wholly inadequate. The example of
Liberia is sufficient to illustrate the problem. In view of the fact that Li-beria has the largest single tanker fleet in the world - twenty-five percent of the world total14 - of which most ships rarely, if ever, sail into
Liberian ports, it is impossible for Liberia to enforce any national legislation over its registered ships, even if it should choose to do so. Nevertheless, there must be some enforceable regulation of transportation on the
high seas, preferably by international cooperation, before the seas irre-

138. 60 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1932).
139. Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976).
140. 60 F.2d at 929. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has more recently concluded
that U.S. labor laws may not be imposed upon flag of convenience vessels. McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
141. See On, TRANSPORTATION BY TANKEts, supra note 10, at 18 and 92.
142. A tanker is defined as a "self-propelled ship designed for carrying liquid oil cargo
in bulk." The capacity of a supertanker is in excess of 100,000 deadweight tons (dwt). The
typical size categories of supertankers are classified as very large crude carriers (VLCC) 200,000-400,000 dwt, and ultra-large crude carriers (ULCC) - greater than 400,000 dwt. The
dimensions of an average 100,000 dwt supertanker are approximately 1,000 feet in length
and 50 feet in draft. There are supertankers under construction of 533,000 dwt, 1,360 feet
long, 208 feet wide, and 93 feet in draft. One ton of crude oil is the equivalent of 311 gallons.
Id. at xvii.
143. See id. at 17.
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trievably fall prey to what may be referred to as "the tragedy of the
44
commons."'
B.

The InternationalConventions of IMCO

There have been a number of multilateral efforts to deal with the
serious problem of oil pollution by maritime vessels at sea.' 45 For example, Article 24 of the High Seas Convention attempts to place the burden
upon individual nations to address this problem, by providing that

"[e]very State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas
by the discharge of oil from ships .
provisions on the subject."

taking account of existing treaty

Most international conventions dealing with the environmental re-

gime of the seas have been drafted by IMCO and presented to the governments of member states for ratification and implementation. IMCO is
among the smallest of the United Nations' specialized agencies. 4s Its
functions are stipulated to be no more than "consultative and advisory." 4" Thus, it may convene conferences, make recommendations to the
world community in the form of draft conventions, and may generally
facilitate intergovermental cooperation on technical matters, including

144. This phenomenon has been related to pollution by Garrett Hardin as follows:
In a reverse way, the tragedy of the commons reappears in problems of
pollution. Here it is not a question of taking something out of the commons,
but of putting something in ....
The calculations of utility are much the same
as before. The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he
discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before
releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of
'fouling our own nest,' so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free
enterprisers.

Quoted in Juda, supra note 8, at 579 n.115. See G.

HARDIN

& J.

BADEN, MANAGING THE

COMMONS (1977).
145. See generally Juda, note 8, supra; Mensh, note 57 supra; Note, International
Conventions on Ship-based Pollution, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 389 (1976); Conventions and
Amendments Relating to Pollution of the Sea by Oil: Hearings on Executive G, Before the
Subcomm. on Oceans and InternationalEnvironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
146. Juda, supra note 8, at 559.
147. Id. One commentator has focused on the weakness of the IMCO organizational
structure:
At present, IMCO is the primary international agency studying the oil pollution area. But IMCO has organizational and political drawbacks. It has no
real regulatory powers; it can only make recommendations to its members. It
seems likely that effective regulation is the most important aspect in the effort
to control pollution. IMCO also is very limited financially and, as a result, cannot undertake ambitious research and planning projects. IMCO is certainly not
independent of the shipping industry in general and relies heavily on research
done by private and public organizations. It is questionable whether such an
organization could ever be effective in controlling pollution regardless of the
expressed position of the international community of states. Thus, a new
organization or a reconstituted IMCO may be required.
Hunter, Possibilitiesand Problems of Preventing Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 4 TRANSP.
L.J. 21, 55 (1972) (citations omitted].
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safety and navigition. " " However, it may not adopt a legally binding instrument; it may do no more than submit proposals to states, which may
or may not be adopted as binding conventions. And although a number of
conventions addressing the subject of maritime pollution and liability
have been drafted and presented by IMCO to the world community for
ratification, "1 9 many have not yet entered into force.
The first convention to be ratified was the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.'" In order for it
to enter into force, assent was required by ten governments, including five
having not less than 500,000 gross tons of tanker tonnage. 5" While the
United States, Liberia, and Panama were not among the first ten to ratify, they have since done so. The Convention applies to seagoing vessels
registered in any of the contracting states, " and prohibits the discharge
of oil or oily mixtures from tankers of 500 tons or larger within 50 miles
of land.1 5 3 Every ship must carry on board an oil record book'" in the
form provided by the Convention, 85 which may be inspected by the
proper authorities of any contracting state. 1 6" Any violations of the standards of the Convention must be reported to the government of the state
of registry," which is then obliged to exact appropriate penalties according to its national laws.'"
In 1962, a conference was convened by IMCO to review this convention. The conference adopted amendments extending its application to
vessels of smaller gross tonnage, and extending the prohibited zones
(where no discharge is allowed). 5" There are currently fifty-two states
party to the convention (including flag of convenience states), which account for ninety-five percent of the world tanker fleet.'" The IMCO Assembly adopted additional amendments to the 1954 convention in 196911
and 1971.1 61 The 1969 amendments provide for further reduction and limitation of the amount of oil that may be discharged. They strictly prohibit

148. Juda, supra note 8, at 559-60. Jurisdiction over economic maritime matters rests
with UNCTAD. Id. at 560.
149. Actually, it was not until the Torrey Canyon disaster that ocean pollution became
a major focus of concern for IMCO. Id. at 562. See generally Nanda, note 8 supra.
150. Entered into force July 26, 1958, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327

U.N.T.S. 3.
151. Id. art. XV.
152. Id. art. II.
153. Id. art. III and Annex A.
154. Id. art. IX(1).
155. Id. Annex B.
156. Id. art. IX(2).
157. Id. art. X.
158. Id. art. VI. See generally Juda, supra note 8, at 560-61.
159. The text of the Amendments which were adopted in 1962 and ratified by the
United States in 1966 appears at 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332.
160. Mensah, supra note 57, at 116.
161. 12 U.S.T. 2989, 17 U.S.T. 1523, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1 (1970).
162. Reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 267 (1972).
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the discharge of more than sixty liters of oil per nautical mile anywhere in
the ocean, even at distances more than fifty miles from shore. " Also, flag
state governments which have been notified of violations by their ships
are required to report to IMCO what action, if any, has been taken
against the ship. The 1971 amendments establish construction standards
based upon the ship's dimensions, providing for compartmentalization,
limitations of tank sizes, and requirements involving the arrangement of
tanks. However, neither of these amendments has yet received adequate
ratification to enter into force.
In 1973 IMCO convened on International Conference on Marine
Pollution, 1" whose purpose was to update the 1954 Pollution Convention
to make it more responsive to current tanker practices. The Conference
produced the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships. 1 " When the convention enters into force, it will supersede
the 1954 convention between those countries that ratify it. In essence, it
incorporated the 1954 convention with amendments, but provides for
complete elimination of intentional pollution and minimization of accidental discharges. 1" It addresses not only the discharge of oil at sea, but
also prevents the discharge of any "harmful substance," a term which is
defined to include "any substance which, if introduced into the sea, is
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and
marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses
of the sea . . . . 67 Each nation which becomes a party to the Convention must promulgate legislation which prohibits and imposes sanctions
on such violations by vessels flying its flag wherever such violations occur.
On the high seas the state of registry will continue to have sole jurisdiction; but if a violation occurs in the territorial waters of a contracting
state, that state may assert jurisdiction, regardless of the registry of the
ship (provided, of course, that the violator flies the flag of a contracting
state).'"
In the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon disaster, the International
Convention Relating to Intervention of the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties'" was adopted in 1969. The purpose of this convention
is to permit a coastal state to intervene on the high seas in the case of a
casualty or the threat of one in order to prevent or minimize harm to its

163. See Juda, supra note 8, at 567.
164. See Mensah, supra note 57, at 117-22; see also 1973 IMCO Conference on Marine
Pollutionfrom Ships, Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
165. Done at London, Nov. 2, 1973, opened for signatureJan. 15, 1974, reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1319 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Convention].
166. Id. Preamble.
167. Id. art. 2.

168. Id. arts. 4 and 6.
169. Done at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, entered into
force for the United States, May 6, 1975; reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Intervention Convention].
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coastal environment. A coastal state is required to notify and consult the
flag state, IMCO, and neighboring coastal states which may also be affected prior to such intervention, except in the case of an extreme emergency when action may be taken without prior notification or consultation. Any intervention must be proportionate to the threat of harm
involved. The Intervention Convention entered into force for the United
States in 1975, and has also been ratified by Liberia. 7
The primary convention relating to liability for oil pollution is the
71
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.
This Convention places strict liability on the shipowner for oil pollution
damage, but in the absence of fault or privity of the shipowner in causing
the damage, he may limit his liability based on the tonnage of the ship to
a maximum of approximately $16.8 million. The Convention requires
shipowners of contracting states to maintain adequate insurance to cover
the full extent of their liability under the Convention. The ship is further
required to carry a certificate evidencing such insurance coverage. A contracting state may deny access to its ports of any ship that does not have
the required insurance certificate, including a ship of a state that is not
party to the convention.17 2 Presumably, this convention would apply to
U.S. shipowners, regardless of the registry of the ship, but for the fact
that the United States has not ratified it.
In view of the fact that the Civil Liability Convention does not provide adequate compensation to victims of oil pollution casualties, in 1971
IMCO drafted the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage.' 7 This
convention establishes a compensation fund of up to thirty million dollars
for oil pollution casualties. The fund is established and maintained by oil
companies in contracting states and provides reimbursement to tanker
owners. However, a tanker owner or his insurer will not be reimbursed in
the event of his failure to comply with IMCO conventions, which itself
provides a strong incentive for compliance. While this convention contains some very effective provisions for ensuring compliance and compen74
sating losses, it has not yet entered into force.
There are, in addition, two voluntary liability plans that have been
implemented by tanker owners. In 1969 the Tanker Owners' Voluntary
Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) 17 5 was

170. See Mensah, supra note 57, at 124-26; Juda, supra note 8, at 566; Wittig, supra
note 63, at 134 n.112.
171. Done at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, reprintedin 9 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 45 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Civil Liability Convention]. See generally, Watson, The 1976 IMCO Limitation Convention: A Comparative View, 15 Hous. L. Rav. 249 (1978).
172. See Mensah, supra note 57, at 126-28; Wittig, supra note 63, at 134-35. The carrier is not, however, liable for damages caused by an act of God, act of war, hostilities, civil
war or insurrection - the traditional common law defenses to liability for common carriers.
173. Done at Brussels, Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 284 (1972).
174. See Juda, supra note 8, at 566-67; Wittig, supra note 63, at 135-136 n.115.
175. Signed Jan. 7, 1969, reprinted in 8 IT'L LEGAL MAT. 497 (1969).
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agreed to, and now embraces ninety-nine percent of the world's tanker
tonnage. The Agreement requires participating tanker owners to reimburse governments for the clean-up costs of oil spills at the rate of $100
per gross registered ton or $10 million per incident.17 A second agreement, the Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
for Oil Pollution (CRISTAL),' 7 7 was entered into in 1971 and increases
liability coverage to thirty million dollars per incident. Both of these
agreements are intended to be temporary measures, pending the entry
into force of the IMCO conventions.
C. The Law of the Sea Treaty
The draft Law of the Sea Treaty1 78 includes several provisions significantly affecting the rights and duties of vessels on the high seas and in
territorial waters. As of the date of this writing, the draft convention had
not yet been completed and opened for signature; nevertheless, it was
contemplated that it would be tendered to the world community during
1981.179 Although its emphasis is on matters other than the environment,
and it was drafted outside the framework of IMCO, the Law of the Sea
Treaty will, when consummated, have an important role in restricting
maritime pollution. It strongly reaffirms many of the principles to which
this article is addressed.
Although the draft Law of the Sea Treaty extends the territorial limits of coastal states to twelve nautical miles, 80 it provides for the right of
innocent passage through waters.'18 This right may be circumscribed by
the coastal state where the vessel engages in "willful and serious pollution. . . ." 8' Moreover, the coastal states may adopt measures which regulate innocent passage through territorial waters where necessary to ensure the "preservation of the environment of the coastal state and the

prevention, reduction and control of pollution.

. .

.,1183

Ships in transit

have the coordinate obligations to comply with international standards
regarding both safetyas and environmental pollution.188

176. See Wittig, supra note 63, at 136.
177. Id.
178. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text); Third U.N. Conference
on the Law of the Sea, Resumed Ninth Session, Geneva (July 28-Aug. 29, 1980), U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/WP.10/Rev.3/Add.1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as the Law of the Sea Treaty]. See
generally, Rusk &Ball, Sea Changes and the American Republic, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
1 (1979); Charney, Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 598 (1977).
179. United States Delegation, Report of the Resumed Ninth Session of the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, at ii (July 28-Aug. 29, 1980).
180. Law of the Sea Treaty, art. 3.
181. Id. art. 17. See id. art. 52.
182. Id. art. 19, § 2(h).
183. Id. art. 21, § 1(f). The coastal state may impose regulations designed to conserve
"the living resources of the sea . .. ," id. art. 21 § 1(d). Such requirements shall not, however, "apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships unless they
are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards." Id. art. 21 § 2. See
id. art. 24.
184. Id. art. 39, § 2(a).
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Freedom of navigation on the high seas also is reaffirmed by the Law
of the Sea Treaty. ' The right of flag states to issue standards regulating
the granting of "nationality to ships . . . the registration of ships in its
territory, and. . . the right to fly its flag. . . " is limited to the requirement of a "genuine link between the state and the ship."'' s Moreover, the
Treaty imposes specific obligations on flag states to insure that ships
flying their flags meet minimum safety standards. '
Throughout the Treaty, the right of coastal states to take such measures "as may be necessary to prevent, mitigate or eliminate grave and
immediate danger to their coastlines, or related interests from pollution
or threat thereof or from hazardous occurrences . . . "'8 is explicitly reaffirmed. 9 ' Further, all states have the obligation, either individually or
jointly, to take such measures as are necessary "to prevent, reduce and
control pollution from any source. .. ",, including "[plollution from vessels, in particular measures for preventing . . . intentional and unintentional discharges. . .. ."91 States are collectively bound to consummate
multilateral negotiations leading to the establishment of "international
rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
of the marine environment from vessels. . .19

185. Id. art. 39, § 2(b). See id. art. 43.
186. Id. art. 87, § 1(a).
187. Id. art. 91, § 1. See id. art. 90. See also text accompanying notes 100-116, supra.
188. Id. art. 94. Specifically, the flag state must impose safety regulations involving:
(a) The construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;
(b) The manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews, taking
into account the applicable international instruments:
(c) The use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions.
Id. art. 94, § 3. These regulations shall embrace those measures essential to ensure:
(a) That each ship ... is surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has
on board such charts, nautical publications and navigational equipment and
instruments as are appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship;
(b) That each ship is in the charge of a master and officers who possess appropriate qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, communications and marine engineering...;
(c) That [they] are fully conversant with and required to observe the applicable international regulations concerning ... the prevention of collisions, [and]
pollution. ....

Id. art. 94, § 4.
189. Id. art. 142, § 3.
190. See id. arts. 145, 211 §§ 4-6, 200. Such measures may include activities beyond the
territorial waters of a coastal state where necessary, under circumstances consistent with
general principles of international law, and proportionate to the injury threatened, "to protect their coastlines or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty ..
" Id. art. 221, § 1. The
circumstances under which a coastal state may examine a foreign flag vessel are limited. See
id., art. 226.
191. Id. art. 194, § 1.
192. Id. art. 194, § 3(b).
193. Id. art. 211, § 1.
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THE UNILATERAL EFFORTS OF COASTAL STATES

A number of coastal states, having been the victims of dumped oil,
have grown dissatisfied with both the traditional flag of convenience doctine,' " and the general failure of the world community to achieve agree-

ment on means to resolve the continuing crisis through multilateral conventions. This dissatisfaction has led to the unilateral promulgation of
legislation to deal with the problem. The laws of two such nations, the
United Kingdom and the United States, will be explored here.
A. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has enacted a series of statutes dealing with oil
pollution, ranging from laws asserting jurisdiction over ships causing pollution to legislation imposing liability for any damage caused. Several of
these statutes represent domestic enactments of international conventions, one of which has not yet entered into force internationally.
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 19711" amended previous acts of
1955 and 1963 to give effect to the amendments to the 1954 International
Pollution Convention in the United Kingdom. It further enables the
British Government to take action against any ship in its territorial or
internal waters, regardless of registry, which has caused an oil pollution
casualty.
The Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act of 19711" enacts into
British law the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.9 7 As mentioned above, the act provides for strict liability
and under certain circumstances allows for limitation of liability for oil
pollution damage. Such liability is imposed on the owner of the ship, re-

gardless of state of registry; access to British ports is dependent upon
compliance with the required certification of adequate insurance
coverage.
The Prevention of Oil Pollution Act of 197110' is a consolidation of

previous Oil in Navigable Waters Acts. It primarily provides jurisdiction
over territorial waters to prevent oil pollution, as well as over British
ships causing pollution anywhere. Its enforcement mechanisms are carried out by use of oil records, power of inspection, enforcement of applicable conventions, prosecution, and imposition of fines for violations.
Finally, the Merchant Shipping Act of 19741" is an enactment of the

International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. Although this Convention
194. It is ironic that coastal states such as the United States would be dissatisfied with
the flag of convenience doctrine, since U.S. tax and labor laws provide a significant economic
incentive for U.S. Shipowners to register their vessels abroad. See note 271 infra.
195. 1971, ch. 21, 41 HALSBURy'S STATUTES at 1330.
196. 1971, ch. 59, id. at 1345.
197. For an analysis of the 1971 act, see Cusine, note 8 supra.
198. 1971, ch. 60, 41 HALSBURY'S STATUTzS at 1361.
199. 1974, ch. 43, 44 id. at 1415 (1974).
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has not yet entered into force in the international sphere, it has been
implemented in the United Kingdom, and provides compensation from
the Fund to any victim of oil pollution damage who is unable to obtain
complete recovery from the person liable under the Merchant Shipping
(Oil Pollution) Act of 1971.
As can be seen, the legal regime in force in the United Kingdom corresponds very closely to the international framework, and is in the forefront of implementing the most recent international conventions. The
statutory scheme allows assertion of jurisdiction in territorial waters over
any vessel, regardless of registry, which threatens to cause oil pollution.
In addition, a liability scheme has been established which ensures the victim as complete compensation as possible, and places liability on the parties who most fairly should bear it - the ship owner and the owner of the
oil cargo.
B. The United States
The United States has enacted a substantial body of law to deal with
oil pollution in U.S. waters, establishing minimum standards for ships using U.S. ports, jurisdiction over ships in U.S. waters, and liability for pollution damage. This statutory scheme partially embodies existing international conventions, and is in part unilateral.
1. Early U.S. Legislation
The first legislation to provide a basis for the regulation of both domestic and foreign ships in United States harbors was enacted by ,Congress in 1917. This legislation conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury the power to control "anchorage and movement of any vessel, foreign
or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States" during times
of national emergency due to war or threatened war.0s0 The 1917 legislation was amended in 1950 to place the regulatory power under the Presi0 Although this act estabdent, as well as the Secretary of the Treasury."'
lished substantial authority for the control of movement and anchorage of
foreign flag vessels in United States waters, it may be invoked only "when
200. Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 24, Title I, § 1, 40 Stat. 220 (1917).
Whenever the President by proclamation or Executive order declares a national emergency to exist by reason of actual or threatened war, insurrection,
or invasion, or disturbance of international relations of the United States, the
Secretary of the Treasury may make, subject to the approval of the President,
rules and regulations governing the anchorage and movement of any vessel,
foreign or domestic, in the territorial waters of the United States, may inspect
such vessel at any time, place guards thereon, and, if necessary in his opinion
in order to secure such vessels from damage or injury, or to prevent damage or
injury to any harbor or waters of the United States, or to secure the observance
of the rights and obligations of the United States, may take, by and with the
consent of the President, for such purposes, full possession and control of such
vessel and remove therefrom the officers and crew thereof and all other persons
not specially authorized by him to go or remain on board thereof.
201. Act of August 9, 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1980). A 1979 amendment deletes
the Panama Canal Zone from the jurisdiction of the Act. 50 U.S.C. § 191 (Supp. IV 1980).
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the national security of the United States is endangered. 20 2 This legislation, therefore, does not provide an adequate basis for the regulation of
vessel safety and operations in the normal course of activity.
As a consequence, in 1936 Congress enacted a law governing the inspection of vessels, which for the first time provided a basis for federal
safety regulation of the carriage of "inflammable or combustible liquid
cargo in bulk. 202 The 1936 act created a "Board of Supervising Inspectors" under the Secretary of Commerce, which was empowered to establish rules and regulations basically concerning the design, construction,
alteration and repair of vessels which come within the purview of the
4
20

act.

Further, the 1936 act prohibited the carriage of inflammable or combustible cargo, unless the carrying vessel had been issued a "certificate of
inspection.

. .

and.

. .

a. permit has been endorsed on such certificate of

inspection by a board of local inspectors, indicating that such vessel is in
compliance with the provisions of this section and the rules and regulations established hereunder .. ."05 Although the 1936 act specifically
applied to "all vessels," an express exception was carved out with respect
to foreign vessels: "the provision of this subsection shall not apply to vessels of a foreign nation having on board a valid certificate of inspection
recognized under law or treaty by the United States. . .. ,," Therefore,
this legislation provided no basis for the regulation of foreign vessels.
A second weakness of the 1936 act was in the area of crew certification. The act provided for crew member certification only where "the certificate of inspection does not require at least two licensed officers."' °
However, even where crew member certification was mandated, the
"number of the crew required to be certificated as tankermen,' ' 0 8 was

entirely left to the discretion of the board of local inspectors.. Also, the
criteria for certification were ill-defined by the Act, and could be imposed
on a discretionary basis by the Board of Supervising Inspectors. Therefore, the 1936 act, while providing a valuable legislative basis for tanker
202. S. REP. No. 2118, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 2954, 2954.
203. Act of June 23, 1936, Pub. L. No. 765 § 1, 49 Stat. 1889 (1936) [hereinafter cited as
1936 act].
204. Id. § 2:
In order to secure effective provision against the hazards of life and property
created by the vessels to which this section applies, the Board of Supervising
Inspectors, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, shall establish
such additional rules and regulations as may be necessary with respect to the
design and construction, alteration, or repair of such vessels . ...
205. Id. § 4.
206. Id. § 1.
207. Id. § 4.
208. Id. § 6a. "In all cases where the certificate of inspection does not require at least
two licensed officers, a board of local inspectors shall enter in the permit issued to any vessel
under the provisions of this section the number of the crew required to be certified as
tankermen." Id.
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design and construction requirements, did not establish a sufficient
means for the regulation of foreign flag vessels, or the certification of tank
ship crew members.
2. Contemporary U.S. Legislation
In 1961 Congress promulgated the Oil Pollution Act,20" which implemented the 1954 International Pollution Convention. 10 The act was
amended in 19731 to bring into force as to the United States the afore-

mentioned 1969 and 1971 amendments. The only other irternational convention to be implemented by the United States is the Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas,"'
which has been enacted as the
13
Intervention on the High Seas Act."

For the purpose of establishing the extent of United States territorial
jurisdiction over all ships, the U.S. is a party to the Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone."' The convention establishes
the jurisdiction of a coastal state over its territorial waters,2" and the
extent of jurisdiction permissible in the contiguous zone,"26 which is
twelve miles from the baseline."17 In the case of a ship entering internal
waters, the coastal state has "the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to
those waters is subject."2' A foreign ship "exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the
coastal State in conformity with these articles and other rules of international law and, in particular, with such laws and regulations relating to
transport and navigation. ' 1' " The convention, therefore, allows a coastal
state to enforce its environmental and navigation laws against all ships
entering its territorial waters or contiguous zone, regardless of registry.
This allows a coastal state to create, in essence, a twelve-mile pollution
0
control zone."
The first significant attempt in the United States to promulgate comprehensive legislation concerning tanker safety was the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972.221 Congress recognized the growing dependence
209. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1016 (1976).

210. Note 150 supra.
211. Oil Pollution Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-119, § 1, 87 Stat. 424
(1973) (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1016 (1976)).
212. Note 169 supra.
213. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1471-87 (1976).
214. Done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. Entered into
force for the United States on September 10, 1964.
215. Id. art. 1.
216. Id. art. 24(1).
217. Id. art. 24(2).
218. Id. art. 16(2).
219. Id. art. 17.
220. See Wulf, Contiguous Zones for Pollution Control: An Appraisal Under International Law, SEA GRANT TECHNICAL BULLErN No. 13 (Univ. of Miami Sea Grant Program

1971).
221. Pub. L. No. 92-340, Titles I and II, 86 Stat. 424 (1972) (prior to the 1978 amend-
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of the United States on imported oil, and the increased threat to the environment and risks which would naturally result therefrom.2 2 Hence,
the primary emphasis of the 1972 Act was the prevention of pollution
rather than compensation or liability. In reviewing the 1972 legislation,
Congress concluded that: "Unfortunately, no amount of after-the-fact reporting, liability, and efforts at cleanup will effectively prevent the growing incidence of oil spill tragedies,
or restore environmental and ecological
'' 8
resources once destroyed.

The 1972 act was divided into two parts.2 1 4 The first dealt with
waterway and port safety, and provided a legislative basis for the regulation of navigable waters, ports, and harbors.225 The second consisted of an
extensive revision of the Tank Vessel Act of 1936.22 Thus, the 1972 act
attacked the problem from two directions: traffic control procedures, and
vessel design and construction." 7 This two-pronged approach however,
was to prove inadequate, in that it perpetuated one of the principle weaknesses of the Tank Vessel Act of 1936. The 1972 act left virtually unchanged the provision of the 1936 act dealing with crew certification. Additionally, the problem of absence of effective control over foreign vessels
remained.

ment) [hereinafter cited as 1972 act].
222. S.R"i. No. 92-724, 92d Cong., 2d Seas., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2766, 2772 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 92-724]:
Other data received indicated that the importation of an incremental 10 to
11 million barrels per day of overseas crude oil and products projected by the
National Petroleum Institute by 1985 would require more than 350 tankers,
each of 250,000 deadweight tons. In gas, the importation of 4 trillion cubic feet
of liquid natural gas annually by 1985 would require the building of 120
tankers each having a maximum capacity of the equivalent of approximately
790,000 barrels.
Even if the foregoing projections prove to be greatly overstated, there is no
question that the increase in waterborne movement of oil and hazardous
cargoes which will occur has grave implications for the quality of the marine
environment and requires positive action now.
223. Id. at 2769.
224. Titles I and II, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424 (1972).
225. Title I of the 1972 act was captioned "Ports and Waterways Safety and Environmental Quality." Regulations promulgated pursuant to Title I were set forth in 33 C.F.R.
§§ 160-62, 164, 165 (1973). Title I was codified in 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227.
226. Title II of the 1972 act was captioned "Vessels Carrying Certain Cargoes in Bulk."
Title II was codified at 46 U.S.C. § 391a.
227. S. REP. No. 92-724, supra note 222, at 2773.
Although concurring in the need for vessel traffic services, systems and controls
contained in H.R. 8140, the committee believed that a comprehensive approach to the prevention of pollution from marine operations and casualties
required, in addition, improvement of the vessels themselves: their design, construction, maintenance, and operation. The testimony and data received at the
committee's hearings in September made this conclusion inescapable. It is
clear that a systems approach to prevention of damage to the marine environment requires not only better control of vessel traffic but an improvement in
the vessels themselves.
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More recent environmental regulations of the United States regarding pollution control in the territorial sea are quite comprehensive and
stringent, and apply to all ships entering U.S. territorial waters, regardless of state of registry. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974228 concerns the
construction, operation, location, and ownership of deepwater ports beyond U.S. territorial limits. The act prohibits the discharge of any oil into
the sea from a vessel within the safety zone."' A penalty for violation
may be assessed against the vessel owner or operator in the amount of
$10,000.130 In the event of an oil discharge, the owner and operator of the
vessel are jointly and severally liable for clean-up costs, without regard to
fault, in the amount of the lesser of $150 per gross ton or $20 million,
unless gross negligence and wilfull misconduct with privity of the owner is
shown. 31 A foreign vessel may not use a deepwater port unless its state of
registry has specifically agreed to recognize U.S. jurisdiction over vessels
in deepwater ports, and has designated an agent in the U.S. for receipt of
service of process in the event of a claim against the vessel or its
personnel.232

However, the inadequacies of both the 1972 and 1974 acts became
painfully apparent after a rash of tanker accidents in U.S. waters and in
the coastal waters offshore.232 In response to these inadequacies, Congress
in 1978 enacted the most comprehensive and far reaching legislation in
U.S. history, the Port and Tanker Safety Act."' This 1978 act sought to
improve on the 1972 act not only in the areas of construction and operations, but also in the areas of personnel qualifications and control over
foreign flag vessels."' Perhaps the two most significant additions to the

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
CONG. &

33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976).
Id. § 1517(a)(1). See id. §§ 1502(16), 1509(d)(1).
Id. § 1517(a)(2).
Id. § 1517(d).
Id. § 1518(c).
H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
AD. NEWS 3270, 3273 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 95-1384]:
On occasion, proposed regulations have been criticized as weak and ineffective, and the Coast Guard's reluctance to proceed expeditiously has resulted, in at least one occasion, in a law suit by environmental interests to
mandate more rapid implementation by the Coast Guard.
This was the overall situation in December of 1976 when a rash of tanker
accidents in U.S. waters and in the coastal waters offshore focused public and
congressional attention on the problem.
See also Recent Tanker Accidents: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
234. Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-474, 92 Stat. 1471 (to be
codified in 33 U.S.C. 1222, -24, -28, -32, and 46 U.S.C. 214 and 391) [hereinafter cited as
1978 act).
235. H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, supra note 233, at 3270-71.
It is obvious that improvements can be made in the supervision and control
over all types of vessels, foreign and domestic, operating in the navigable waters of the United States; and in the safety of all tank vessels, foreign and
domestic, which transport and transfer oil or other hazardous cargoes in ports
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1978 act are its provisions to regulate more effectively both foreign vessels

and crew qualifications.
The 1978 act significantly amends Title I of the 1972 act. Under the
new amendments, the Secretary of the department in which the Coast

Guard is operating (i.e. as of the date of this writing, the Department of
Transportation) is authorized to issue regulations compelling compliance
with the vessel traffic service in each area of operation.8 3 Most significant, however, is the inclusion of enforcement provisions which provide
for civil and criminal penalties, in rem liability, injunction, and withholding of clearance (by the Secretary of the Treasury).' 7 The liability provision is included to insure the enforcement of civil penalties so that "the
vessel involved shall be liable in rem and proceeded against wherever
found. 2 8 8 In addition to these enforcement powers, the Secretary is also
given investigatory powers,"'9 and the power to condition entry to ports of
the United States."0
Among the important exceptions to these powers, which allow the
Secretary to deny entry, is that such denial shall be "subject to recognized principles of international law.' 4 1 This rather vague limitation is
only somewhat clarified by the legislative history. The legislative history
of the act specifies force majeure as one recognized principle of international law to which the Secretary's power of denial is subject; nevertheless, it leaves open the question of other "recognized principles of international law" which may compel entry, e.g. entry in distress.''

or places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Improvements can
also be made in the control and monitoring of vessels operating in offshore
waters near our coastlines. There is also a demonstrated need for improved
personnel qualifications, including improved pilotage standards for the issuance of Federal licenses, as well as realistic manning standards for vessels using
our ports.
236. Regulations promulgated under the amended Title I are contained in 33 C.F.R.
9§ 160-62, 164 and 165 (1979).
237. 1978 act, § 13.
238. Any vessel subject to the provisions of this chapter, which is used in violation of this chapter, or any regulations issued hereunder, shall be liable in rem
for any civil penalty assessed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and
may be proceeded against in the United States district court for any district in
which such vessel may be found.
Id. § 13(c).
239. Id. § 8.
240. Id. § 9.
241. Id. § 13(e). 33 U.S.C. § 1232(e) sets forth:
Except as provided in section 9, the Secretary may, subject to recognized principles of international law, deny entry into the navigable waters of the United
States or to any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States to
any vessel not in compliance with the provisions of this Act or the regulations
issued hereunder.
242. H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, supra note 233, at 3285. "[Tlhe Secretary may deny entry
to any vessel not in compliance with the act or regulation, subject to such recognized international principles as force majeure." Id.
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Therefore, even under the present limitation of force majeure, query
if a tanker, badly damaged in a storm and capable only of making a
United States port, could be turned away, regardless of the danger to the
harbor or potential of catastrophe. The doctrine of force majeure would
appear to compel entry in such a situation.2 4 A second notable exception,
also presumably included in a deference to international law, permits free
passage through U.S. territorial waters of vessels originating at and destined to foreign ports. "

243. See Hoff, Administratrix (United States v. United Mexican States), 4 U.N. Rep.
LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL

Int'l Arb. Awards 444, reportedin N.
LEGAL SYSTEM 167, 169 (1973).

[Tihere appears to be general recognition among the nations of the world of
what may doubtless be considered to be an exception, or perhaps it may be
said two exceptions, to this general, fundamental rule of subjection to local
jurisdiction over vessels in foreign ports.
Recognition has been given to the so-called right of "innocent passage" for
vessels through the maritime belt in so far as it forms a part of the high seas
for international traffic. Similarly, recognition has also been given - perhaps it
may be said in a more concrete and emphatic manner - to the immunity of a
ship whose presence in the territorial waters is due to a superior force. The
principles with respect to the status of a vessel in "distress" find recognition
both in domestic laws and in international law.
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 48 (1965):
(1) A foreign vessel or aircraft has the right to enter the territory of a state
when such entry is necessary for the safety of the vessel, aircraft or persons
aboard, and to leave the territory once the conditions that made the entry necessary have ceased to exist.
(2) The territorial state may not exercise its jurisdiction under the rule stated
in § 20 to enforce rules prescribed by it with respect to
(b) the possession or carriage of property aboard a foreign vessel or
aircraft entering in distress, bona fide and without intent to evade the
customs and antismuggling laws of the coastal state, except in so far as
such regulation may reasonably be necessary for reasons of health or
safety of the coastal state [emphasis supplied].
244. 1978 act § 2(4)(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1223(d):
Except pursuant to international treaty, convention, or agreement, to which
the United States is a party, this chapter shall not apply to any foreign vessel
that is not destined for, or departing from, a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and that is in (1) innocent passage through the territorial Sea of the United States, or
(2) transit through the navigable waters of the United States which
form a part of an international strait.
See H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, supra note 233, at 3282, which states that:
Subsection (d) exempts from the applicability of the Act any foreign vessel in
innocent passage through the territorial sea of the United States or any foreign
vessel in transit through navigable waters of the United States which form a
part of an international strait, unless that vessel is destined for or departing
from a port or place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This exemption of foreign vessels is consistent with international law and may, of
course, be lifted pursuant to any international treaty, convention, or agreement
to which the United States is a party and by which the flag state of the vessel
involved is bound.
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The significance of these two exceptions will largely depend upon the
volume of tanker traffic plying the waters off the coast of the United
States, but not destined for any United States port. The development of
Mexican oil may well result in a significant increase in traffic of this
nature, which passes through United States waters (e.g., destined for
Europe), endangering valuable environmental and ocean resources, yet
which is nevertheless exempted from the reach of this legislation. This
would appear to be an instance where the national interests of the United
States are so great as to warrant some degree of regulation even of innocent passage through United States territorial waters.
The 1978 act also significantly amends Title II of the 1972 act. The
importance of this part of the 1978 act is in its recognition of the inadequacy of existing international standards, and willingness to unilaterally
enact stricter standards.' 4 The Secretary has been given broad power to
issue, amend, or repeal regulations relating, 46 inter alia to:
(i) superstructures, hulls, cargo holds or tanks, fittings, equipment,
appliances, propulsion machinery, auxiliary machinery, and boilers;
(ii) the handling or stowage of cargo, the manner of such handling or
stowage of cargo, and the machinery and appliances used in such handling or stowage;
(iii) equipment and appliances for lifesaving, fire protection, and
prevention and mitigation of damage to the marine environment;
(iv) the manning of such vessels and the duties, qualifications, and
training of the officers and crew thereof... ;
(v) improvements in vessel maneuvering and stopping ability and
other features which reduce the possibility of collision, grounding, or

245. To the extent feasible, the committee elected to endorse standards internationally agreed to. However, it declined to await the ratification of any international agreement on this subject and established specific dates on which certain standards would go into effect, whether or not there is a final convention
in force at the time of such effective dates. Furthermore, the committee indicated its concern that the international conference chose not to require certain
modifications of existing vessels which it would require for certain new
vessels....
The Committee has elected to impose additional requirements on all U.S.
vessels beyond those which, present indications are, would be imposed by international agreement. It makes the same additional requirements applicable
to foreign vessels which elect to operate within the navigable waters of the
United States.
Id. at 3289-90.
Actually, this concept is anolagous to the domestic transportation concept of the "land
bridge exemption," which exempts from U.S. economic regulation surface movements in
foreign commerce which have both an origin and destination outside the territory of the
United States. See Dempsey, The Contemporary Evolution of Intermodal and International Transport Regulation Under the Interstate Commerce Act: Land, Sea and Air Coordination of Foreign Commerce Movements, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505, 513-18 (1977);
Dempsey, Foreign Commerce Regulation Under the Interstate Commerce Act: Intermodal
Coordinationof InternationalTransportation in the United States, 5 SYR. J. INT'L L. &
COM. 53, 66-71 (1977).

246. H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, supra note 233, at 3289-90. See note 225 supra.
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other accidents;
(vi) the reduction of cargo loss in the event of a collision, grounding,
or other accident; and
(vii) the reduction or elimination of discharges during ballasting,
2 47
deballasting, tank cleaning, cargo handling, or other such activity.

In addition to the regulations which may be issued by the Secretary,
minimum standards are also established under the 1978 act. These standards place specific requirements on "vessels between 20,000 and 40,000
deadweight tons which reach an age of 15 years by January 1, 1985,"'"

new tank vessels,2 4 9 and self-propelled vessels.' 50

.Other provisions of the 1978 act require certification of compliance

and establish personnel and manning standards for both U.S. and foreign
vessels. 25 ' Thus, the 1978 act establishes "a procedure whereby the Secre-

247. 1978 act § 5(6)(A), 46 U.S.C. § 391a(6)(A). Regulations promulgated pursuant to
this section are contained in volume 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
248. H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, supra note 233, at 3290.
249. Under the 1978 act § 5(7)(K), 46 U.S.C. § 391a(7)(K), a'vessel complies with minimum U.S. standards,
(K) if a new tanker of 10,000 gross tons or above, be equipped with (i) two remote steering gear control systems operable separately from
the navigating bridge; ...
(ii) main steering gear control in the steering compartment;
(iii) means of communications and rudder angle indicators on the navigating bridge, remote steering gear control station, and the steering gear
compartment;
(iv) two or more identical and adequate power units for the main
steering gear;
(v) an alternative and adequate power supply, either from an emergency source of electrical power or from another source of power located
in the steering gear compartment; and
(vi) means of automatic starting and stopping of power units with attendant alarms at all steering stations.
250. Additionally, the 1978 act § 5(7)(J), 46 U.S.C. § 391a(7)(J), sets forth the following
minimum standards:
(J) if of 10,000 gross tons or above, not later than June 1, 1979, [a vessel] be
equipped with (i)
a dual radar system, with short-range and with long-range capabilities and each with true-north features;
(ii)
an electric relative motion analyser, which is at least functionally
equivalent to such equipment complying specifications established by
the United States Maritime Administration;
(iii) an electronic position fixing device;
(iv) adequate communications equipment;
(v)
a sonic depth finder;
(vi) a gyrocompass; and
(vii) up-to-date charts:
Provided, That the effective date of compliance with the requirement of clause
(ii) shall be July 1, 1982 or such earlier date as agreed to internationally and
accepted by the United States.
251. Subsection 8 of Section 5 requires certificates of compliance for both United States
and foreign vessels. Subsections 9 and 10 establish personnel and manning standards for
United States and foreign vessels respectively. Subsection 10(B) provides that:

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 10:37

tary can be assured that foreign crews on foreign flag tankers do not constitute an unacceptable threat to U.S. waters and the marine environment."2 5 2 The act provides for enforcement, "5 and establishes a national
program of inspection to insure compliance. 2 " Finally, in an attempt to
decrease nontraumatic sources of oil pollution, the 1978 act imposes controls on lightering,' and prohibits the "discharge of tank washings by
dumping at sea." These two final provisions are of tremendous importance considering the large amount of pollution which results solely from
normal tanker operations.'"
A final area which remains to be examined is the possibility of state
regulation where federal regulation is found to be wanting. In Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,15 7 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional sections
of the Washington tanker law, which placed size limitations and operating restrictions on tankers entering Puget Sound. The Court essentially
held those provisions of the state legislation invalid which interfered with
a "uniform national rule," such as those regarding design, construction,
and size limitations. The Court, however, upheld provisions requiring tug
escorts, and to some extent, local pilotage.

Any foreign vessel having on board oil or hazardous materials in bulk as cargo
or in residue shall have a special number of personnel certificated as
tankermen, or equivalent, as may be required by the Secretary, when the vessel
transfers oil or hazardous materials in any port or place to the jurisdiction of
the United States; and such requirement shall be noted in applicable terminal
operating procedures. No transfer operations may take place unless the crew
member in charge is capable of clearly understanding instructions in English.
Id., § 5(10)(B), 46 U.S.C. § 391a(10)(B).
252. H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, supra note 233, at 3294.
253. 1978 act, § 13.
254. As is explained in the legislative history;
With respect to foreign flag vessels, the procedures would be similar and consistent with existing procedures, except that a foreign-issued certificate would
not be automatically accepted as adequate. The Secretary would be required to
examine the vessel and may, as a basis for the issuance of a certificate of compliance, accept in whole or in part a foreign-issued certificate.
H.R. REP. No. 95-1384, supra note 233, at 3296.
255. Id. at 3297-98:
This subsection provides new legislative authority for the control of lightering
operations; that is, the practice of transferring cargoes at sea from large deepdraft vessels to shallow-draft vessels for subsequent transfer to shoreside terminals, a practice which has proliferated due to the inability of the larger tankers to enter our shallow ports. It prohibits a tanker from unloading any cargo
of oil or hazardous material at any port or terminal under the jurisdiction of
the United States, unless such cargo has been transferred in accordance with
any lightering regulations that have been promulgated by the Secretary.
256. S. REP. 92-724, supra note 222, at 2779. "Even more important than accidental
spills, is pollution occuring from the normal, everyday operation of tankers, primarily from
deballasting operations and tank flushing. According to the Environmental Protection
Agency, this accounts for 11 percent of the total oil pollution of the sea." Id.
257. 435 U.S. 151 (1978). For a discussion of this case, see Note, Oil Spills - State
Prevention and the Possibility of Pre-Emption, 30 MERCER L. REv. 559 (1979); Note, Oil
Tanker Regulation: A State or Federal Area? 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 701 (1979).
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The 1978 act contains two provisions with respect to state law. The
first permits states to impose more stringent safety standards than those
imposed by the federal government.2 5" The second allows the Secretary to
license pilots under circumstances where the relevant state government
has not imposed licensing requirements.15 It must be borne in mind that
vessels under 10,000 tons are not required to be equipped with electronic
devices designed to prevent collisions from occurring."' The 1978 act has
left the States with the freedom to impose more stringent safety standards. The states, therefore, must independently evaluate the safety standards and requirements imposed under the 1978 act.
Turning to the issue of carrier liability, the United States has not
ratified the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, which contains provisions for civil liability for oil pollution, as
well as for limitation of liability. The overall scheme is extremely complex
and confusing to apply, largely because of the fine line that must be trod
with regard to federal-state jurisdiction. While a detailed discussion of
liability provisions is beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to
mention the federal acts that are applicable. The act which has been in
existence for the longest period of time, and still survives in some form, is
the Limitation of Liability Act.26 ' The scope of its application has been
26 2
somewhat narrowed by the Water Pollution Control Act.
Part of the difficulty in the regulation of oil pollution lies in the concurrent competence of both the federal statutory scheme and that of the
individual coastal states. Coastal states are allowed to implement and enforce pollution control regulations in their territorial waters,26 but in
areas where there exists a uniform federal policy, the coastal states may
not enact any conflicting legislation. 2 6 There may be some hope for clarification of the current confusion should the Comprehensive Oil Pollution

258. 1978 act § 2(6)(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which provides: "Nothing contained in this
section, with respect to structures, prohibits a State or political subdivision thereof, from
prescribing higher safety equipment requirements or safety standards than those which may
be prescribed by regulations hereunder."
259. Id. § 2 (7), 33 U.S.C. § 1226, which provides:
The Secretary may require federally licensed pilots on any self-propelled vessel, foreign or domestic, engaged in the foreign trade, when operating in the
navigable waters of the United States in areas and under circumstances where
a pilot is not otherwise required by State law. Any such requirement shall be
terminated when the State having jurisdiction over the area involved establishes a requirement for a State licensed pilot and has so notified the
Secretary.
260. 1978 act, § 5(7)(k).
261. For further analysis of the complexity of liability for oil pollution, see Sisson, Oil
Pollution Law and the Limitation of Liability Act: A Murky Sea for Claimants Against
Vessels, 9 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 285 (1978); Post, Private Compensation for Injuries Sustained by the Dischargeof Oil from Vessels on the Navigable Waters of the United States,
SEA GRArr TECHNIcAL BULLMN No. 22 (Univ. of Miami Sea Grant Program 1972).
262. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (1976).
263. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
264. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
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Liability and Compensation Act s66 be consummated.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The conduct of the United States Government in the area of international environmental and transportation law relating to oil tankers deserves no applause from the world community. Paradoxically, U.S. labor
and tax interests have created an economic regime which frequently
makes it imprudent for U.S. vessel owners to register their ships domestically unless subsidized by U.S. taxpayers."s U.S. commercial interests,
coupled with the demands of sovereign equality by flag states, have insured that the flag of convenience option remains a viable alternative to
U.S. tax and labor encroachments on the profit margin.2 6 7 United States
military and environmental interests have assured that only the most
modern fleet of tankers will fly the U.S. flag' e and serve U.S. ports, 6 '
while the rusty hulks of aged U.S.-owned vessels will be scattered
throughout the rest of the world to serve foreign ports and pollute foreign
seas.27 0 At the same time the United States refuses to cooperate with the
world community in ratifying many of the major multilateral conventions
now pending before it. 7 1 From a global perspective, such preoccupation
with domestic interests is reprehensible.
While such conduct is not desirable, if may be understood as a logical
response to an international legal regime whose rules were developed at a
time when significant pollution by ocean vessels neither existed nor was

265. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
266. See Sisson, supra note 261, at 338-41.
267. Actually, because the flag of convenience option is available, such labor and tax
laws are self-defeating. They create economic incentives for shipowners to register their vessels outside the United States. Only vessels which transport commodities or passengers between points in the United States are precluded from utilizing the flag of convenience option. See 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1976). See generally Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives
for Foreign Direct Investment in the Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 247, 254 (1976). Thus, it is for the federal government to relax its tax burden and labor
regulations on maritime vessels so as to encourage additional U.S. registry.
268. See notes 62, 63, 66-83 supra and accompanying text.
269. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
270. See notes 247-50 supra and accompanying text.
271. The United States unquestionably has developed a body of law that effectively
copes with the problems of oil pollution by tankers which serve its ports, and which corresponds with the existing international framework. However, U.S. policy, as evidenced by its
overall statutory scheme, may be viewed as being unduly exploitive of the existing international system. On the one hand, the United States promotes the use of flag of convenience
registry by U.S. vessel owners by virtue of its strict registration and taxation laws. However,
U.S. environmental and pollution laws, which have been enacted independently from international conventions, ensure that only the newest ships with the highest construction standards serve U.S. ports. Assuming that it is advantageous for a shipowner to serve U.S. ports
and to maintain a vessel that meets American standards, U.S. law may have a beneficial
effect on world shipping standards and the reduction of oil pollution. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that the United States should implement this policy in cooperation with the international community, rather than enacting its own laws so to ensure that substandard
ships, many of which may be U.S.-owned, serve other ports.
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contemplated. One could argue that as a result of significantly changed
circumstances in which the ecological balance in our oceans and coastal
tidewaters is seriously threatened, and in which a continuation of the
contemporary trend could lead to disastrous consequences for both
marine life and man, the customary notion of flags of convenience should
no longer be given determinative weight.' Such archaic notions of national
sovereignty over ships which fortuitously happen to be registered in a
state with which they have absurdly little in common must be rendered
subordinate to the legitimate interests of both coastal states and the international community in protecting a fragile and seriously threatened
marine environment.
The law appears to be evolving in a way which relects this challenge
to our existence. Flag states are losing significant elements of their sovereignty when their vessels enter a coastal state's territorial waters. Coastal
states are now unilaterally imposing their own notions of safety as obligations upon vessels which serve their ports. 27 2 Moreover, it may be desirable to further limit the exclusive sovereignty that flag states assert in such
a way as to confine it to freedom of navigation, vesting jurisdiction over
safety and environmental pollution in the international community.2 73
The concept of a "genuine link," if it is to be employed, should be carefully and clearly defined to require a significant nexus between the flag
state and its registrants (e.g., a requirement of fifty-one percent ownership by resident nationals of the flag state as a condition precedent to
registration). Perhaps coastal and flag states could resolve their difference

272. In terms of regulation of oil pollution in territorial waters, and providing liability
for pollution damage, both the United Kingdom and the United States have enacted comprehensive and effective statutory schemes. The United Kingdom has traditionally acted in
cooperation with the international community, being among the first countries to ratify the
1954 Pollution Convention and the 1971 Compensation Fund Convention. Collectively, the
international conventions drafted by IMCO provide an effective means of dealing with all
aspects of oil pollution on the basis of international cooperation, and the United Kingdom,
as one of the major maritime nations, has consistently put them into force.
The United States, on the other hand, has only ratified two international conventions,
although it has developed a substantial body of law unilaterally. As another of the major
maritime nations, this lack of participation in the international community is unfortunate.
The United States can and should be an active participant in the international maritime community, and should ratify such agreements as the 1973 International Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, and the 1971 International Convention Establishing an International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage. Ratification of
these conventions would serve to further both U.S. and international interests.
273. The existing international framework for dealing with oil pollution has largely
eliminated the problems created by extensive use of flags of convenience. Since coastal
states are allowed to assert jurisdiction over any vessel in their territorial waters to prevent
pollution, the issue of a ship's nationality has become essentially irrelevant. The existing
international conventions which provide for enforcement by the flag state are not effective
for sanctioning flag of convenience vessels which violate international conventions. However,
the conventions which allow the coastal state to take any necessary enforcement measures
will minimize this problem, if and when they enter into force.
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7
through the vehicle of the multilateral conventions proposed by IMCO.1
But having witnessed (and contributed to) the failure of the most promising of these proposals to secure sufficient assent to enter into force,
coastal states, notably the United States, have been compelled to act, al27 5
beit unilaterally.

The U.S. Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 is a step in the right
direction.27 It defines clear and fairly stringent safety standards for vessels of any flag serving U.S. ports. 27 7 This legislation, however, is only the
attempt of one nation to deal with a problem which is by definition
multinational. Nevertheless, so long as the industrial world is addicted to
the herion of oil, perhaps the best that can be done is to develop every
avenue of regulation available, at all levels (state, national, and international), so as to reduce the risks associated with tanker
operation to the
7
lowest level economically and technologically feasible.1 1
Perhaps only a combined multilevel regime can effectively deter continued environmental pollution by maritime vessels. Customary principles
of international law do not now permit coastal states to regulate oil spillage by foreign flag vessels at points beyond their territorial waters. Thus,
unilateral coastal state legislation, alone, may be unable to prohibit intentional pollution on the high seas. Multilateral efforts, such as those
drafted by IMCO, will continue to be the principal means of deterring oil
pollution beyond the territorial waters of a coastal state. These are efforts
which the United States should enthusiastically embrace. Further, it may
be desirable for IMCO to become more than a mere consultative organization. Perhaps it should be permitted to evolve into an international organization with the authority to issue binding, mandatory rules over environmental pollution and safety of maritime vessels.
The problem of maritime pollution is sufficiently severe that these
efforts, both unilateral and multilateral, should have teeth; they should
impose strong sanctions on intentional dumping at sea, including both

274. It appears that the most effective method of minimizing oil pollution on the high
seas lies in enforcing high construction and safety standards in territorial waters and ports
by coastal states. A vessel that must have a double hull, segregated ballast tanks, a highly
trained crew, etc. will be less likely to cause an accident on the high seas and will not cause
pollution by its routine operations. The effectiveness of this enforcement mechanism is, of
course, dependent on the economic considerations involved in improving tanker construction and refurbishing old tankers. Nevertheless, it is a solution that may become increasingly effective over the course of time.
275. See notes 234-60 supra and accompanying -text.
276. The one major loophole of this legislation exempts from its provisions those vessels traveling through U.S. territorial waters but originating at and destined for foreign
ports. See note 244 supra, and accompanying text. Although this exemption comports with
customary international legal notions of free passage, it nevertheless may result in coastal
state injury. See Rusk & Ball, Sea Changes and the American Republic, 9 GA. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 1 (1979).
277. See Anderson, supra note 52, at 985. This article discusses international efforts to
prevent traumatic source oil tanker pollution.
278. But see note 256 supra and accompanying text.
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fines and imprisonment. Companies which are repeated offenders should
be prohibited from engaging in ocean trade. Corporate veils should be
pierced to insure that both vessel owners and the oil companies which
own the cargo are held jointly and severally liable, indeed, strictly liable,
for the costs of cleanup and reimbursement to the affected fishing and
tourist industries. Insurance rates are likely to rise dramatically for unsafe vessels and notoriously unsafe operators. This will give both oil companies and ocean shipping companies a pecuniary incentive to employ the
safest ocean vessels with highly trained crews.
Certainly, the ultimate consumer of imported oil will pay the price of
such stringent regulation, but the ecological benefits to be realized therefrom may well be worth the price. These increases will fuel inflation, but
they will decrease in a small way domestic demand for imported fuel,
thereby ultimately reducing growth in oil importation and, hence, sailing
frequencies. Fewer ships at sea or a reduction in volume shipped will,
again in a small way, reduce the likelihood and impact of collision. Every
drop of oil which we keep out of our oceans is one which will not injure
the fragile maritime environment. Not only does international environmental policy dictate that we prevent oil from entering the oceans of our
planet, but with our collective contemporary awareness of both the cost
and the relative scarcity of fossil fuels, and the burdens imposed by such
excessive dependence upon foreign energy sources, U.S. energy policy
requires that we do so as well.

Legal Effects of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Agricultural Commodities
REX J. ZEDALIS
I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 12, 1979, ministers from a majority of developed and developing nations initialed various multilateral and bilateral agreements
concluded in Geneva during the course of the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN). Consonant with the Tokyo Declaration of September 14, 1973,' which commenced the round, many of the
agreements reflect the desire of the negotiators to deal with the particularly troublesome problems created by non-tariff barriers (NTB's) and international trade in agricultural commodities. Given the earlier preoccupation with efforts to reduce tariff 'levels and the reluctance of the
European Economic Community (EEC) to negotiate issues affecting the
fledgling Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),' it is not surprising that
NTB's and agriculture were not dealt with sooner.
The objective of this article is to discuss briefly the multilateral codes
of conduct, bilateral trade concessions, and international commodity
agreements concluded during the MTN which will affect both imports
into and exports from the United States of agricultural commodities.
Since some of these measures serve to elaborate established principles of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and other measures which have been enshrined in U.S. municipal law through the various provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA),' this article
analyzes a selected MTN measure, with reference to the relevant GATT
principles. Those portions of the MTN measure dealing explicitly with
international trade in agricultural commodities will be emphasized. The
analysis concludes with some observations about the provisions of the
TAA designed to implement the MTN measure domestically. A special
effort will be made throughout to call attention to those instances where
the provisions of the TAA change previously existing municipal law.
0 1980 by Rex J. Zedalis
Rex J. Zedalis is Cutting Fellow, 1980-1981, and J.S.D. candidate, Columbia University.
LL.M., 1978, George Washington University;, J.D., 1976, Pepperdine University; B.A., 1973,
California State University. Attorney, Foreign Agriculture Division, Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1978-1980; Office of the General Counsel, U.S.
International Trade Commission, 1977-1978. Member of the California Bar.
1. Declaration of Ministers Approved At Tokyo on 14 September 1973, GATT BAsic
INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTs

19 (Supp. 20, 1974).

2. CAP consists of several measures designed to protect and promote the EEC agricultural community.
3. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
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MULTILATERAL CODES OF CONDUCT

Six major agreements designed to reduce or restrict the adverse consequences of NTB's were produced during the course of the MTN.4 Four
of these will be discussed in this article: the Agreement on Government
Procurement (Government Procurement Code), 5 the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards Code), 6 the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Subsidies/Countervailing Duties (CVD)
Code), 7 and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Antidumping Code). 8 The other
measures are unquestionably of some importance, but it is unlikely they
will affect international trade in agricultural commodities quite as much
as the four to be addressed.
A. The Government Procurement Code
The laws, regulations, procedures, and practices of several nations
concerning government procurement of items for public use either require
or result in suppliers of domestic products being given preference over
suppliers of imported foreign products.9 The GATT generally prohibits
importing nations from engaging in discriminatory practices,1" but article

III, paragraph 5 explicitly sanctions discrimination of the sort mentioned.
Specifically, it states that the other provisions of article III, particularly
that of paragraph 2, which prohibits across-the-board discrimination
against foreign products in respect of all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting internal sale, offering for sale, or purchase," do not apply
in those instances where such laws, regulations, and requirements concern
government procurement of items for public use.' 2 The effect of this is to
except current discriminatory government procurement practices from
4. Multilateral Trade Negotiations, GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTS 3 (Supp. 26, 1980), also in AaENTS REACHED INTHE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, PART 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as MTN AGREMENTS].

5. MTN/NTM/W/211/Rev.2 and Add. 1 [hereinafter cited as GOVERNMENT PROCUREalso in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 69.
6. MTN/NTM/W/192/Rev.5 [hereinafter cited as STANDARDS CODE], also in MTN
AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 211.
7. MTN/NTM/W/236 and Corr. 1 [hereinafter cited as SUBSIDIES/COuNTERVAILING DuTIES CODE], also in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 259.
8. MTN/NTM/W/232 [hereinafter cited as ANTIDUMPING CODE], also in MTN AGREEENTS, supra note 4, at 311.
9. One such law is the Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10d (1976). For similar
foreign laws, regulations, procedures, and practices, see Comment, Eliminating Nontariff
Barriers to International Trade: The MTN Agreement on Government Procurement, 12
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 315, 328-33 (1980).
10. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, arts. I, III, 61 Stat. 73
(1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade]. Article I contains the most-favored-nation obligation and article III contains the national-treatment obligation.
11. Id. art. III, para. 2.
12. Id. art III, para. 5.
MENT CODE],
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the national treatment obligations of article III.
The Government Procurement Code, which takes effect on January
1, 1981,13 attempts to deal with the adverse effects caused by government
entities giving preference to domestic products when purchasing items for
public use. Part II of the Code states rather explicitly that all laws, regulations, procedures, and practices of states parties shall accord products
originating within the customs territory of another state party treatment
no less favorable than that accorded to domestic producers and suppliers."' In order to reduce or eliminate the discriminatory effect of procedures and practices utilized in awarding contracts, the Code prescribes
specific rules for drafting specifications for items to be procured,' 5 giving
notice of proposed purchases," the preparation and submission of bids
and the awarding of contracts,"7 and the review of protests concerning
rejected bids. 8
While all of these provisions promise to increase the opportunities
for suppliers of imported foreign products to sell to government entities,
it must be noted that the provisions of the Code apply to contracts of
purchase by the government entities listed in Annex I,19 and then only
when such contracts involve an amount which equals or exceeds 150,000
SDR's' 0 (Special Drawing Rights)."' The provisions of the Code do not
apply to purchases by entities not listed in Annex I, purchases of less
than 150,000 SDR's, or purchases by regional or local government entities,"3 even though such purchases may be made with funds granted by
the national government." Nevertheless, states parties are required to inform all regional and local government entities, and all national government entities not listed in Annex I, of the objectives, principles, and rules
of the Code and to draw attention to the benefits of the liberalization of
government procurement."
It has been estimated that the Government Procurement Code will
produce twenty billion dollars worth of new markets for exporters of
United States products.' 5 However, it seems unlikely that it will affect the

13. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Part IX(3).

14. Id. Part II(1)(a). Even though not so stated, this provision presumably refers to
"like" products.
15. Id. Part IV.
16. Id. Part V(3).
17. Id. Part V(14).

18. Id. Part VI.
19. Id. Part I(1)(c).
20. Id. Part I(1)(b).
21. A unit of measurement used by the International Monetary Fund. 150,000 SDRs
equals approximately $190,000.

22. This appears from the fact that such are not included in Part I(1)(c) of the Code.
23. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE AGREEMEmTS ACT, S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong.,
1st Seas. 130 (1979) [hereinafter cited as SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT].
24. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Part 1(2).
25. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 128.
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U.S. agricultural community to any significant degree. As previously mentioned, the provisions of the Code apply only to those national government entities listed in Annex I. A perusal of the entities subsumed under
the various states parties listed in Annex I reveals that, in a great many
cases, entities involved in purchasing agricultural commodities have
explicitly excepted such purchases from their commitments under the
Code." For instance, purchases of agricultural products" by most ministries of agriculture (including the U.S. Department of Agriculture) in
futherance of agricultural support programs or food programs have been
excepted.28 Similarly, purchases of agricultural supplies2 by some ministries of defense (especially the U.S. Department of Defense) have been
excepted from the provisions of the Code. 0 Government purchases from
the U.S. agricultural community will thus remain relatively insulated and
new market opportunities abroad will exist only to the extent that states
parties have seen fit to subject national government entities which
purchase agricultural commodities to the liberalizing provisions of the
Government Procurement Code.
In implementing the obligations of the United States under Part II of
the Government Procurement Code, section 301 of the TAA3 ' authorizes
the President, effective January 1, 1981,33 to waive the applicability of all
laws, regulations, procedures, or practices regarding procurement for public use which would, if applied, result in an imported foreign product being treated less favorably than a domestic product. 3 According to the
terms of section 301, however, the President is authorized to issue such
waivers only with respect to: a country which is a state party to the Government Procurement Code; " a non-major industrial country which,
though not a state party, will otherwise assume the obligations of the

26. For example, under the United States it reads: "Department of Agriculture (This
Agreement does not apply to procurement of agricultural products made in furtherance of
agricultural support programmes or human feeding programmes.)" GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Annex I.
27. The term "agricultural product" is not defined in the Code. Does it mean "raw"
commodities or "processed" commodities?
28. See GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Annex I, European Economic
Community, Part I, n.2. These items were obviously excepted because it would be absolutely
impossible to support domestic agriculture by purchasing foreign commodities.
29. In some places the term "food stuffs" is utilized. This difference in terms could lead
to dispute about what items have been excepted from the Code's coverage.
30. See GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 5, Annex I, European Economic
Community, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, United States. In' contradistinction to the
exception pertaining to support programs, the exception of agricultural supplies by ministries of defense appears to be based on the notion that required purchases of foreign food
would imperil the ability of the military to operate during times of crises.
31. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 301, 93 Stat. 236 (1979).
32. Id. § 309(2) 93 Stat. 242.
33. Though not explicitly stated, this presumably applies to "like" products.
34. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 301(b)(1), 93 Stat. 236 (1979) (to be
codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2511(b)(1)).
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Code;38 a non-major industrial country which, though not necessarily assuming the obligations of the Code, will provide competitive government
procurement opportunities to U.S. products; 6 or, a "least developed
country."3' 7 Furthermore, such waivers apply only to those entities and
products covered by the Government Procurement Code. In essence, this
provision has the effect of precluding the issuance of waivers involving
agricultural commodities purchased by the Department of Defense or the
Department of Agriculture since, as we have already seen, both have excepted from the Code their purchases of agricultural commodities.
Apparently, it is not anticipated that agricultural products 'should
forever remain beyond the coverage of the liberalizing provisions of the
Code. This is evidenced by the fact that section 304 of the TAA states
that in the renegotiations contemplated by Part IX,paragraph 6(b) of the
Code the President "shall" seek improved market access abroad with a
view to maximizing the economic benefits to the United States through
efforts to maintain and enlarge foreign markets for products of, inter alia,
U.S. agriculture." It is difficult, however, to imagine that foreign states
will acquiesce in U.S. efforts to obtain unilateral concessions designed to
benefit the U.S. agricultural community. More than likely, if the Code is
eventually altered so as to cover purchases of agricultural commodities,
this will come about as a result of concessions which will either have to be
mutual in nature or at least entail some quid pro quo.
B.

The Standards Code
Product standards are perhaps the most troublesome of the various
NTB's affecting international trade in agricultural commodities. The
standards generally relate to quality, nutritive value, wholesomeness, and
other specifications which an item must meet before it may be shipped to
or sold in the importing country.3 9 Product standards often are designed
to attain some legitimate objective such as the protection of human,
animal, or plant health or safety. There have been instances, however,
where product standards have been deliberately
used to obstruct the free
40
flow of goods in international commerce.
Certain provisions of the GATT would seem to prohibit the use of

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. § 301(b)(2), 93 Stat. 236 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C.
Id. § 301(b)(3), 93 Stat. 236 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C.
Id. § 301(b)(4), 93 Stat. 236 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C.
Specifically, § 304(a) of the Trade Agreements Act, Pub.

§ 2511(b)(2)).
§ 2511(b)(3)).
§ 2511(b)(4)).
L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 238

(1979), states in pertinent part: "The President shall seek in ... renegotiations ... more

open and equitable market access abroad ... with the overall goal of maximizing the economic benefit to the United States through maintaining and enlarging foreign markets for
products of United States agriculture .
39. See generally United States Cotton Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 51-65 (1976); United
States Grain Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71-87h (1976); Naval Stores Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 91-99
(1976); Federal Plant Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa-150jj (1976); Plant Quarantine Act, 7
U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1976); Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1976).
40. Technical Analysis of the Technical Barriersto Trade Agreement, 12 L. & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 179, 183 (1980).
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standards in a fashion which discriminate between or against foreign
trading partners. Specifically, article I provides that the treatment which
is accorded to products imported from the territory of one state party
shall also be accorded immediately and unconditionally to like products
imported from the territory of all other states parties.4' Article III, paragraph 4, goes even further and provides that products imported from the
territory of any state party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable
than that accorded to like domestic products.

42

Neither of these two pro-

visions, however, addresses standards which, though not discriminating
between or against foreign trading partners, actually have the effect of
erecting barriers to international trade. In short, articles I and III of the
GATT proscribe discriminatory standards but say nothing of nondiscriminatory standards which obstruct international trade.
The Standards Code, 48 effective January 1, 1980, 4 4 reiterates the obligations extant in the opening provisions of the GATT by stating that
technical regulations, standards,4 5 testing methods and procedures,"' and
certification systems shall accord products imported from the territory of
a state party no less favorable treatment than that accorded to like products of domestic origin or like products imported from the territory of
another state party. 4" Of much greater significance than this nondiscriminatory obligation, article 2.1 of the Code provides that states parties shall
ensure that technical regulations, standards, 48 and certification systems 4'
are not prepared or adopted "with a view to creating obstacles to international trade" or applied so as to create "unnecessary obstacles to international trade." In essence, unlike GATT, article 2.1 of the Standards Code
proscribes the adoption of standards for the purpose of intentionally obstructing international trade as well as the application of standards
which, though not adopted with such an intention in mind, have the effect of unnecessarily obstructing international trade. Since the term "unnecessary" is not defined, it would seem that whether a standard unnecessarily obstructs international trade turns upon an evaluation of factors
such as the nature of the standard itself, the extent of the impact of the
standard on international trade, the importance of the objective which
the standard seeks to attain, and the availability of equally efficacious yet
less restrictive alternative methods of accomplishing the same objective.' 0
In addition to the foregoing, the Code requires states parties,
"[wiherever appropriate," to state "technical regulations and standards in
41. This is known as the most-favored-nation (MFN) obligation.
42. This is known as the national treatment obligation.
43. STANDARDS CODE, supra note 6.
44. Id. art. 15.5.

45. Id. art. 2.1.
46. Id. art. 5.1.
47. Id. art. 7.2.
48. Id. art. 2.1.

49. Id. art. 7.1.
50. See text accompanying notes 81 and 82 infra.
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terms of performance rather that design or descriptive characteristics."' 1
Further, states parties are required-except where inappropriate for reasons of national security, prevention of deceptive practices, or protection
of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment-to use relevant international standards as a basis for standards of
central government bodies.62 If relevant international standards do not
exist and technical regulations or standards are being considered which
may have a significant impact on trade of other states parties, then the
state party interested in promulgating such regulations or standards is
required to publish the proposal for comment, notify all states parties
through the GATT Secretariat of the products to be covered, provide
copies of the proposal to states parties upon request, and allow a reasonable time during which states parties may submit written comments on
the proposal.68 Article 7.3 makes the same rulemaking procedure applicable to certification systems." Finally, the Code obligates each state party
to accept, "whenever possible," the results of tests conducted by relevant
entities located in other states parties, 56 and to establish an "enquiry
point" for answering questions from entities located in other states parties concerning adopted or proposed technical regulations, standards, or
certification."
Unlike the Government Procurement Code, the provisions of the
67
Standards Code apply to both industrial and agricultural products.
Since they are not explicitly limited, it would appear that the provisions
of the Code govern mandatory as well as voluntary technical regulations,
standards, and certifications systems." The Code distinguishes between
standards-related activities engaged in by central government bodies6"
and those engaged in by local1' or nongovernmental bodies. 6' Specifically,
while central government bodies are required to adhere to the obligations
of the Code, local or nongovernmental bodies are not. However, central
government bodies are obligated to take "such reasonable measures as
may be available" to ensure that local and nongovernmental bodies abide
by the terms of the Code. 62 If such efforts prove unsuccessful, it would
appear that states parties adversely affected might be entitled to subject
the state party in whose territory the local or nongovernmental body is
located to international dispute resolution proceedings spelled out in the

51. STANDARDS CODE, supra note 6, art. 2.4.
52. Id. art. 2.2.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.

2.5.
7.3.
5.2.
10.1.
1.3.

58. SENATE FINANCE CoMm. REPORT, supra note 23, at 149.
59. STANDARDS CODE, supra note 6, Annex I, art. 6.

60. Id. Annex I, art. 7.
61. Id. Annex I, art. 8.
62. Id. art. 3.
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Code and, if appropriate, legitimate retaliation."
Articles 13 and 14 establish the procedures for resolving disputes
arising under the provisions of the Code. Basically, these articles provide
for the creation of a Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade composed
of representatives of each state party to the Code.6 4 Disputes incapable of
being resolved by the states concerned" can be referred to the Committee, which shall meet within thirty days of a request received from any
party to the dispute.es Investigations of the matter in dispute shall proceed expeditiously and in the case of perishable (for example, agricultural) products "in the most expeditious manner possible with a view to
facilitating a mutually satisfactory solution within three months of the
request for the Committee investigation." ' The Committee will make
"every effort" to resolve within a twelve month period disputes affecting
products with a definite crop cycle of twelve months." The Committee
may enforce its decisions concerning matters in dispute by authorizing
the suspension of obligations established by the Code with respect to any
party.69
Article 14.2570 provides that any state party who "considers that obligations under this Agreement are being circumvented" by the drafting of
standards-related requirements in terms of processes and production
methods (PPM), rather than product characteristics, is entitled to invoke
the dispute settlement procedures set out in articles 13 and 14. In essence, this provision would seem to permit a party to a dispute to request
the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to exercise jurisdiction
over the matter whenever the party itself "considers" that circumvention
is taking place. The jurisdictional standard would appear to be purely
subjective and based totally on the perception of the aggrieved party.
Once the Committee has assumed jurisdiction, it would seem that if a

63. The language of article 5.1 of the Code somewhat confuses this point, however.
Since it appears only to fix an obligation on central government bodies (states parties) to
avoid violations with respect to testing methods and procedures, it might be argued that
violations committed by local or nongovernmental bodies are not actionable under the Code.
On the other hand, to the extent that article 2.1 states the controlling principle applicable to
all sorts of standards-related activities, it would appear to make violations of article 5.1 by
local or nongovernmental bodies actionable.

64.

STANDARDS CODE,

supra note 6, art. 13.1.

65. Id. art. 14.2.
66. Id. art. 14.4.
67. Id. art. 14.6.
68. Id. art. 14.7.
69. Id. art. 14.21.
70. In view of the fact that it was not definitively settled until December of 1978 that
standards for agricultural products would be covered by the Code, most of the Code's provisions are drafted in language reflecting a preoccupation with industrial products. Given the
fact that many of the standards applicable to agricultural products are drafted in terms of
processes and production methods (PPM), rather than product characteristics as is the case
with industrial goods, there is some question as to whether the Code will effectively restrain
the use of standards as an NTB to international trade in agricultural commodities. It would
appear, however, that article 14.25 should go a long way toward accomplishing such a result.
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circumvention is in fact occurring, then it could, where appropriate, authorize the retaliatory suspension of obligations under the Code.71
The provisions of the Standards Code are implemented domestically
through Title IV of the TAA. Specifically, section 402 of the TAA states
that federal agencies are prohibited from engaging in standards-related
activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of
the United States. No comparable prohibition exists with respect to standards-related activities of state agencies and private persons.7' Standards-related activities which create unnecessary obstacles include: tests
or test methods subjecting imported products to treatment less favorable
than that accorded to like domestic or imported products; 7 ' domestic
standards which fail to take into consideration relevant international
standards; 74 domestic standards based on design rather than performance
criteria; 75 and certification systems which fail to give foreign suppliers
access on the same basis as suppliers of like domestic or imported
7
products. 1
In addition to these obstacles, which are considered per se unnecessary, it would appear that there are other standards-related activities
which might well be considered violative of Title IV. Specifically, section
401 intimates that any standards-related activity having a great enough
impact on the foreign commerce of the United States, which does not
have as its demonstrable purpose the attainment of a legitimate domestic
objective 77 or which operates to exclude imported products that fully
meet such an objective, may also be viewed as creating an unnecessary
obstacle.7 8 The explicit language of section 401 indicates that legitimate
domestic objectives include "the protection of legitimate health or safety,
essential security, environmental, or consumer interest. . . ."9 Standards-related activities unquestionably designed to accomplish some legitimate domestic objective may still be found to create an unnecessary
obstacle to foreign commerce if they operate to exclude imported products which fully meet the legitimate objective.8 0

71. This would seem to result from the broad language in article 14.2, which speaks of
"any benefit" under the Code being "nullified or impaired" and the fact that article 14.25
invokes the dispute settlement procedures set out in the Code. The retaliatory suspension of
obligations under the Code is provided for in article 14.21 which authorizes the Committee
to suspend "the application of obligations including those in Articles 5 to 9, in order to
restore mutual economic advantage and balance of rights and obligations."
72. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 403, 93 Stat. 243 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 2533).
73. Id. § 402(1), 93 Stat. 242 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(1)).
74. Id. § 402(2), 93 Stat. 242 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(2)).
75. Id. § 402(3), 93 Stat. 243 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(3)).
76. Id. § 402(4), 93 Stat. 243 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2532(4)).
77. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 152.
78. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 40, 93 Stat. 242 (to be codified in 19
U.S.C. § 2531).
79. Id.

80. Id.
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The approach intimated in section 401 comports with the multifactor-oriented configurative analysis suggested for determining whether,
under article 2.1 of the Code, some standards-related activity creates an
unnecessary obstacle to international trade. 1 More precisely, it will be
recalled that since the Code does not define "unnecessary," it was suggested earlier that in order to determine whether a standards-related activity creates an unnecessary obstacle to international trade, one should
look at a host of factors associated with the activity itself and its impact
on international trade. Standards-related activities are to be designed to
accomplish legitimate domestic objectives, such as legitimate health and
safety, essential security, environmental or consumer interests, and yet to
avoid excluding products which fully meet any such objective. Thus it
appears that the Congress recognizes that many factors considered during
the course of evaluating standards-related activities under article 2.1 of
the Code should also receive consideration when evaluating standards-related activities undertaken pursuant to U.S. municipal law. The value of
such an approach would seem to be in the liberalization of international
trade. The requirement that a health and safety standards-related activity be designed to protect "legitimate" health and safety interests would
indicate that standards establishing unreasonably high health and safety
levels might create unnecessary obstacles in violation of section 402 if the
impact on foreign commerce of the United States is great enough."2 Similarly, a standards-related activity which has an indiscriminate impact on
international trade, resulting in the exclusion of wholesome products,
might also be of questionable validity. In each case it would appear that
the concern is to strike a balance between the protection of legitimate
domestic interests and the liberalization of international trade.
Section 414 of the TAA requires the Secretary of Commerce to establish a standards information center within the Department of Commerce. 88 This assures compliance with article 10 of the Standards Code
which requires that each state party establish an "enquiry point" for the
collection and dissemination of information concerning technical regulations, standards, or certification systems which have been adopted or proposed within the territory of the state party. Further, with the standards
information center serving as the national collection and dissemination
facility for standards-related information, whether public or private, domestic or foreign, or international, regional, or local, entities located in
the United States should have ready access to materials which cast light
on all types of standards-related activities affecting the foreign commerce
of the United States."
If a federal agency engages in some standards-related activity which

81. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
82. This, of course, assumes that there is some impact on international trade.
83. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 414(a), 93 Stat. 245 (1979) (to be codi-

fied in 19 U.S.C. § 2544).
84. Id. § 414(b), 93 Stat. 245 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2544(b)).
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creates an unnecessary obstacle to international commerce or violates
some provision of the Standards Code, then any state party to the Code
may make a "representation" to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations so long as it can provide some reasonable indication that the
standards-related activity is having a significant trade effect. 88 Since section 421 speaks only of standards-related activities "engaged in within
the United States," it would appear that representations could also be
made with respect to activities by state agencies or private persons. Title
IV does not provide for the receipt of representations from domestic entities interested in assuring that federal agencies comply with the TAA's
proscription of standards-related activities which create unnecessary obstacles to foreign commerce." Alleged violations of the Standards Code
by other states parties which impact U.S. commerce may be remedied in
two distinct fashions. First, in accordance with articles 13 and 14 of the
Code, the United States may proceed through international channels, including the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade. 87 Second, any interested domestic person may petition the Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations" to request the President to take whatever actions
are necessary under section 301 of the Trade Act of 197489 to enforce the
rights of the United States under the Code." These enforcement provisions should go a long way toward obtaining the benefits of efforts to reduce or eliminate standards-related activities as an effective NTB.
C. The Subsidies/CountervailingDuties (CVD) Code
The granting of subsidies has been described as one of the most pernicious practices in international trade. 1 Since subsidies are frequently
used by governments to support the domestic agricultural community, it
is only fitting that some discussion in this article be devoted to the modifications in the rules governing the use of subsidies and the circumstances
under which countervailing action is permissible.
The GATT does not proscribe the utilization of subsidies in all instances. Rather, it simply provides guidelines which must be followed if
subsidies are to be consonant with accepted international principles. Specifically, article XVI states that export subsidies are permitted on primary products-including agricultural commodities-so long as they do
not result in the subsidizing state obtaining more than an equitable share
of the world export trade in such product, with account being taken of
trade during a previous representative period.92 Export subsidies on non-

85. Id. § 422, 93 Stat. 247 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2552).
86. Id. § 421, 93 Stat. 247 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2551).
87. See text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
88. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 901, 93 Stat. 296 (1979) (amending 19
U.S.C. § 2412 (1976)).
89. Id. § 901, 93 Stat. 295 (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976)).
90. Id. § 424(b), 93 Stat. 248 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. 2554(b)).
91. SENATE FINANCE Comm. RzPolr, supra note 23, at 37.
92. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. XVI, para. 3, as
amended by Protocol Amending The Preamble and Parts H and m of the General Agree-
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primary products are permitted so long as they do not result in the subsidized product being sold in the importing country at a price below the
domestic market price of like domestic products.'3 Article XVI also provides that states parties granting any form of subsidy which operates to
increase exports or decrease imports must notify other states parties of
the nature and extent of the subsidy." If such subsidy causes or threatens
to cause "serious prejudice" to the interests of another state party, then
the subsidizing state must, upon request, consult with the affected state
with a view to limiting the subsidization."
The Subsidies/CVD Code, effective January 1, 1980, and applicable
only between states parties, changes the GATT rules on subsidies in three
pertinent respects. First, article 9 of the Code specifically prohibits states
parties from granting export subsidies on non-primary products." The
prohibition no longer turns on whether subsidization results in the product being sold at a price below the domestic market price of like domestic
products. Second, while export subsidies on primary products continue to
be permitted, they are compatible with the obligations of article 10 of the
Code only so long as they neither result in the subsidizing state obtaining7
more than an equitable share of the world export trade in such product,9
or the subsidized product being sold at prices materially below those of
other suppliers to the same market.' 8 The prohibition of subsidies resulting in the subsidized product being sold at prices materially below those
of other suppliers is new and should be subject to less dispute than the
earlier GATT standard. Also new is a provision which attempts to define
the phrases "equitable share of world export trade" and "previous representative period."" Third, article 12 provides that states parties granting
any form of subsidy which causes "injury" to the domestic industry of
another state party or "nullification or impairment of benefits" accruing
to that state party under the GATT must, upon request, enter into consultations with the affected states as soon as possible so that they can
achieve a mutually satisfactory solution. 1°° Though article 12 also requires
consultations whenever the subsidy causes "serious prejudice" to the interests of another state party, it would appear that the Code increases
access to the kind of consultation mechanism initially set out in article
XVI of the GATT. Violations of any of the obligations of the Code which
are not satisfactorily resolved may result in the Committee of Signato-

mert On Tariffs and Trade, Mar. 10, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 1767, T.I.A.S. No. 3930, 278 U.N.T.S.

168.
93. Id. art. XVI, para. 4.
94. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. XVI, para. 1.

95. Id.
96. SUnMMSD/COUNMRVAING DuTa

97. Id. art. 10(1).
98. Id. art. 10(3).

99. Id. art. 10(2).
100. Id. art. 12.

CODE,

supra note 7, art. 9.

1980

TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

ries"'I making "recommendations to the parties as may be appropriate"
and, if such recommendations are
not followed, authorizing counter10
measures as may be appropriate. '
Traditionally, whenever states have subsidized the export of products
to make them more attractive to foreign purchasers, the country of importation has responded by imposing a CVD equal to the amount of the
subsidy. Article VI of the GATT states the principles applicable to the
imposition of such CVD's. In essence, article VI provides that a CVD may
be imposed on an imported product only if it can be demonstrated that a
subsidy is being bestowed on the manufacture, production, or exportation
of the product and that such subsidization is causing or threatening to
cause material injury to a domestic industry or materially retarding the
establishment of such an industry.' Though it would seem that article
VI establishes a relatively precise principle, in practice it has not served
to promote a great deal of uniformity in the imposition of CVD's by the
various states parties to the GATT.
The provisions of the Subsidies/CVD Code applicable to the imposition of CVD's on products imported from other states parties are
designed to correct this deficiency. Specifically, notwithstanding the fact
that states parties to the GATT may have had some perfectly legitimate
reasons in the past for not complying with the terms of article VI when
assessing CVD's, 104 the Code now makes it eminently clear that a CVD
may be imposed on a product imported from another state party only
after it has been demonstrated that the product is being subsidized and
that this results in material injury to a domestic industry. 10° Further, articles 2 through 5 of the Code establish extensive procedural requirements
incident to the imposition of CVD's and article 6 enumerates factors to be
considered when attempting to determine whether a domestic industry is
being materially injured. Article 6 states essentially that injury should be
determined by examining the volume of imports and the effects of such
on domestic prices of like products, as well as the consequent impact of
such imports on domestic producers of like products. With particular respect to agricultural products, article 6(3) provides that when examining
the impact on domestic producers, special consideration should be given
to determining whether the economic conditions created by the subsidized imports have increased the burden on government support programs. The mere fact that producers of agricultural products are not experiencing a decline in output, sales, market share, or productivity does
not alone indicate that imported agricultural commodities benefitting

101. Id. art. 16.
102. Id. art. 13(4).
103. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. VI.
104. Under the Protocol of Provisional Application to the GATT, states parties to that
agreement were permitted to continue to operate under antedating municipal laws inconsistent with the principles stated in GATT.

105. SUSrMMs/CouNMVMUNo

Duri

COD, supra note 7, art. 1.
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from subsidies are not having any impact on the domestic industry. The
absence of a decline in any of these areas may be attributable to increased government price support activity and such activity may be indicative of injury warranting imposition of a CVD. Article 4(1) of the Code,
however, makes it clear that the imposition of a CVD on agricultural
products, or any other type of imported item, is not mandatory.
The provisions of the Subsidies/CVD Code are implemented domestically by title I of the TAA, which adds a new title VII to the Tariff Act
of 1 9 3 0 .1°6 However, since there would be serious questions about the legislative jurisdiction, not to mention the efficacy and political propriety, of
Congress enacting a statute designed to proscribe foreign entities from
granting subsidies on products imported into the United States, title I of
the TAA merely purports to establish when subsidies will warrant the
imposition of a CVD and does not provide for the prohibition of subsidies
granted by foreign entities.
Title I of the TAA, 107 apart from establishing extensive procedural
requirements which must be followed whenever a CVD is to be imposed,
provides for countervailing action only in those instances where an imported product is benefitting from a subsidy which is resulting in material
injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry producing like
products.'" The application of the standard enunciated in title I is limited to those products imported from countries which are states parties to
the Code or which extend the benefits of the Code to products imported
from the United States.1 0' Products imported from the territory of other
countries will not be accorded such treatment but will remain subject to
CVD's imposed pursuant to section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.110 In
essence, this means that products imported from countries which are not
states parties to the Code or do not extend the benefits of the Code to
products imported from the United States will continue to be subject to
CVD's without regard to whether subsidization is resulting in material
injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry.11 This dichotomy between treatment accorded products imported from countries
which adhere to the obligations of the Code and products imported from
all other countries is consistent with the commitments of the United
States under both the Subsidies/CVD Code and the GATT. 1 2
In explication of the standard stated in title I of the TAA, section

106. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 150 (1979) (amending 19
U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976)).
107. Id. §§ 101-107, 93 Stat. 150-93 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677(g)).
108. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 150 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1671).

109. Id.
110. Id. See also Tariff Act of 1930, § 303, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
111. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 151 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c)). SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 43-44.
112. Article 1 of the Code makes it clear that the provisions of the Code apply'only
between States Parties. Other states will continue to be treated under section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
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771 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by title I, defines several pertinent
terms. Specifically, the term "subsidy" is defined as including those export subsidies described in Annex A of the Code and certain enumerated
domestic subsidies paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any product." The term "domestic industry" is defined as including domestic producers as a whole, producers
whose collective output constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production, and, in certain limited situations, regional producers.1 "
Perhaps most importantly, however, the term "material injury" is defined
as harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.11' 6 In
determining whether the requisites of this definition have been satisfied,
section 771 directs that consideration be taken of the volume of imports,
the effect of such imports on domestic prices of like products, and the
s
impact of such imports on domestic producers.
Of particular interest to this discussion, section 771 provides, consistent with article (3) of the Code, that when attempting to determine
whether imports of subsidized agricultural products are causing material
injury, consideration "shall" be given to whether there has been any increased burden on government income or price support programs.'1 7 As a
corollary, section 771 states further that it "shall not" be determined that
there is no material injury or threat of material injury to domestic producers of like agricultural products merely because the prevailing market
price is at or above the minimum support price." 8 Both principles should
prove significantly helpful in attempting to deal with the difficulties incident to efforts to determine whether producers of supported agricultural
products are being injured by imported agricultural products.11 '
D.

The Antidumping Code

Frequently, imported products are sold in the country of importation
at prices below their fair value or home market price. When such sales
cause or threaten to cause material injury to a domestic industry, or retard materially the establishment of such an industry, article VI of the
GATT entitles the country of importation to assess a duty on such products equal to the difference between the fair value and the price at which
the products are actually being sold.120 This duty, known as a dumping
duty, is designed to increase the price of the imported product to a more
representative level thereby averting the economic dislocations associated
with unfair price advantage.

113. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 177 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)).
114. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 176 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)).

115. Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 178 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 179 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(D)(ii)).
Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 179 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(D)(i)).
SENATE FINANCE Comm. REPoir, supra note 23, at 87-88.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 10, art. VI.
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The Antidumping Code, recently completed in Geneva, 1 reiterates
the GATT standard for the imposition of dumping duties by stating that
such duties may not be imposed unless the requisites of article VI of the
GATT have been satisfied.1 2 2 In addition, articles 3 and 4 of the Code go
further than article VI of the GATT and attempt to suggest definitions
for both material injury and domestic industry. These definitions are essentially identical to those used in the Subsidies/CVD Code. In one respect, however, the definition of material injury in article 3 differs from
that in article 6 of the Subsidies/CVD Code. Specifically, it will be recalled that article 6(3) of the Subsidies/CVD Code states that whenever attempting to determine whether domestic producers of agricultural products have suffered material injury, consideration should be given to
whether the importation of the subsidized agricultural products has increased the burden on government support programs. Article 3 of the Antidumping Code contains no reference to special factors deserving consideration when the dumped products are agricultural. It should be noted,
however, that by stating that the definition of material injury does not
list all the factors to be examined, the last sentence of article 3(3) would
seem to indicate that the impact of dumping on government support programs may be considered in determining whether material injury exists.
The provisions of the Antidumping Code, effective January 1,
1980,128 are implemented domestically by title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930, as added by title I of the TAA. As we have seen previously, title VII
also implements the Subsidies/CVD Code. Section 731 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 provides, consistent with the Antidumping Code, that imported
products sold or likely to be sold at less than fair value-that is, normal
value or home market price-are subject to dumping duties if such sales
result in material injury or threat of material injury to a domestic industry or retard materially the establishment of such an industry. 2 4 In most
respects this standard is identical to that used pursuant to section 701
when determining whether the imposition of a CVD is warranted. More
precisely, both standards refer to the fact that the improper activity must
result in or threaten to result in material injury to a domestic industry.
For this very reason, the terms "material injury" and "domestic industry"
as used in that portion of title VII dealing with the imposition of dumping duties have the same meaning as when used in that portion dealing
with the imposition of CVD's.
One important consequence proceeds from the fact that the term
"material injury" is given the same meaning under section 731 of the

121. During the Kennedy Round of the MTN an Antidumping Code was formulated.
Subsequently, Congress enacted municipal measures severely restricting the significance of
that Code for the United States.
122. ANTIDUMPING CODE, supra note 8, art. 1.
123. Id. art. 16(4).
124. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 162 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1673).
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Tariff Act of 1930 as it is under section 701 dealing with CVD's. Section
731 states that whenever imported agricultural products are the concern,
consideration "shall" be given to whether imports of such products have
resulted in any increased burden on government income or price support
programs. Thus it is made explicitly clear that even though article 3 of
the Code does not require that consideration be taken of such concerns,
section 731 does. This would seem to rectify the omission which was previously alluded to in the language of article 3 of the Code, thus eliminating questions that might arise over the discrepancy between material injury in the case of CVD's and material injury in the case of antidumping.
Apart from this, two other matters deserve consideration before moving to a discussion of the bilateral trade concessions granted by the
United States during the course of the Tokyo Round of the MTN. First,
it would appear that even though section 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930
uses the term "material ' 125 to describe the type of injury requisite to the
imposition of a dumping duty, Congress' expectation is that this should
not increase the quantum of injury one is required to show over what was
previously required under section 202 of the Antidumping Act of 1921.1*'
That former provision did not contain the adjective "material" but was
applied in a fashion equally as strict as section 731.127 Second, the standard enunciated in article VI of the GATT and reaffirmed in the Antimping Code, unlike that pronounced in the Subsidies/CVD Code, applies to
products imported from all countries, including those which are not states
parties to the Code. It is uncertain exactly why this distinction exists.
The two most probable reasons, however, are that section 731 is seen
largely as a re-enactment of the basic standard in section 202 of the Antidumping Act-a standard of general applicability-and that the language in article 1 of the Antidumping Code might very well require such a
result. In particular, article 1 of the Antidumping Code does not provide
for application only between states parties. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that the liberal treatment accorded by article 1 of the Subsidies/CVD Code is limited to states parties.
III. BILATERAL TRADE CONCESSIONS
The bilateral trade concessions concerning agriculture granted by the
United States during the recent round of trade negotiations concluded in
Geneva are reflected in a host of agreements on meat, chocolate crumb,
and cheese. While each agreement has indisputable importance to the
parties affected, only the agreements on cheese merit more than passing
reference in this brief survey.

A.

Agreements on Meat
Under the Meat Import Act of 1964,'"* and the voluntary restraint
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. § 101, 93 Stat. 178 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A)).
19 U.S.C. § 161 (1976).
SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 87.
Meat Import Act, Pub. L. No. 88-482, 78 Stat. 594 (1964) (codified in 19 U.S.C.
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agreements negotiated under section 204 of the Agricultural Act of
1956,129 the United States has for years managed to limit the amount of
foreign meat entering the country. In response to requests and concessions from Australia, New Zealand, and Canada during the recent trade
negotiations, the United States entered into bilateral agreements affecting foreign meat importation.8 0 These agreements do two things: increase
the access level for all suppliers of foreign beef and reduce the duty on
certain high quality foreign beef imported from Canada.1 3 1 More precisely, the agreements with Australia and New Zealand commit the
United States to a global access level of no less than 1.2 billion pounds of
beef annually, 82 and the agreement with Canada provides that the
United States will reduce the duty on high quality control cuts of beef
188
from ten to four percent.
B.

Agreements on Chocolate Crumb

Chocolate crumb is basically chocolate containing up to approximately nine percent butterfat. Quotas have existed on chocolate crumb
for some time, since imports might displace significant quantities of domestic butterfats, thus depressing the domestic price support programs.1 34 The agreements negotiated in Geneva with Australia and New
Zealand are designed to permit these countries to participate with Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands in supplying chocolate
crumb to the United States. Specifically, the agreement with Australia
entitles it to supply 4.4 million pounds to the United States annually.8 5
The agreement with New Zealand entitles it to supply 2.2 million pounds
annually. " " While the amount granted New Zealand is admittedly small,
the fact that New Zealand is granted a specifically assigned quota share
permits it to participate in country of origin adjustments made as a result
of any of the other four countries being incapable of supplying their own
quota share. Section 703187 of the TAA implements the provisions of the
two agreements on chocolate crumb.
C.

Agreements on Cheese

Under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,188 the
President is authorized to issue proclamations limiting the amount of any

§ 1202, sched. 1, pt. 2 (1976)).
129. 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1976).
130. MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 460, 510.
131. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 192-93.
132. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 704, 93 Stat. 273 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
133. Id. § 506, 93 Stat. 252 (to be codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1202, sched. 1, pt. 2).
134. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979, H.R. REP.
No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE COMM. REPORT].
135. Id. at 142.

136. Id.
137. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 703, 93 Stat. 272 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 app. note).
138. 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1976).
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agricultural product imported into the United States whenever the U.S.
International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that the importation
of any such product is interfering with a domestic price support program.
Modifications increasing or decreasing the limitation so proclaimed may
be made following similar consideration by the ITC.
Pursuant to section 22, the United States has long maintained a
quota limiting the amount of imported cheese which may enter the country annually. However, since the quota on imported cheese essentially was
designed to protect domestic dairy products benefitting from price support programs, the United States has largely refrained from limiting the
importation of cheese not jeopardizing such programs. This is perhaps
best indicated by the fact that the quota on imported cheese existing
prior to the implementation of the results of the Tokyo Round did not
cover certain foreign specialty cheeses (goat's milk and sheep's milk
cheese, and certain soft-ripened cow's milk cheese) or imported cheese
priced higher than the support price for domestic cheddar cheese ($1.16/
1' 9
lb.) plus seven cents per pound-a figure known as the "price-break. " '
In 1978 only about fifty percent of the roughly 100,000 metric tons of
1 40
imported cheese entering the United States was subject to the quota.
During the recent trade negotiations the United States concluded bilateral agreements on cheese with Austria, Norway, Finland, Israel, New
Zealand, Canada, Switzerland, Portugal, Sweden, Iceland, Australia, Argentina, and the EEC.1" ' Each of these agreements commits the United
States to permit the importation of a specified amount of cheese annually. The sum of the amounts stated in each of the agreements represents
approximately all the quota and above price-break cheese imported during 1978, plus a small increase conceded by the United States during the
course of the negotiations. 142 In addition, each of the agreements, with the
exception of those with Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and Argentina, ' 8
commits the United States to refrain from imposing CVD's on any of the
cheese supplied in satisfaction of the amounts permitted under the agreements. In return for these commitments the United States received written assurances from the countries involved that they would not grant subsidies on such cheese in a manner which would result in the undercutting
44
of the domestic wholesale price of like domestic cheese.1
The commitments to permit the importation of a specified amount of
cheese annually are implemented domestically by section 701 of the
TAA.' 45 Section 701 directs the President to issue a proclamation, to be

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
paras. 3,
145.

SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra
HousE COMM. REPORT, supra note 134,

note 23, at 193-94.
at 135.

Id.
Id.
SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note

23, at 191.
See, e.g., the agreement with the EEC in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 417,
4.
Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 701, 93 Stat. 268 (1979) (to be codified
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considered as issued under section 22, limiting the amount of quota
cheese which may enter the United States annually to an amount of not
more than 111,000 metric tons. The need for such a Congressional directive existed for two distinct reasons. First, the quota level under U.S. law
in 1978 and 1979 was considerably lower than the quota level needed in
order to permit the United States to comply fully with the thirteen bilateral agreements on cheese concluded in Geneva. And second, it was unclear whether the time consuming consultations with the ITC required by
section 22 would produce the kind of result necessary to authorize the
President to issue an amending proclamation increasing the quota level
above that then existing. In order to bring the quota level under U.S. law
into line with the international commitments of the United States, avert
potential problems accompanying consultations with the ITC, and at the
same time assure the domestic dairy industry of the continuing viability
of section 22, Congress simply required the issuance of a proclamation
establishing a quota roughly equal to the sum of the amounts specified in
all of the bilateral agreements. 46 Presumably, interest in protecting the
price support programs received some consideration by Congress prior to
its approval and implementation of the bilateral agreements entered into
by the executive branch.
Apart from altering the method by which quotas on cheese have traditionally been established, section 701 changes the cheese quota system
in another significant respect. Since 1968 imported cheese priced higher
than the price-break has been permitted to enter the United States free
of quota. By directing the issuance of a proclamation limiting the amount
of quota cheese which may enter the United States annually and then
defining the term "quota cheese" without reference to any support price
figure, 47 section 701 effectively eliminates the price-break. As a result,
rather than having a system comprised of quota cheese, above price-break
cheese, and non-quota cheese, section 701 creates a system comprised of
only quota cheese and non-quota cheese. This change, which will bring
about eighty-five percent of all cheese imported into the U.S. within the
quota system, represents concern with projected increases in importations
of above price-break cheese. The only cheese now entitled to enter the
United States free of quota will be the specialty cheese.14 8
The commitments of the United States to refrain from imposing
CVD's on quota cheese imported from countries which have obligated
themselves not to undercut the domestic wholesale price of like domestic

in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
146. If one looks closely at figures, it is apparent that only approximately 109,000 of the
111,000 metric tons authorized by Congress to be allocated had, as of August 1, 1980, actually been allocated.
147. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 701(c), 93 Stat. 269 (1979) (to be
codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
148. SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT, supra note 23, at 194-95.
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cheese are implemented by section 702(0 of the TAA." 9 In view of the
fact that section 702(f) applies only to quota cheese imported from countries which have agreed not to engage in price-undercutting, nothing in
the TAA would seem to prohibit the imposition of CVD's on items of
non-quota cheese or items of quota cheese imported from countries, such
as Australia, New Zealand, Israel, and Argentina, which have not obligated themselves to avoid price undercutting. However, before CVD's
may be imposed in such cases, it must at least be demonstrated that the
imported cheese is benefitting from a subsidy. Whether the subsidy must
also cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic industry
will depend upon whether section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or section
701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by title I of the TAA, applies.
The commitment to refrain from imposing CVD's on quota cheese
imported from countries agreeing not to engage in price undercutting
does not leave the domestic dairy industry subject to foreign depredation.
Subsections (b) through (e) of section 702 provide the President authority
to penalize transgressions of the international obligations to avoid sales
undercutting the domestic wholesale price of like domestic cheese. Specifically, these subsections provide that the President may impose fees or
quantitative limitations on subsidized quota cheese imported into the
United States whenever such cheese is being offered for sale at a dutypaid wholesale price below the domestic wholesale market price of similar
domestic cheese. Fees imposed pursuant to this authority are clearly distinct from CVD's in that they do not exceed what is necessary to eliminate the price undercutting. Furthermore, it would appear that they are
consonant with the bilateral agreements, since the bilaterals do not prohibit the United States from penalizing violations of the international obligations to avoid price undercutting.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS

Two international commodity agreements, both effective January 1,
1980, deserve passing consideration in concluding this brief survey of the
results.of the Tokyo Round of the MTN which affect international trade
in agricultural commodities. These agreements are the Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat 50 and the International Dairy Arrangement."5 " In
general, both agreements are designed primarily to establish an informational and consultative network. Attached to the International Dairy Arrangement, however, are three protocols containing substantive economic
provisions.
A.

Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat (ARBM)
The purpose of the ARBM, which covers trade in live bovine animals, as well as fresh, chilled, frozen, salted, dried, smoked, and prepared

149. Trade Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 702, 93 Stat. 269 (1979) (to be codified
in 19 U.S.C. § 1202 note).
150. MTN/ME/8, also in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 585.
151. MTN/DP/8, also in MTN AGREEMENTS, supra note 4, at 339.
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or preserved meat and edible offals of bovine animals,1 2 is to facilitate
the expansion, liberalization, and stability of the international meat and
livestock market. 5 8 This purpose is to be accomplished by assisting in the
progressive dismantling of obstacles and restrictions to world trade in bovine meat and live animals.'

The fundamental instrument established by the ARBM to satisfy its
stated purpose is the International Meat Council. 5' The Council is to be
comprised of representatives from all states parties to the agreement and
shall meet at least twice each year or at any other time requested by its
chairman upon his own initiative or following the urging of a state
party." If a state party urges the chairman to call a meeting of the
Council to consider a matter affecting the ARBM, the Council shall meet
within fifteen days of such request.1' 7
Article III of the ARBM provides that states parties are to transmit
regularly to the Council information which will permit the Council to
monitor and access the overall situation of the world market for meat.'"
Such information shall include data on the past performance and current
situation with respect to meat, and an assessment of the outlook regarding meat production, consumption, prices, stocks, and trade."' States
parties are also required to provide the Council with information concerning domestic policies and trade measures in the bovine sector. 60 Based on
such information the Council shall evaluate the world supply and demand
situation and outlook."' If such evaluation indicates the existence of a
"serious imbalance" or threat thereof in the international meat market,
then the Council will proceed by "consensus"'' " to identify possible solutions to remedy the situation.'" These possible solutions are merely for
the "consideration" of the states parties to the ARBM and need not be
adopted or implemented.'"
B. InternationalDairy Arrangement (IDA)
The IDA, which covers trade in milk and cream, butter, cheese and
curd, as well as casein,' 65 is designed to promote the expansion and liberalization of world trade in dairy products.'" In order to attain this objec-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, supra note 150, art. II.
Id. art. I.

Id.
Id. art. V(1).
Id. art. V(2).
Id. art. IV(6).
Id. art. I(1).
Id. art. 111(3).
Id.
Id. art. IV(1)(a).
Id. art. V(3) (indicating that "consensus" means unanimity).
Id. art. IV(2).
HOUSE COMM. REPORT, supra note 134, at 150.
International Dairy Arrangement, supra note 151, art. II.
Id. art I.

1980

TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

tive, the IDA establishes an International Dairy Products Council comprised of representatives from all states parties, 67 vests the Council with
responsibilities and powers virtually identical to those assigned by the
ARBM to the International Meat Council,"6 8 and obligates states parties
to the IDA to adhere to the provisions of three protocols attached
thereto.' 6 The Protocols Regarding Certain Milk Powders, Milk Fat, and
Certain Cheeses enunciate minimum price levels for sales to commercial
markets.
,Specifically, the Protocol Regarding Certain Milk Powders sets prices
of $425, $725, and $425 per metric ton for skimmed, whole, and buttermilk powders respectively.170 The price levels per metric ton established
by the Protocol Regarding Milk Fat are $1100 for anhydrous milk fat and
$925 for butter.1 7 ' The price stated in the Protocol Regarding Certain
Cheeses is $800 per metric ton.17' The minimum price levels provided for
in the three protocols do not apply to sales made to non-commercial markets.1 7 3 Further, each of the protocols provides that the price levels stated
therein are subject to annual review and adjustment1 7" by one of the three
appropriate committees set up by the Council under the authority of article VII(2) of the IDA to assure compliance with and implementation of
the provisions of each of the various protocols.
V.

CONCLUSION

Though it is still far too early to assess the real impact of the results
of the Tokyo Round on United States international agricultural trade, it
seems safe to posit one obervation. Unlike previous rounds of trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of the GATT, the round concluded
in Geneva in April of 1979 makes an attempt to deal comprehensively
with the issues which have plagued U.S. international agricultural trade
during the post-World War II era. Most of these issues have developed
out of the use of various NTB's and the absence of an effective informational and consultative network between trading partners. The four
multilateral codes of conduct and two international commodity agreements discussed here should contribute substantially to the resolution of
these issues and the promotion of agricultural trade in general.

167. Id. art. VII.
168. Id. art. V.
169. Id. art. VI.
170. Id. Annex I, art. 3(2)(b).
171. Id. Annex II, art. 3(2)(b).
172. Id. Annex III, art. 3(2)(b).
173. HousE COMM. REPoRT, supra note 134, at 149.
174. International Dairy Arrangement, supra note 151, Annex I, art. 3(3)(b); id., Annex
I, art. 3(3)(b); id., Annex III, art. 3(3)(b).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On 26 March 1979, in Washington D.C., President Mohamed Anwar
El-Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the Treaty of
Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel.'
United States President Jimmy Carter signed the Treaty as its witness.
The Treaty came into force, in accordance with its terms, on 25 April
1979.2
This historic Treaty constitutes a "major step forward in the seemingly endless search for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict."'s This
Comment focuses on the Treaty's peacekeeping 4 arrangements for the
Sinai Peninsula, which raise issues relating both to United Nations
peacekeeping forces and observers and to non-U.N. multinational peacekeeping arrangements. The discussion will begin with an overview of the
Treaty's provisions, including its prescriptions for permanent security arrangements in the Sinai. Implementation of the peacekeeping provisions
will then be addressed in their three phases: Israel's interim withdrawals,
during the course of which the United Nations force in the Sinai was disbanded; the period prior to Israel's scheduled final withdrawal from the
Sinai in 1982, when the concerned parties fashioned their response to the
refusal of the U.N. Security Council to act in accordance with their request; and the period following Israel's final withdrawal, at which time
President Carter's pledge concerning an "alternative multinational

Richard W. Nelson is a J.D. candidate at the University of Denver College of Law, and
an M.A. candidate at the University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies.
B.A., 1976, University of California at Los Angeles.
1. Hereinafter referred to as "the Treaty." For text, see EGYPrIAN-IsRAELI PEACE
TREATY (1979) (U.S. Dep't of State, Selected Docs. No. 11, Pub. No. 8976); 18 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 362 (1979). Accompanying the Treaty were three annexes, an appendix, agreed minutes, and six letters. Also, the United States exchanged Memoranda of Agreement with

Israel. These materials are reprinted in Middle East Peace Package: Hearings on S. 1007
Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-184 app. (1979).
2. Treaty art. IX, para. 1. The exchange of documents of ratification took place at
Umm Khisheib, in the Sinai. N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1979, at 8, col. 3 (city ed.; all citations
infra to The New York Times are to the city edition).
3. Murphy, To Bring to an End the State of War: The Egyptian-IsraeliPeace Treaty,
12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 897, 941 (1979). Professor Murphy's article offers an excellent
evaluation of the Treaty, as well as a survey of the entire process leading up to its conclusion and of the future Middle East agenda for peace. He acknowledges the difficulties facing
the concerned parties. Another scholar, Professor Bassiouni, has concluded, in view of the
responses of Egypt, Israel, and the United States to the Western European initiative to
recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people, that "[t]his signifies the end of the Camp David Peace Process which
has now served its historic usefulness." Bassiouni, An Analysis of Egyptian Peace Policy
Toward Israel: From Resolution 242 (1967) to the 1979 Peace Treaty, 12 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 3, 26 (1980).
4. On the use of the term "peacekeeping," see note 69 infra.
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force"" may come into play. Conceivable courses of events during this
final, indeterminate period will then be explored, including the possibility
of a United States-sponsored peacekeeping force. The effects of the dissolution of the United Nations Sinai force on U.N. peacekeeping efforts will
then be considered in the course of general comments, in light of the
Treaty and its aftermath, on the prospects for U.N. peacekeeping.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE TREATY'S PROVISIONS

6

A.

Comprehensive Provisions
1. Peaceful Relations
The Treaty terminated the state of war existing between Egypt and
Israel since 15 May 1948.7 The parties agreed to apply between them the
provisions of the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations among states in times of
peace.8 They agreed, in particular, to recognize and respect each other's
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, and to respect each other's right to live in peace within their recognized boundaries.9 They also agreed to refrain from the direct or indirect threat or use
of force against each other, and to peaceably settle all disputes arising out
of the application or interpretation of the Treaty by negotiation or, failing that, by conciliation or arbitration.10 A claims commission was to be

5. See text, section II(B)(4) infra.
6. The Treaty did not deal at length with the Middle East conflict as a whole; neither
will this Comment. Rather, it "postponed the confrontation." Abba Eban (paraphrased),
Camp David-The Unfinished Business, 57 FOREIGN AFF. 343 (1978-79). See Murphy,
supra note 3, for an analysis of the Treaty's place in the Middle East peace process. Issues
concerning the status of the Palestinian people, and the situation in the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, were addressed in the Preamble and in the letters attached to
the Treaty between President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter. The parties recognized the need to create a first step toward a comprehensive peace based on
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, 22 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 8-9,
U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967); on Security Council Resolution 338, 28 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 10, U.N. Doc. S/INF/29 (1973); and on the Camp David Agreements.
The two documents which together constitute the Camp David Agreements are: 1) A Framework for Peace in the Middle East, agreed at Camp David, Sept. 17, 1978 [hereinafter cited
as Camp David Framework for Peace], and 2) Framework for the Conclusion of a Treaty
Between Egypt and Israel, agreed at Camp David, Sept. 17, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Camp
David Conclusion of Treaty]. For texts, see THR CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (1978) (U.S. Dep't of
State, Pub. No. 8954), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1463 (1978). By the Camp David
Agreements, the parties initiated negotiations designed to lead to an agreement defining the
powers and responsibilities of a "self-governing authority (administrative council)" in the
West Bank and Gaza. Camp David, Framework for Peace, supra, sections A.1(b)-(c). For
recent opposing studies on the Camp David Agreements, see D. ELAZAR, THE CAMP DAVID
FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE: A SHIFT TOWARD SHARED RULE (Am. Ent. Inst. Stud. Foreign Pol'y,
No. 236, 1979); CAMP DAVID: A NEW BALFOUR DECLARATION (A. Arab-Am. U. Grads, Spec.
Rep. No. 3, F. Zeadey ed. 1979).
7. Treaty art. I, para. 1.
8. Treaty art. III, para. 1.
9. Treaty art. III, para. l(a)-(b).
10. Treaty art. III, para. 1(c) (these provisions reflect those embodied in U.N. CHARTER
art. 2, paras. 3 & 4), and art. VII, paras. 1-2 (reflecting U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1).
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established for the settlement of all financial claims."
The parties agreed to fulfill in good faith the obligations imposed by
the Treaty, without regard to the action or inaction of the other party,
and independently of any other instrument. They agreed not to enter
into any obligation in conflict with the Treaty,' and specified that in the
event of a conflict between an obligation under the Treaty and any other
4
obligation, the former would be binding and implemented.
Each party agreed to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence directed against the population or property of the other
party would not originate in its territory." The parties also agreed that
upon completion of Israel's interim withdrawal from the Sinai,' they
would establish normal and friendly relations. Those relations were to
include full recognition, diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations, and
Neither the Treaty nor any of the accompanying documents specifies who or what organization would arbitrate a dispute.
11. Treaty art. VIII.
12. Treaty art. VI, para. 2.
13. Treaty art. VI, para. 4.
14. Treaty art. VI, para. 5. This provision was stated to be subject to article 103 of the
U.N. Charter, which states that the Charter prevails over any other international agreement.
The intent of the parties in article VI, paragraphs 2 and 5, is not clear. Paragraph 2
may be read to mean that regardless of what other Arab states may do concerning the West
Bank/Gaza negotiations and regardless of the outcome of those negotiations, the Treaty
remains binding; thus, there is no "linkage" between the Treaty and those negotiations. A
second possible interpretation is that the Treaty is binding and takes precedence over any
other treaties or agreements (save for the U.N. Charter). The Agreed Minutes to article VI,
paragraph 2, state that article VI as a whole shall not be construed so as to contradict the
Camp David Framework for Peace, and that that rule of construction should not be viewed
as contravening article VI, paragraph 2.
During the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty, Israel insisted that the
Treaty should take precedence over Egypt's other treaties, such as the Arab League's Pact,
its Joint Defense Treaty, or its Council's resolutions, particularly that of April 13, 1950. See
H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DispuTEs, at 34, 311, 406 (1975).
These documents preclude a "separate peace" with Israel and would require Egypt to go to
the defense of an Arab state at war with Israel. Arab League Council Res. of Apr. 13, 1950,
made mandatory by Arab League Pact art. 7, para. 1; Joint Defense Treaty art. 2. Egypt
maintained that the Treaty would not necessarily take precedence over these obligations.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1979, at 3, col. 1. The Agreed Minutes to article VI, paragraph 5, state
that neither party asserts that the Peace Treaty prevails over any other treaty or that another treaty prevails over the Peace Treaty. "Not surprisingly," writes Professor Murphy,
"armed with this ambiguous language, Egypt and Israel have taken conflicting positions."
Murphy, supra note 3, at 923. For a more comprehensive treatment of these questions, see
Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 20-22; Murphy, supra note 3, at 920-24.
15. Treaty art. III, para. 2.
16. Israel's interim withdrawal is dealt with in Annex I to the Treaty; see text infra.
Annex I is entitled Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements.
17. Treaty art. I, para. 3. The process for achieving these relations was set out in Annex
III to the Treaty (Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties). By Annex III, the parties
agreed, among other things, to establish diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors,
to recognize international conventions on aviation, to open roads and railways, and to establish postal, telephone, television, and other services. They also reaffirmed their commitments to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
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termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free
movement of people and goods." s The parties further agreed to guarantee
the mutual enjoyment by their citizens of the due process of law.'"
2. Permanent Boundary
Israel agreed to withdraw all its military and civilian elements from
the Sinai peninsula,' 0 Egypt thereupon resuming the exercise of full sovereignty over the area." The Treaty established as permanent and inviolable the boundary drawn between Egypt and Israel in 1906 by Turkey
(then sovereign over Palestine) and Great Britain (then sovereign over
Egypt).12 It was stated that the border provision was "without prejudice
to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip."'"
Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes were to enjoy the right of free
passage through the Suez Canal, on the basis of the 1888 Constantinople
Convention, " and were to be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in
all matters relating to use of the Canal.25 The parties also agreed that the
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba were international waterways, open

18. Treaty art. III, para. 3.
19. Id.
20. Treaty art. I, para. 2. Details of the withdrawal are covered in Annex I to the
Treaty and in the Appendix to Annex I. [The latter document, entitled Organization of
Movements in the Sinai, is hereinafter cited as Appendix.] Egypt considers that implementation of this Treaty clause will constitute a partial implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), note 6 supra, which states that Israel must withdraw from the
territories occupied in 1967. Egypt's Prime Minister Khalil said in March 1979 that withdrawal from the Sinai will set a precedent for total withdrawal from the Golan Heights, the
West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Prime Minister Begin said in his
speech opening the Knesset debate on ratification of the Treaty that Israel would never
withdraw from all the occupied territories, that it would never give up Jerusalem, and that
there would never be a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. N.Y. Times, March 21,
at Al, col. 1, & A9, col. 1. Yehuda Blum, currently Israel's Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, has considered the topic of withdrawal in the following terms: "It will be
noted that nowhere does Security Council Resolution 242(1967) contain any reference to the
status quo ante June 5, 1967. Instead, it speaks of 'withdrawal of Israel armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict,' omitting the definite article before the word 'ter-

ritories ....

'" Y. BLUM, SECURE

BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE

72 (1971).

21. Treaty art. I, para. 2. Egypt will resume sovereignty over each area as Israel withdraws. Agreed Minutes to art. I. Full Egyptian sovereignty was the subject of vociferous
debate in Israel, because many Israelis wanted to retain sovereignty over the civilian settlements in the Sinai. On 28 September 1978, the Knesset voted to remove the Israeli settlements. N.Y. Times News Service, Supp. Mat., Sept. 28, 1978, at 24.
22. Treaty art. II.
23. Id. Sovereignty over the Gaza Strip is thus unsettled. Egypt administered the area
from 1949 to 1967, but did not claim sovereignty over it. Israel has administered Gaza since
the 1967 war.
24. Treaty art. V, para. 1. The Constantinople Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, Oct. 29, 1888, reprinted in THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM,
JULY 26-SEPT. 22, 1956, at 16-20 (1956) (U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 6392). Article I of the
Convention states that the Canal shall be open to ships of war or commerce, in time of
peace or war, to all nations. Article X gives Egypt the right to defend the Canal. Egypt has
cited article X as its justification for closing the Canal to Israeli ships since 1948.
25. Treaty art. V, para. 1.
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to all nations for free navigation and overflight.2 6
B. Security and Peacekeeping Provisions"
1. General Provisions
The parties, in order to provide for their maximum security on the
basis of reciprocity, agreed to establish security arrangements, including
limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory."8 They agreed to the
stationing of United Nations forces and observers in the buffer zones between Egyptian and Israeli forces, and agreed not to request withdrawal
of these personnel. 2 They further agreed that the U.N. personnel would
not be removed without the approval of the U.N. Security Council, that
approval to require the affirmative votes of the five permanent Council
members."0 The Treaty also provided that these arrangements could be
reviewed at the request of either party, and amended by mutual
agreement.3 1
2. Interim Withdrawals
Annex I to the Treaty, the implementation of which will be dealt
with in section III below, provided details of Israeli withdrawal from and
security arrangements in the Sinai Peninsula. Israel was to withdraw from
the Sinai under the supervision of an Egyptian-Israeli Joint Commission 2 first to an interim line within nine months from the date of ratification,3" then to the international border within three years.3 4 The final
withdrawal would include all Israeli armed forces and civilians." The parties agreed that, notwithstanding their stipulation that the Treaty superseded the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September 1975,36 all

26. Treaty art. V, para. 2. The fact that Egypt and Israel agree that the Strait and the
Gulf are international waterways does not necessarily make them so, particularly since the
other affected states, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, have not so agreed.
27. A number of separate security agreements, intertwined with the Treaty's provisions,
were signed by the United States and by Egypt and Israel respectively. For a discussion of
these agreements, see Murphy, supra note 3, at 915-16.
28. Treaty art. IV, para. 1.
29. Treaty art. IV, para. 2.
30. Id.
31. Treaty art. IV, para. 4. A review would commence within three months of a party's
request. Agreed Minutes to art. I.
32. Annex I, art. I, para. 4; see also Treaty art. IV, para. 3. The Joint Commission was
to function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification until the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. Appendix, art. IV, para. 1. It was to be composed of
representatives of each country under a senior officer, and would, among other things, coordinate military activities, assist U.N. forces and observers, and organize the demarcation of
the international boundary and all lines and zones. Appendix, art. IV, paras. 2, 3(a), 3(c),
3(d).
33. Annex I, art. I, para. 3(a). Israeli withdrawal to the interim line (the El Arish-Ras
Mohammad Line, Map 1) was completed in five subphases, in accordance with Appendix
art. II, para. 1.
34. Annex I, art. I, para. 3(b).
35. Annex I, art. I, para. 1.
36. Treaty art. IX, para. 2. For text of Agreement of Sept. 1, 1975, its Annex, and the
United States proposal for an early warning system in the Sinai, see DEP'T OF STATE, NEWS
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applicable military arrangements under that Agreement would remain in
effect until Israeli armed forces completed withdrawal from lines "J" and
"M" in the western Sinai established by the Agreement (see Map 1) up to
the interim withdrawal line (that running from El Arish to Ras Mohammad; see Map 1).3
During the period of withdrawal of Israeli armed forces, the parties
agreed that United Nations forces were to immediately enter each evacuated area and establish interim and temporary buffer zones (see Map 1),
for the purpose of maintaining a separation of Egyptian and Israeli
forces. The deployment of these forces was to precede the movement of
any other personnel into these areas3 s Deployment of Egyptian armed
forces, border units, and civil police in the Sinai, and of naval units in the
Gulf of Suez, was to follow the stationing of the U.N. forces.39
An interim buffer zone was to be established west of and adjacent to
the interim withdrawal (El Arish-Ras Mohammad) line after Israeli withdrawal to the area east of that line. Egyptian civil police were to perform
normal police functions in the buffer zone, 0 while United Nations forces
were to operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation
posts."' Israeli personnel were to operate military technical installations
at four locations in the zone. 3 These installations were to be withdrawn
when Israeli forces withdrew from the interim line, or at another time
agreed to by the parties.43 Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical
teams were to inspect all installations (for example, utilities, airfields,
roads, pumping stations, ports, and water sources) to be transferred to
Egypt following Israeli withdrawals."
The parties requested the United States to continue surveillance

Sept. 1, 1975, reprinted in Report by the Secretary-General concerning the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, Annex, 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (July-Sept. 1975) 54, U.N.
Doc. S/11818/Add.1 (1975); THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT-READINGS AND DOCUMENTS 1208
(abridged & revised ed. J.N. Moore 1977) [hereinafter cited as J.N. Moore]. The U.S. proposal on the early warning system is also found at 26 U.S.T. 2271, T.I.A.S. No. 8155.
37. Appendix art. I, para. 2(a).
38. Appendix art. I, para. 2(b).
39. Appendix art. I, para. 2(c)-(f).
40. Appendix art. V, para. 1.
41. Appendix art. V, para. 2.
42. Appendix art. V, para. 3. See Map 1 for the locations of the Israeli military technical installations, sites "T 1-4." These installations were to be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms (including rifles, sub-machine guns, and
hand grenades) required for their protection. Only officers were to be allowed to carry weapons outside the sites. A third party (unidentified in the Treaty) was to conduct random
inspections of the sites at least once a month to verify compliance with Treaty obligations.
Access to and exit from the sites was to be monitored by U.N. forces. Appendix art. V, para.
3(a)-(c), (g).
43. Appendix art. V, para. 5.
44. Appendix art. VI, paras. 1 & 2. Israel was to remove all military barriers and mines
prior to withdrawal, or to provide maps and technical data for those not removed. Appendix
art. VI, para. 4(a)-(b).
RELEASE,
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flights until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal. Special inspection
flights were to be allowed at the request of either party or of the United
Nations." The United States was also requested to continue to operate
the Sinai Field Mission until the completion of Israel's withdrawal from
the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes,"" whereupon its activities
were to be terminated. 7
The parties agreed to request that United Nations forces be deployed
as necessary until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal, and agreed
to the use of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for that purpose. 48 The U.N. forces were to "employ their best efforts" to prevent

45. Appendix art. VII, para. 1(a)-(b).
46. See Map 1. This, the last phase of the interim withdrawal, was to be completed
within nine months from the date of ratification. The withdrawal was completed on time.
See note 70 infra.
47. Appendix art. VII, para. 2. The Sinai Field Mission was authorized by a Joint Resolution of Congress on 13 October 1975 (Pub. L. No. 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, codified in 22
U.S.C. 2348(n) (Supp. III 1979)), and was established on 13 January 1976 by Exec. Order
No. 11,896, 41 Fed. Reg. 2067 (1976). It became operational on 22 February 1976. For a
summary history of the Sinai Field Mission and its Washington-based headquarters, the
Sinai Support Mission, see WATCH IN THE SINAI (1980) (U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 9131,
General Foreign Policy Series 321).
48. Appendix art. III, para. 1. The U.N. force referred to is that created by the Security
Council by Resolution 340, 28 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 11, U.N. Doc. SINF/29
(1973). The resolution was adopted by 14 votes in favor to 0 against, with the People's
Republic of China not taking part in the vote. [1973] U.N.Y.B. 202. On China's position on
this vote, see note 215 infra. See also Resolution 341, 28 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.)
11, U.N. Doc. SINF/29 (1973), by which the Council mandated the operations of the force
in approving the Secretary-General's initial report thereon. This force will hereinafter be
referred to as UNEF. (It is often referred to in the literature as UNEF II.) A predecessor
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was created by the General Assembly at its
First Emergency Special Session in 1956. On UNEF I, see generally A. ELKORDY, THE
UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FUNCTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD 167-203 (1967); 1 R.
HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-67, at 221-529 (1967); E. LAUTERPACHT, THE
UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE-BASiC DOCUMENTS (1960); G. ROSNER, THE UNITED
NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE (1963).
The parties' request to employ UNEF was consistent with what one long-time
peacekeeping expert described as "the two salient principles that have governed the creation
and implementation of United Nations peacekeeping operations" in the period following the
creation of UNEF I. Harbottle, The October Middle East War: Lessons for UN Peacekeeping, 50 INT'L AFF. (London) 544, 545 (1974), reprinted in J.N. Moore, supra note 36, at 615.
These principles are: 1) that peacekeeping operations "should be of a peaceful, not of an
enforcement nature," and 2) that they should be used "only at the request, or with the
consent, of those who are a party to the dispute." Id. at 545-46.
This use of UNEF would also fulfill existing expectations concerning peacekeeping
under terms described by James, since it would fit into two of the three broad categories of
U.N. peacekeeping operations he identified. First, its general purposes would be to maintain
peace and security and to prevent a deterioration in the situation, with the more specific
aims of maintaining calm and preventing violence. Second, it would assist in the execution
of the political settlement. A. JAMEs, THE POLITICS OF PEACE-KEEPING 7-9, 15 passim, 177
passim (1969). But, on the political settlement aspect of peacekeeping, see Saksena, Not by
Design: Evolution of UN Peace-Keeping Operations and its Implications for the Future,
16 INT'L STUD. 459, 473 (1977). (James' third category is neither a conciliatory nor a pre-
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violations of the withdrawal terms,49 and to verify troop limitations, operate check points, send out reconnaissance patrols, and man observation
posts. 0
3. . Permanent Arrangements
The Treaty also dealt at length with security in the Sinai following
Israel's final withdrawal in April 1982. Four zones, three in the Sinai and
one in Israel-each with specified limitations on military installations and
fortifications, weapons, troops, equipment, aircraft, and naval vessels-were to be set up."1 Egypt and Israel were to be allowed to establish
system was to replace
early warning systems in specified zones."' A liaison
54
5
the Joint Commission " after full withdrawal.
The parties agreed to request the United Nations to provide forces
and observers following final withdrawal to operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary
and along line B-a line running from a point about midway between El
Arish and the Gaza Strip in the north to Sharm el Sheikh in the
south-and within Zone C, that area between the international boundary
and line B (see Map 2). 55 The United Nations forces were also to carry
out verifications of the implementation of pertinent Treaty provisions
also to entwice monthly or on the request of either party."6 They were
57
sure the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran.
The U.N. forces were to be deployed in Zone C58 and stationed
mainly in camps located in two areas, shown in Map 2, near the Gaza
Strip and Sharm el Sheikh respectively.5 s Only United Nations observers,
as opposed to forces, were to be permitted on the Israeli side of the border, in Zone D, a thin band of territory adjacent to the border running
from the Mediterranean Sea at the southern end of the Gaza Strip to the

ventative role. Rather, the peacekeeping unit is designed to "upset certain aspects of the
established order of things," with the United Nations attempting to act as an instrument of
change. A. JAMES, supra, at 9, 371 passim.) Other United Nations peacekeeping operations
have engaged in both peace maintenance/violence prevention and settlement assistance, notably those in Kashmir, Indonesia, and Cyprus. See generally 2 R. HIGGINS, supra; D.
WAINHOUSE et al., INTERNATIONAL PEACE OBSERVATION (1966); D. WAINHOUSE et al., INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AT THE CROSSROADS (1973).

49.
50.
51.
52.
D. See
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Appendix art. III, para. 2.
Appendix art. III, para. 3.
Annex I, arts. II, III, & IV. The zones are depicted in Map 2.
Annex I, art. V. Egypt was to be allowed to set up systems in Zone A; Israel, in Zone
Map 2.
See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
Annex I, art. VII.
Annex I, art. VI, para. 2(a).
Annex I, art. VI, para. 2(b)-(c).
Annex I, art. VI, para. 2(d). See also Treaty art. V; note 26 supra and accompany-

ing text.

58. Annex I, art. II, para. 1(c)(4); Annex I, art. VI, para. 3.
59. Annex I, art. II, para. 1(c)(5).
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Gulf of Aqaba near Eilat. 0° The forces and observers were to enjoy freedom of movement, and were to be allowed any necessary facilities. e They
were not to be empowered to authorize the crossing of the international
boundary.6 2 The parties were to agree at a later date on the countries
from which the United Nations forces and observers would be drawn; nationals of permanent members of the U.N. Security Council were not to
be included.6" The parties stipulated that if they could not reach an
agreement on the composition of the U.N. forces and observers, they
would "accept or support" a United States proposal on that matter."
4.

President Carter's Letters

On the same day on which the Peace Treaty was signed, President
Carter addressed to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin virtually
identical letters by which he "confirm[ed]" certain aspects of United
States obligations arising from the Treaty."5 The President stated in the
letters that in the event of an "actual or threatened violation" of the
Treaty, the United States would, on the request of one or both parties,
consult with the parties and take such action as it might deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.66 The President
also confirmed that the United States would conduct aerial monitoring as
requested by the parties. 7
Also by these letters, and of primary importance for the purposes of
this Comment, President Carter expressed the conviction of the United
States that the Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone" could and should be
implemented by the Security Council, and stated that the United States
would exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Council. If the Council failed to establish and maintain the arrangements
called for in the Treaty, the letters continued, "the President [would] be
prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and
maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force." All of
these confirmations were made "subject to United States Constitutional
processes."

60. Annex I, art. II. para. 1(d)(2); Annex I, art. VI, para. 3.
61. Annex I, art. VI, para. 6.
62. Annex I, art. VI, para. 7.
63. Annex I, art. VI, para. 8.
64. Agreed Minutes to Annex I.
65. The letters, dated 26 March 1979, are published in the State Department publication referred to in note 1 supra, at 23, and at 18 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 532 (1979). The only
difference between the two letters is the ordering of the Treaty's parties in their texts. The
legal and political nature of these letters and the extent of the obligation they impose is
discussed in section IV(A) of this Comment.
66. An interesting work on this general topic is A. DowTY, THE ROLE OF GREAT POWER
GUARANTEES IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE AGREEMENTS (Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems,
1974).
67. Appendix art. VII, para. l(a).
68. Annex I, art. VI.
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69

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY'S PEACEKEEPING

PROVISIONS

A. InternationalAction: The Situation During the Initial Withdrawals
(April 1979 to January 1980)
Between 25 April 1979 and 23 January 1980,70 Israel withdrew, in
accordance with the Treaty's provisions, to the interim (El Arish-Ras Mohammad) line. During this period, however, considerable problems concerning the peacekeeping provisions of the Treaty arose. Initially, the
problems centered on UNEF, which was called on by the parties to execute tasks similar in many ways to those it had been performing, but over
larger areas.

69. The term "peacekeeping" is used neither in the Treaty nor in any of its accompanying documents. Nor does it appear in the United Nations Charter. Professor Inis Claude has
written that "the term may come to be generally employed as a designation for whatever
may be done or recommended to promote or uphold stability in international relations."
Claude, The Peace-keeping Role of the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 49 (E. Tompkins ed. 1972). Professor Higgins has noted that the term may refer to
"the entire role of the UN in maintaining, or restoring, international peace," but that it may
also be used with reference to U.N. forces and observer groups or solely to U.N. forces.
"There is, of course, no one 'correct' definition." 1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at ix.
The use of the term "peacekeeping" derives from the escape fashioned by SecretaryGeneral Dag Hammarskj6ld and others from the problems presented by the failure of the
United Nations to live up to the Charter's conception of collective security in the enforcement of peace. Hammarskjild's doctrine of "preventive diplomacy" employed as its central
component the proposition that the United Nations could provide an alternative to peaceenforcement in the form of peacekeeping, whereby the Organization, through the employment of somewhat modest forces, would intervene in a situation which threatened international peace. In the words of Brigadier Michael Harbottle:
[Pleacekeeping by definition must be a third party intervention, peaceful and
impartial-the task of a referee, equipped with a whistle rather than a gun
with which to control the violence. UN peacefeeping is exactly that: an operation that is conducted without force, coercion or undue persuasion, but with
tactful reasoning, quiet diplomacy and above all patient restraint.
Harbottle, supra note 48, at 545.
Much has been written about whether peacekeeping is action taken under Chapter VI
or Chapter VII of the Charter, or whether it is an autonomous function, arising from practice, which in effect lies between those chapters. See generally D. BOWETT, UNITED NATIONS
FORCES 266-312 (1964); J. BoYD, UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A MILITARY
AND POLITICAL. APPRAISAL 5-13 (1971); L. FABIAN, SOLDIERS WITHOUT ENEMIES 1-12 (1971); L.
GOODRICH, THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 138-58 (1974); L. GOODRICH, E.
HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 290-317 (3d rev. ed. 1969); J. GUTTERIDGE, THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD 28-47 (1969); R. KHAN, IMPLIED
POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 58-73 (1970); A. LEGAULT, RESEARCH ON PEACE-KEEPING

NEEDS 9-28 (Int'l Information Center on Peacekeeping Operations Monograph No. 5, 1967); M. NAIDU, COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE
UNITED NATIONS 75-82 (1974); Halderman, Legal Basis for United Nations Armed Forces,
56 AM. J. INT'L L. 971 (1962).
OPERATIONS-CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE

70. Israel's interim withdrawal was completed two days before the date anticipated by
the Treaty. Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1980, at 1, col. 1.

1980

PEACEKEEPING AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY

1. The Authority of the Secretary-General vis-a-vis the Security
Council
a. Trends in United Nations Practice
By the Treaty's terms, Egypt and Israel agreed to request the redeployment of UNEF to enable it to perform during the interim withdrawals the functions called for in the Treaty. 7' The parties did not indicate to whom this request was to be directed. There are two possibilities:
the Security Council and the Secretary-General. UNEF was a creation of
the Security Council,"2 and in modern practice, there is little disagreement that the Council is the United Nations entity which possesses ultimate and dominant power in all matters concerning international peace
and security. Arguments over the extent to which the Secretary-General
must defer to the Council's authority nevertheless persist.
It was not Mr. Kurt Waldheim, but rather the United States, which
asserted that the Secretary-General possessed the authority to order the
redeployment of UNEF even lacking a specific decision to that effect by
the Council. 73 The Secretary-General, while not delving into the matter of
his legal right to order redeployment, declined to do so. To one senior
United Nations official, it was "a question of prudence." This official
feared that the Organization would be "torn apart" if the Secretary-Gen7 4
eral acted without at least the tacit consent of the U.S.S.R.
There is today no dispute that the Secretary-General cannot establish a peacekeeping force even if all involved parties give their consent.
The question of the Secretary-General's authority over existing forces
then centers on two issues: whether in some circumstances a significant
change in the functioning of an existing force is tantamount to the creation of a new force; and the extent of the authority over existing forces
that may in fact be exercised by the Secretary-General.
With regard to the first issue, the clear trend has been and continues
to be towards fairly extreme deference to the prerogatives of the Council.
In 1965, for example, when U Thant "felt that a further deployment of
United Nations personnel was required to contain the Indo-Pakistan dispute he was careful to get the approval of the Security Council. '75 Also,

71. Appendix art. III, para. 1.
72. See note 48 supra. By contrast, UNEF I was created by the General Assembly, to
which the matter had been transferred from the Council under the "Uniting for Peace"
procedure, where the veto does not operate. (The Uniting for Peace procedure was adopted
by G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).)
73. N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1979, at 10, col. 2. This contrasts with the United States position on the permanent deployment of a U.N. force during the period following Israel's final
withdrawal from the Sinai. On that matter, President Carter confirmed in his letters to
President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin that the United States would "exert its utmost
efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council" for the permanent stationing
of United Nations forces in the Sinai. (Emphasis added.)
74. Id. The official was not named in this report. See also Samuels, The UN vs. the
Treaty, THE NEW LEADER, Apr. 9, 1979, at 7.
75. Higgins, A General Assessment of United Nations Peace-keeping, in UNITED
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in October 1967, following an exchange of hostilities between Egypt and
Israel, Thant enlarged the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) in the Suez Canal area, thereby creating "a
new role in a different geographical area by an adaptation of an existing
body. ' .. The United Kingdom and the United States regarded this action
as within the discretion of the Secretary-General so long as the directly
interested parties consented. 7 7 The Soviet Union disagreed, and the Secretary-General awaited Security Council action. The Council used the
technique of approval by informal consensus, with the President of the
Council issuing a statement, thus avoiding a formal vote.78
On the question of the extent in fact of the Secretary-General's authority over existing forces, a similar trend can be identified, though the
matter is not yet settled to the same degree as that regarding force creation. Evolving customary practice in this area, as in the entire United
Nations experience in peace and security matters, has been determined
largely on an ad hoc basis. In the main, the Secretary-General is allowed
to take all necessary "day-to-day" decisions on military and administrative matters; the problem, of course, is that no agreed definition of "dayto-day" matters exists. Thus, when a Secretary-General has acted so as to
deny wide discretion to the Council, that body-or more to the point,
those of its permanent members opposed to the particular actions taken
or proposed-have reacted strongly and negatively. In 1960, for example,
the controversy over Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj6ld's control over
the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) culminated in a
Soviet demand for his dismissal. " And, as Jackson has stated:
Since the death of Hammarskjdld, the Soviets have been more determined in their efforts to limit the role of the Secretary-General on
peace and security issues. France and, since 1971, the People's Republic of China have also opposed any actions on the part of the Secretary-General reminiscent of the Hammarskjold model. Moreover, ...
[w]hile Lie and Hammarskjdld could usually count on U.S. support
for their initiatives, Thant and Waldheim have not been able to do
SO.80

Nevertheless, the refusal of Secretary-General Waldheim to redeploy
UNEF as called for in the Treaty is most accurately explained in terms of
political realities. The joint political will of the United States and the
U.S.S.R., a necessary element of effective Security Council action, was
lacking. A comparison with events that took place in 1975 and 1976 pro-

NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING: LEGAL ESSAYS

1, 7 (A. Cassese ed. 1978) [book hereinafter cited as

A. Cassese].
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 62.
Id. at 62-63, and Higgins, supra note 75, at 7.
R. SIMMONDS, LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO 75 n.6 and accompanying text (1968).
. 80. Jackson, The Political Role of the Secretary-General under U Thant and Kurt
Waldheim: Development or Decline?, 140 WORLD AFF. 230, 242-43 (1978).
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vides an illustration of the fact that it was not so much evolving custom
in United Nations practice as practical politics that determined the extent of the Secretary-General's authority vis-a-vis the Council.
In September 1975, Egypt and Israel entered into an Agreement,8 1
supplemented by a detailed Protocol, 2 whereby UNEF was asked to undertake responsibilities more varied and extensive than those it had been
performing. The force also was to operate in new and larger areas."
In his periodic reports on UNEF to the Security Council, the Secre84
tary-General described the new functions the force had in fact taken on.
Among the changes made necessary by the Agreement and Protocol was
extensive alteration of UNEF's deployment.8 " The Council implicitly approved this redeployment after the fact in its resolutions of 23 October
197588 and 22 October 1976.8'
In this case, of course, virtually none of the opposition of the kind
displayed towards the 1979 Peace Treaty was present.8 8 Since the September 1975 Agreement and Protocol were politically acceptable, the Secretary-General was free to act in accord with their terms. In addition, the
United Nations had been actively involved in the formulation of the 1975
accords. General Siilasvuo, Chief Coordinator of the United Nations
Peace-keeping Missions in the Middle East, actually signed the EgyptianIsraeli Agreement as witness, and he chaired the Military Working Group
that negotiated the Protocol.
The question of the authority of the Secretary-General and of the
Security Council in peacekeeping was also clarified to some degree by an
important initiative by Secretary-General Waldheim. Mr. Waldheim's
first report to the Security Council on UNEF 9 contained a statement of

81. See note 36 supra.
82. The text of the Protocol is reproduced as an annex to the 10 October 1975 Report
of the Secretary-General concerning the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, 30 U.N.
SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 5, U.N. Doc. S/11818/Add.5 (1975).
83. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force for the
period 15 July to 16 October 1975, 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1975) 12, at para. 20,
U.N. Doc. S/11849 (1975).
84. Id.; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force for
the period 17 October 1975 to 18 October 1976, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1976) 7,
U.N. Doc. S/12212 (1976).
85. During the period under review, the deployment of UNEF changed considerably following the implementation of the new Agreement. This redeployment,
which was executed in 15 separate phases, began in November 1975 and was
completed on 22 February 1976 in accordance with the time-table set out in
the Protocol to the Agreement.
Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force for the period 17
October 1975 to 18 October 1976, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1976) 7, at para. 10, U.N.
Doc. S/12212 (1976).
86. S.C. Res. 378, 30 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 6, U.N. Doc. S/INF/31 (1975).
87. S.C. Res. 396, 31 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1976).
88. See note 111 infra and accompanying text.
89. Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolu-
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certain broad principles to be applied to that force. The approval of these
principles was "hailed by many States, including the two major powers, as
a good example of the long sought compromise solution."90 The Secretary-General's report stated in part that the force "must have at all times
the full confidence and backing of the Security Council,"91 and that "[a]ll
matters which may affect the nature. . . of the Force, shall be referred to
the Council for its decision.""' Thus, whether or not the Council's approval of the report established the ultimate authority of the Security
Council in peacekeeping,'9
it certainly justified Secretary-General
Waldheim's insistence that the redeployment of UNEF called for by the
Treaty would have required the Council's approval. The issue of future
redeployment is much less military than political in nature, and probably
cannot be categorized as a day-to-day operation.
b.

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping

The issue of authority over peacekeeping operations, including the
question of the Secretary-General's powers, and of all other matters concerning peacekeeping, are dealt with on an ongoing basis by the General
Assembly's Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations (the Special
Committee). 9'4 The Special Committee was mandated to undertake a
"comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations
in all their aspects,"' 5 and it proceeded in that task by attempting to formulate principles and guidelines for the practice of United Nations
peacekeeping. That mandate is far from fulfillment in many respects, including the matter of the extent of the responsibilities of the Secretary-

tion 340(1973), 28 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1973) 91, U.N. Doc. S/11052/Rev. 1 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Report of the Secretary-General].
90. Cassese, Recent Trends in the Attitude of the Superpowers towards Peace-keeping, in A. Cassese, supra note 75, at 223, 233. Cassese cites the statements of the representatives of the U.S.S.R., 28 U.N. GAOR, C.121 (62d mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.121/SR.62 (1973);
France, id. at 5, 7; the United States, 29 U.N. GAOR, C.121 (63d mtg.) 15, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.121/SR.63 (1974; and that of the Chairman of the Special Committee, id. at 3-4.
91. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 89, at para. 3.
92. Id. at para. 4(a).
93. There is compelling evidence that the effect of the Council's action was to do precisely that. A United States representative at the United Nations spoke of the "absence of
any argument over the primacy to the Security Council in peace-keeping operations" in the
aftermath of the Council's decision. 28 U.N. GAOR, Special Political Committee (899th
mtg.) 16, U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.899 (1973). A Soviet representative said that the decision
"established officially that all principal United Nations peace-keeping operations [are] entirely the responsibility of the Security Council." 28 U.N. GAOR, Special Political Committee (898th mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. A/SPC/SR.898 (1973).
Cassese observes that this development met "the essential demands of the Soviet Union
to a far greater extent" than those of the United States. He suggests that the United States
"gave in" partly because it "could no longer control the other United Nations bodies on
which it had previously been able to count for the furtherance of its own interests and
goals." Cassese, supra note 90, at 236-37.
94. The Special Committee was established by G.A. Res. 2006, 19 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 15) 7, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1965).
95. Id.
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General and the Security Council.
In 1974, the Committee's Working Group "was able to prepare a
number of alternative or complementary draft formulae for articles of
agreed guidelines .
"9...
" Using these draft articles as a basis for its further discussions, the Working Group in 1976 refined some of them, reaching "a measure of agreement" ' on the introduction and first four articles,
dealing with "the authority and responsibilities of the Security Council
and the possible establishment by the Security Council of a committee
under Article 29 of the United Nations Charter." '
Article 1, paragraph 2 of these guidelines provided a list of twelve
responsibilities to be exercised directly by the Council. Among the items
included in this list was "ultimate direction and control during the operation.""" This provision still leaves the controversy quite unclear. 00 Indeed, this and each of the other responsibilities on the list were described
by the Working Group as "headings for questions of substance which will
be discussed at length . . .,.

96. [1974] U.N.Y.B. 102. The draft formulae are contained in the Eighth Report of the
Working Group, reproduced in the 1974 Report of the Special Committee, 29 U.N. GAOR,
Annexes (Agenda Item 39) 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/9827 (1974).
97. Tenth Report of the Working Group, reproduced in the 1976 Report of the Special
Committee, 31 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 54) 2, at para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/31/337
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Tenth Report of Working Group].
98. [1976] U.N.Y.B. 110. Article 29 of the Charter reads: "The Security Council may
establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions."
99. Tenth Report of Working Group, supra note 97, at Appendix I (draft articles), art.
1, para. 2(h).
100. An illustration of the lack of clarity is shown by reference to the views expressed
in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee on the draft guidelines:
Indonesia believed that in the interests of efficiency the Secretary-General
should be given authority to oversee day-to-day operations. Canada considered
it desirable that the Secretary-General be in a position to direct the operations
under the broad authority of the Security Council. Pakistan held a similar
view: responsibility and ultimate control must rest with the Security Council,
but the Secretary-General within the over-all mandate established by the
Council should direct the activities of the forces.
[1977] U.N.Y.B. 128.
Voting requirements in the Security Council's exercise of its "ultimate direction and
control" are also unclear. The Special Committee's draft guidelines are silent on the question of voting in the Council. The United Kingdom has made "a major effort to change the
frame of reference by seeking to recast the debate not so much in terms of Secretary-General versus Security Council, but of simple majority vote in the Council votes requiring the
concurrence of the permanent Members." Higgins, supra note 75, at 8. The United Kingdom proposed in 1973 that the Special Committee adopt an approach to limit use of the
veto to certain questions, including force creation, mandate, duration, and termination. The
proposal would nonetheless have allowed any member of the Council to challenge a move by
the Secretary-General, whereupon a decision, categorized as substantive in nature (the veto
therefore operating), would be required. There was no clear response to this initiative,
though it seemed to have made an "imprint" in the Special Committee. Id. at 8-9. See letter
of 6 September 1973 from the representative of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/9144 (1973).
101. Seventh Report of the Working Group, at para. 3, "reiterated" and reproduced in
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In 1977, while it could not "finalize an agreed set of guidelines, the
Working Group produced a draft text" of the remaining articles. 10 2 There
was still substantial "absence of agreement" 1 3 in this draft. One article,
however, contained a sentence which serves to reemphasize the primacy
of the Security Council: "It is essential that throughout the conduct of a
United Nations peace-keeping operation it shall have the full confidence
and backing of the Security Council.' 0 4 This sentence provides a basis
for understanding Secretary-General Waldheim's insistence that the
Council was required to give its consent to the desired redeployment of

UNEF.
Through October 1980, with the Special Committee still using its
1976 and 1977 draft guidelines, there had been no substantial progress.
As expressed in the 1979 report of the Committee's Working Group,
"[l]aborious discussions reaffirmed that long-standing basic differences
remain and that the task of achieving agreed guidelines will continue to
be a difficult one, owing to the fundamental nature of the issues with
which the Working Group is faced."' 1 5
2. The Expiration of UNEF's Mandate
a. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Compromise
A further problem in the implementation process involved the fact
that UNEF's mandate was to expire, failing its renewal by the Security
Council, on 24 July 1979. On 22 May, news reports from Cairo indicated
that the U.S.S.R. had informed the United States that it planned to veto
any attempt to expand the mandate to allow the force to police the

Tenth Report of Working Group, supra note 97, at para. 6.
102. Interim Report of the Working Group, reproduced in 1977 Report of the Special
Committee, 32 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 56) 2, at para. 6, U.N. Doc. A/32/394
(1977). These draft articles appear in the Eleventh Report of the Working Group, reproduced in id. at 4, Appendix I (draft articles) [hereinafter cited as Eleventh Report of Working Group].
103. Eleventh Report of Working Group, supra note 102, at para. 7. For example,
article 7, dealing with the powers of the Secretary-General, provided:
The Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council, [shall
direct peace-keeping operations] [is in charge of the implementation of peacekeeping operations, receiving guidance from a subsidiary body of the Security
Council], within the mandate entrusted to him by the United Nations Charter,
contributing with all means at his disposal to giving effect to relevant decisions
of the Security Council.
Id. at Appendix I (draft articles), art. 6. The brackets indicate the "absence of agreement."
104. Id. at Appendix I, art. 9.
105. Twelfth Report of the Working Group, reproduced in the 1979 Report of the Special Committee, 34 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 52) at Annex, para. 4, U.N. Doc. A/
34/592 (1979). See also the 1980 Report of the Special Committee, which contained the
following statements: "The course of discussions, both in the Special Committee and in the
Working Group, reaffirmed the wide disparity of members' views . . . and the great difficulty in finding any compromise at all. . . . The Special Committee . . . could not reach
agreement on how to carry out its mandate." 35 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 54) at
paras. 7, 9, U.N. Doc. A/35/532 (1980).
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Treaty.' Indeed, on 6 April, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, Oleg Troyanovsky, had said that to extend UNEF's mandate would
"signify approval of the U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian peace pact."' 7 Thus, while
the Soviet Union grounded its refusal to approve the redeployment of
UNEF called for in the Treaty in its opposition to the Treaty, it deemed
it a practical necessity to terminate the mandate of the force
altogether. °s
The United States, trying to convince the U.S.S.R. to allow UNEF to
remain, argued among other things that since one of the goals of Resolution 242 was the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in
1967,09 the Israeli pullout from the Sinai and the use of U.N. troops
would constitute steps towards achieving the Security Council's aims, requiring UNEF's continued presence in the Sinai." 0 The Soviets and most
of the Arab countries, however, disapproved of Egypt's willingness to negotiate a treaty which left unsolved the Palestinian questions, and felt
also that linking the operation of UNEF with the Treaty would imply
United Nations endorsement of the Camp David Agreements as well as of
the Treaty itself. Some reports indicated that the U.S.S.R. may in fact
not have wanted to block an extension of UNEF's mandate, partly because of President Carter's promise to arrange an alternative forcepossibly involving a United States presence-and because of the possibility that the action could adversely affect the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. It did so, according to these reports, mainly to appease the
Arab states opposed to the Treaty."'

106.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE

12 (Issue Brief No. IB79076, 1979) [hereinafter cited as C.R.S. Issue Brief].
107. N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1979, at 29, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, June 18, 1979, at 14,
col. 6.
108. Indeed, without redeployment, UNEF would have been rendered unable to perform any peacekeeping functions as Israeli forces withdrew beyond the former buffer zones.
Its mandate would then have lapsed in fact, if not in law, as it became incapable of practical
application.
109. S.C. Res. 242, note 6 supra, operative para. 1(i).
110. N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1979, at 11, col. 5. The Christian Science Monitor also reported that the United States had argued that the Security Council was "morally obliged"
on this ground to support the Treaty. Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 9, 1979, at 10, col. 1. For the
views of Egypt and Israel on this point, see note 20 supra.
111. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1979, at 10, col. 1, and May 6, at 11, col. 1. See also
Seale, The Egypt-Israel Treaty and its Implications, 35 THE WORLD TODAY 189, 193-96
(1979). In a recent article, Raymond Sommereyns provides a list of citations to the reactions
in the United Nations of Iraq, Jordan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates (speaking for the
Arab group of states at the U.N.), the Council of the League of Arab States, the Co-ordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Chairman of the General Assembly's Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People. Sommereyns, United Nations Peace-keeping Forces in the Middle
East, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 50 n.14 (1980). It was also reported that the Soviet Union
"[did] not seem particularly inclined to lend a hand to the implementation of a peace treaty
that it [felt] . . .would reduce its own influence in the Middle East and, in fact, lead to its
expulsion from the area." Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 9, 1979, at 10, col. 2.
TREATY
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The prospect of a Security Council refusal to renew UNEF's mandate
presented the United States and the parties to the Treaty with the problem of reaching agreement on alternative arrangements. By 18 July, six
days prior to the expiration of UNEF's mandate, Egypt, Israel, and the
United States had not agreed on an alternative to UNEF." 2 One day
later, however, the United States and the Soviet Union finished working
out a formula that would permit the United Nations to play a role in the
withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai. The compromise was to allow the
military observers of UNTSO-reinforced in numbers-to replace the
troops of UNEF." s
b. Israel's Objections
On 22 July, Egypt announced its agreement with the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
compromise proposal to station U.N. observers between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai.'1 4 On the same day, however, Israel rejected the
plan." 5 Israel cited several objections to the employment of the observers
of UNTSO. Foremost among these was the argument that UNTSO was
under the direct control of the Secretary-General, who could, in Israel's
view, withdraw the observers at any time."' Israel made reference in that
regard to Secretary-General U Thant's withdrawal of UNEF I from the
Sinai just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in June 1967.'1 Israel also
considered that UNTSO was not capable of carrying out the duties assigned to U.N. forces under the Treaty. It was a very small unit in comparison to UNEF," I and consisted entirely of unarmed officers. Moreover,

112. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1979, at 10, col. 3.
113. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1979, at 3, col. 6. U.N. sources were cited as having said that
the unit might be expanded from about 300 to 500 men. Wash. Post, July 24, 1979, at 1, col.
4. Officials in Cairo were reported to have said that 700 to 1,000 observers would be required. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1979, at 3, col. 4. A U.S. Defense Department study concluded
that 600-800 observers would be sufficient. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
114. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1979, at 5, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, July 24, 1979, at 9, col.
2.
115. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1979, at 5, col. 1.
116. Id.; Wash. Post, July 29, 1979, at 1, col. 5, and at 9, col. 1.
117. On U Thant's withdrawal of UNEF I, see the Report of Secretary-General U
Thant to the 5th Emergency Session of the General Assembly, 21 U.N. GAOR, Annexes
(Agenda Item 5) 4, U.N. Doc. A/6730 and Add. 1-3 (1967), reprinted in 1 R. HIGGINS, supra
note 48, at 344-62. See also, among other works, A. KARAOSMANO 6 LU, LES ACTIONS
MILITAIRES COERCITIVES ET NON COERCITIVES DES NATIONS UNIEs 65-68 (1970); A. LALL, THE
UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, 1967, at 11-21 (1968); A. ROVINE, THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS:
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN WORLD POLITICS 1920-1970, at 393-400 (1970); L. SOHN, THE
UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 169-94 (1968); Di Blase, The Role of the Host State's Consent
With Regard to Non-Coercive Actions by the United Nations, in A. Cassese, supra note 75,
at 55, 73; Elaraby, United Nations Peacekeeping by Consent: A Case Study of the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force, 1 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 149 (1968);
Garvey, United Nations Peacekeeping and Host Country Consent, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 241
(1970); Malawer, The Withdrawal of UNEF and a New Notion of Consent, 4 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 25 (1971).
118. The Sinai contingent of UNTSO consisted of about 120-130 officers; UNEF was a
4,178-man force in mid-1979. See N.Y. Times, July 25, 1979, at 8, col. 2; Wash. Post, July
29, 1979, at 9, col. 1; U.N. CHRONICLE, July-Oct. 1979, at 24.
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its use would be inconsistent with the duties specified in the Treaty,
which spoke of "forces," not "observers," in the context of the withdrawal
from the Sinai.1 19 Also, Israel argued that by definition, UNTSO was
authorized to supervise a "truce," whereas the present situation involved
a "peace."' 120 A further Israeli objection concerned the presence of Soviet
officers among the UNTSO observers.' 2'
Israel's complaints also included a general assertion that the United
States, and not the United Nations, was the ultimate guarantor of the
Treaty. Israel considered the peacekeeping issue to be a "test case"-an
indication of whether the United States would stand by its commitments
concerning the Treaty. 22 Related to this was Israel's conviction that the
failure of the Security Council to establish the arrangements called for in
the Treaty gave it, as a party to the Treaty, the right to invoke President
Carter's pledge to establish an alternative force. 23
c.

The U.S. Response

In response to Israel's objections to the U.S.-Soviet compromise, a
State Department spokesman stressed that the use of UNTSO was "fully
in accord with the peace treaty and the Camp David framework which
preceded it." 2" The spokesman also stated that "through the months of
discussions with all of the parties concerned, UNTSO [had] always been
considered a viable alternative to UNEF.' ' 2 5 Other officials were also
quoted as saying that Israeli officials, including Defense Minister Ezer
Weizman, were familiar with the plan to use UNTSO as an alternative to
26
UNEF and "did not object.'

119. Wash. Post, July 29, 1979, at 9, col. 1.
120. British Broadcasting Corporation radio newscast, July 23, 1979. Although this
point was largely ignored by the print media as well as by official spokesmen and presumably the governments they represented, it may have some validity. "Grotius used truce to
mean an agreement by which warlike acts are for a time abstained from, though the state of
war continues-'a period of rest in war, not a peace.'" Bailey, Cease-Fires, Truces, and
Armistices in the Practice of the U.N. Security Council, 71 Am.J. INT'L L. 461 (1977),
citing H. GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Book III, Ch. XXI (F. Kelsey trans. 1925).
See also D. Bowrrr, supra note 69, at 73-74: "[A] 'truce' . . . incorporates a complex of
mutual undertakings and conditions; it is, however, a temporary state of affairs as opposed
to an 'armistice.'"
121. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1979, at 5, col. 1. However, the United States and the
U.S.S.R. reached an understanding that Soviet and American officers would not serve in the
Sinai area. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
122. N.Y. Times, July 25, 1979, at 8, col. 1.
123. Id. at 8, col. 2. Some reports quoted Israeli government sources as saying that the
United States should send NATO forces to the Sinai to police the Treaty. C.R.S. Issue
Brief, supra note 106, at 10.
124. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1979, at 9, col. 1, quoting State Department spokesman
Hodding Carter III.
125. Id. See also N.Y. Times, July 25, 1979, at 8, col. 1.
126. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1979, at 3, col. 1. In this report, Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance was described as "furious" about Israel's distortions of the U.S. position, and as "particularly stung by the allegation of Israel officials that the plan to use UNTSO. . .had been
abruptly sprung on their Government .. "
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The United States contended that Israel's objections to UNTSO were
"either irrelevant or based on misconceptions.""1 ' UNTSO, a United
States official noted, had not been withdrawn on the occasion of the 1967
hostilities nor at any other time in its 31-year existence. The SecretaryGeneral would be able to expand and equip the unit such that it would be
able to carry out adequately the functions specified in the Treaty.2
Finally, it was "clear" to the United States that the Secretary-General
would not withdraw the unit "on his own authority without consulting
the Security Council.""' The official "conceded" that the United States
would not be able to veto the withdrawal of UNTSO, but said that if
relations between Egypt and Israel deteriorated to such a degree that a
party demanded withdrawal, the Treaty would be "dead" and the controversy irrelevant."' A United Nations official, Under-Secretary-General
for Special Political Affairs Brian Urquhart, indicated his agreement with
the United States' conviction that the Secretary-General would not withdraw UNTSO unilaterally, while disputing the United States' "concession" on the Council's control over the unit. Urquhart wrote that "new
dispositions of [the] observers or any major change in their function requires, by long usage, a decision or at least the concurrence of the Security Council." ''
With regard to Israel's argument that, with the expiration of UNEF's
mandate, it could demand that the United States establish an alternative
force, the United States insisted that President Carter's pledge to that
effect "applie[d] to the period after final withdrawal," and would therefore come into effect, if necessary, in 1982. s" There is support for this
position in the text of the President's message, which refers to "the
Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel. . . ."Is' However, some reports indicated that the United States had
approached several countries in an attempt to form a multinational force,

127. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
128. Id. This point was clarified when an unidentified State Department official stated:
"We have an understanding with all the members of the Security Council, including the
Soviet Union, that the secretary general shall be free to establish the number of troops
necessary and the equipment and placement necessary to carry out the functions which we
spelled out in the treaty." Wash. Post, July 27, 1979, at 17, col. 3.
129. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
130. Id.
131. Letter to the editor, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1979, at 22, col. 4. In another letter to
the editor, Professor Seymour Maxwell Finger, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute on
the United Nations at the City University of New York and a former United States representative on the Special (Peacekeeping) Committee, pointed out that one of the basic differences between UNEF and UNTSO was that the former had a fixed term, renewable only by
Council action, while the latter's mandate continued in force unless ended by the Council,
where the United States could veto UNTSO's termination. N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1979, at 18,
col. 5.
132. Letter from David A. Korn, Director, Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Department of State, to the present writer (Aug. 29, 1979).
133. President Carter's letters, note 65 supra. (Emphasis added.)
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but was unsuccessful in winning support. 3 4
On 24 July 1979, at midnight (New York time), the mandate of
UNEF expired. The Secretary-General ordered the force to suspend its
operations and await transportation out of the Sinai. Seven hours earlier,
the Security Council had reached an agreement-avoiding an actual
vote-by which UNEF was to be pulled out of the Sinai, with UNTSO's
observers remaining to monitor Israel's withdrawal.' 35 In his report to the
Council on the expiration of UNEF, Secretary-General Waldheim stated
that in view of the fact that the withdrawal of the force was without
prejudice to the continued presence of UNTSO in the area, he would
make the necessary arrangements for the latter's further functions. 36 On
1 August, UNTSO observers-minus U.S. and Soviet officers-took over
checkpoint and patrol duties in the Sinai from the departing UNEF
troops, assuming the "most essential positions.""13
B. National Action: The Situation During the Interim Period Prior to
Final Withdrawal (January 1980 to April 1982)
1. The Haifa Agreement
The displacement of UNEF by UNTSO, over Israeli objection, took
place during the month of August and into September. On 5 September,
at a meeting at Haifa, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin reached
an agreement, not fully detailed, to station joint Israeli-Egyptian patrols
as a temporary self-policing mechanism in the Sinai. 38 This agreement
represented a compromise on the part of Egypt, which had theretofore
opposed the stationing of Israeli military forces on Egyptian soil. 39 The
agreement was "temporary" in that it left undecided any future United
States or United Nations involvement or direct participation in Sinai
peacekeeping. These questions were to be discussed at an upcoming
meeting in Washington.

134. C.R.S. Issue Brief, supra note 106, at 3 (noting reports to this effect from Cairo,
and stating also that Egypt had tried to recruit an all-African force); N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,
1979, at 1, col. 3 (specifying that the United States had contacted "Scandinavian countries
and others"); Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 9, 1979, at 10, col.2 (stating that most of the countries contributing troops to UNEF, including some NATO countries, were "unlikely" to
agree to station their troops except under United Nations auspices).
135. Letter of 24 July 1979 from the Secretary-General to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/13468 (1979); N.Y. Times, July 25, 1979, at 1, col. 1; U.N. CHRONICLE, July-Oct. 1979,
at 24.
136. U.N. Doc. S/13468, supra note 135, summarized in U.N. CHRONICLE, July-Oct.
1979, at 24.
137. N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1979, at 3, col. 1, quoting Major Jorgen Jansen of Denmark, an
UNTSO observer. The final, official termination of UNEF's work came on 24 April 1980.
Den. Post, Apr. 26, 1980, at 10, col. 1.

138. British Broadcasting Corporation radio newscast, Sept. 5, 1979; N.Y. Times, Sept.
6, 1979, at 1, col. 4. This solution had been mentioned earlier in the press. A 20 May report

from Israel stated that Egypt and Israel had agreed at that time to create joint patrols.
139. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 4. In what appeared to be the Israeli part of
the compromise, Prime Minister Begin pledged to advance the Treaty timetable by returning Mt. Sinai to Egypt two months ahead of schedule.
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2. The Washington Agreement
The Washington meeting, involving Secretary of State Vance, Foreign Minister Dayan, and Defense Minister Hassan Ali, was held 18-19
September. It produced the arrangements which are now in existence and
which will probably prevail until the end of the interim period in April
1982, when Israel will complete its withdrawal from the Sinai. Those arrangements called for the United States to exercise "overall supervisory
responsibilities, possibly augmented by United Nations observers,"140 in
monitoring compliance with the Treaty in areas relinquished by Israel.
The agreement was described as "tentative" in that it would require the
approval of the U.S. Congress and of the Egyptian and Israeli Governments. The United States was to increase its current ground and air surveillance of the Sinai and, in particular, to extend and broaden the mandate of its Sinai Field Mission. It was not envisioned that the number of
personnel at the Mission-200 unarmed civilians-would be altered.1
The Mission had been operating an early-warning system for three years.
By a provision of the Treaty, it was to have been disbanded in late January 1980.142 Regarding air surveillance, the United States agreed to increase the number of flights to improve the accuracy of the monitoring.14
The United States had already agreed to operate air surveillance during
the interim period. 44
The arrangements would also require Egyptian and Israeli patrols to
operate checkpoints in the interim buffer zone. This provision apparently
served to clarify the nature of the agreement reached by President Sadat
and Prime Minister Begin at Haifa.
While the status of UNTSO was not defined at the time these agreements were reached, it was clarified somewhat in December by Egypt's
Ambassador to the United States, Ashraf Ghorbal, who stated that
UNTSO "will have equally a role of supervision within the context of [the
September] agreement." The Ambassador also indicated that other details of peacekeeping arrangements for the interim period were still being
"thrashed out" in meetings between Egypt, Israel, and the United
States. 4"

IV. THE TREATY'S FRAMEWORK FOR PERMANENT PEACEKEEPING
ARRANGEMENTS

IN THE SINAI (FROM APRIL

1982)

A.

President Carter's Letters
The Treaty provisions concerning peacekeeping arrangements during
the indeterminate period following final Israeli withdrawal in April 1982

140. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1979, at 1, col. 6.
141. Id. This report inaccurately indicated that military personnel would be introduced.
The error is corrected in N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1979, at B1, col. 8.
142. See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
143. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1979, at 1, col. 6, and at 6, col. 5.
144. See notes 45 and 67 supra and accompanying text.
145. Response to question posed by the present writer during interview on radio station
KOA (Denver, Colorado, Dec. 4, 1979).
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envisioned substantial United Nations involvement. 46 The parties did
not make specific mention of UNEF or of any other existing U.N. force or
observer group for this period, as they had for the period prior to final
withdrawal. 47 Given the fact that it is unlikely that a United Nations
force for the Sinai will be recreated, " 8 President Carter's letters to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin may take on added importance. By
those letters, among other things, the President confirmed that, should
the Security Council fail to establish and maintain the peacekeeping provisions called for in the Treaty, the U.S. President would, "subject to
United States Constitutional processes . . .be prepared to take those

steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force." 9s
1. The Extent and Commencement of the Obligation
Israel had been steadfast in its position that the United States must
in fact form such a force to take over the peacekeeping role in the Sinai
before the final withdrawal in 1982.150 The posture of the United States,
however, was equally firm: "[The United States'] commitment to establish a multinational force will come into effect only at the time of Israel's
final withdrawal, in April, 1982."1 At the same time, the United States

acknowledged that "any agreements reached for arrangements during the
interim period would be without prejudice to the assurance concerning
[the] permanent arrangements. "' Thus, the obligations incurred by the
letters are not necessarily to be viewed within the context of the Haifa
and Washington agreements.
Moreover, a further agreement between Egypt, Israel, and the United
States was reached at the September 1979 Washington meeting, to the
effect that the three countries would meet "one year before the beginning
of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (that is, April, 1981) to begin
discussing arrangements for the establishment of this force."' 3 The
United States' "first preference, in accordance with the Treaty and the
5 4
President's letter, would be a U.N. force.'

146. The main provisions are in Annex I, art VI; see the text accompanying notes 55-63
supra.
147. Appendix art. III, para. 1, whereby the parties specifically requested UNEF's redepolyment during the interim period.
148. See text, section IV(B)(1) infra.
149. Note 65 supra.
150. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
151. Letter from David A. Korn, Director, Office of Israeli and Arab-Israeli Affairs,
Department of State, to the present writer (Nov. 9, 1979).
152. Letter from Hodding Carter III, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and
Department spokesman, to the present writer (Nov. 5, 1979).
153. Letter from David A. Korn, note 151 supra. The words in parentheses form part of
the quotation.
154. Letter from Hodding Carter III, note 152 supra.
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The Legal Status of the Obligation
a. Under InternationalLaw

The precise nature under international law of the United States
"confirmation" set forth in President Carter's letters is subject to debate.
First, it is not absolutely certain whether they in fact form part of the
Treaty."" Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty provides that "[a]ll protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this treaty shall be regarded as an
integral part hereof." The letters could be considered "annexes" in that
they are "added statements";3 6 however, the term "annex" must be presumed to refer to those documents attached to the Treaty proper which
specifically carry the title "Annex."
If the letters are not part of the Treaty itself, it remains to ask what
kind of documents they do constitute. A recent volume on the law of treaties' 57 lists thirty-two different "Types of Treaties and Instruments Resembling Treaties,"' 8 two of which-unilateral declaration and unilateral
note-might describe President Carter's letters. It is submitted, however,
that regardless of the term employed to describe the letters, the effect in
international law would be the same: the United States would be
bound."5 9
This proposition is supported by a holding of the International Court
of Justice in the Nuclear Tests Cases.'60 In that case, France had conducted atmospheric tests of nuclear devices during the years 1966-1968
and 1970-1972 at a site in the South Pacific. Australia and New Zealand
had protested the tests through diplomatic exchanges, but France refused
to refrain from testing. Australia and New Zealand brought the dispute to
the Court, which in 1973 declined France's request that the cases be removed from the list and indicated interim measures to the effect that
France should avoid nuclear tests which would cause the deposit of radio-

155. Though apparently bilateral, the Treaty has multilateral features. The
Treaty was witnessed by the United States. It refers to the U.N. peacekeeping
forces and aditional documents referring to it commit the United States to
certain undertakings. Thus, the Treaty embodies certain multilateral aspects
which tend to give it a sui generis multilateral character even though it is
labelled a bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel.
Bassiouni, supra note 3, at 19.
46 (1973).
THE TREATY MAKER'S HANDBOOK (H. Blix & J. Emerson eds. 1973).
Id. at 7-8.
It is possible to argue that the President's "confirmation" is not in fact a declaraa promise, if the latter is defined as a specific subset of the former: "a declaration
the maker commits himself to another subject to a specific action." W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 214 (1979). Some writers have
argued that promises, declarations, and other unilateral acts should be consolidated under
the conceptual heading "legal acts," which would be binding if intent was shown to exist.
See, e.g., E. SuY, LEs AcTEs JURIDIQUES UNILATtRAUX EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 22
(1962).
160. (Australia v. France), Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. 253; (New Zealand v. France), Judgment, [1974] I.C.J. 457.
156. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

157.
158.
159.
tion, but
in which
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active fallout on Australia or New Zealand.' 6 '
France recommenced atmospheric testing in 1973-1974. In 1974, however, the President of the Republic and other French government officials
unilaterally declared that following the completion of tests planned for
that year, France would discontinue atmospheric testing. These declarations were made publicly and were transmitted officially to Australia and
New Zealand.
The Court, in deciding the issue whether it possessed jurisdiction to
consider the merits of the dispute, noted that while the Applicants had
formally asked for a judicial determination of the issue, they had also
"repeatedly sought from the Respondent an assurance that the tests
would cease."'16 2 The Court found that France's unilateral declarations-and particularly those of the President'S"-that it would discontinue atmospheric testing "constitute[d] an undertaking possessing legal
effect."' 4" The objectives of the Applicants in bringing the dispute to the
Court thus having been achieved, and "the dispute having disappeared,'16 5 the Court then held, by nine votes to six, that it was "not
called upon to give a decision .... "1166
In reaching this decision, the Court examined "the status and scope
on the international plane" of unilateral declarations, stating that it was
"well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal
obligations. 1 6 7 The Court's criteria were set forth as follows:
When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it
should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on
the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State being
thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent
with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly,
and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the
context of international negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent
acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from
other States, is required for the declaration to take effect ....16

161. Order of 22 June 1973 on Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, [1973] I.C.J. 99, 106; [1973] I.C.J. 135, 142.
162. [1974] I.C.J. 271; [1974] I.C.J. 476.
163. "There can be no doubt, in view of his functions, that his public communications
or statements, oral or written, as Head of State, are in international relations acts of the
French State." [1974] I.C.J. 269; [1974] I.C.J. 474.
164. Id. It has been argued that the Court erred in holding that France's statement that

it would cease its atmospheric nuclear testing was intended to be legally binding. M.
A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (3d ed. 1977). Even if true,

AKEHURST,

the Court's factual error would not affect its legal holding that statements which do reflect

actual intent are binding.
165. [1974] I.C.J. 271; [1974] I.C.J. 476.

166. [1974] I.C.J. 272; [1974] I.C.J. 478.
167. [1974] I.C.J. 267; [1974] I.C.J. 472.
168. Id.
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Judge Jessup, in his separate opinion in the South West Africa Cases
(Preliminary Objections),' 69 also made these points and cited other in17 0
stances of judicial approval of them.
The most important criterion, of course, is that concerning intent to
be bound.17 ' President Carter, in the letters addressed to President Sadat
and Prime Minister Begin, referred not to himself personally, but rather
to "the United States" and to "the President." Moreover, Carter Administration officials made it very clear that the government considered itself
bound. One official stated that should the situation depicted in the President's letters arise, the United States "will of course be prepared to fulfill
this commitment.' ' 7 2 The International Court indicated, moreover, that a
unilateral declaration "made within the context of international negotiations' 173 would be more likely to embrace the required intent to be bound
than would, for example, a declaration made erga omnes. President
Carter's letters did emanate from negotiations and were directed specifically towards Egypt and Israel and not to the world at large. 17 '
While no quid pro quo was specified in the letters, and while none is
required, the fact is that the Treaty could not have been concluded in
their absence. Israel in particular has made clear its reliance on and expectations with regard to the commitments they impose on the United
States. Both parties have acted in direct reliance on the U.S. "guarantees": witness the fundamental changes in the status of the Sinai.""
169. (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, [1962]
I.C.J. 319, 387.
170. The examples included the Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland), [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46 (unilateral manifesto
issued by a domestic Sardinian organ had the character of a treaty obligation); and the
Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Treaty Case (United Kingdom, France, Italy,
and Japan v. Republic of Lithuania), [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 49 (the Statute, even if a
Lithuanian enactment, had the juridical nature of a treaty). [1962] I.C.J. at 403.
171. This point is stressed by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. A unilateral declaration, even if
lacking a specific quid pro quo, will "create binding legal obligations ... if clearly intended
to have that effect, and held out, so to speak, as an instrument on which others may rely
and under which the declarant purports to assume such obligations." Fitzmaurice, The Law
and Procedureof the InternationalCourt of Justice, 1951-4, [1957] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 203,
230.
172. Letter from David A. Korn, note 132 supra. Moreover, the letters are listed in the
State Department's most recent compilation of United States treaties in force. TREATIES IN
FORCE AS AT 1 JANUARY 1980, at 56, 106 (1980) (Dep't of State, Pub. No. 9136).
173. [1974] I.C.J. 267; [1974] I.C.J. 472.
174. While the import of the declarations in the Nuclear Tests Cases was transmitted
officially to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, the Court seemed to rely primarily on statements made erga omnes; hence the Court's requirement that the undertaking
be "given publicly." Id.
175. Fitzmaurice stated that a unilateral declaration would be binding
particularly . . . where other countries have, on the faith of the Declaration,
changed their position or taken action on the basis of it. It seems clear that
once a Declaration of this kind is established as containing binding obligations,
its terms will, mutatis mutandis, fall to be interpreted much as if they figured
in an actual treaty text.
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These facts operate to strengthen the binding character of the letters.
b. Under United States Law
The "confirmations" expressed in President Carter's letters were
prefaced by the phrase "subject to United States Constitutional
processes." This raises questions regarding the legal status and extent of
the obligations set forth in the letters under United States law.
The phrase makes one thing clear: the letters are not self-executing
instruments. It is not clear whether they should be categorized as "sole"
executive agreements 78 or congressional-executive agreements,' 77 the
most likely descriptions in United States constitutional terminology.17 8
While the constitutional foundations of both of these kinds of agreements are uncertain,' 7 9 the viability of each is "widely accepted" and
largely unquestioned.180 The President's power to make at least certain
"sole" agreements in the area of foreign affairs was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in 1937.11s These agreements, moreover, have been
concerned with a wide variety of issues in foreign affairs. 8 2 Arguments

Fitzmaurice, supra note 171, at 230.
176. See generally L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 176-88 (1972).
Professor Henkin's book is an excellent reference work for this area of the law.
177. See generally id. at 173-76; THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
POLICY 126-27 (F. Wilcox & R. Frank eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Wilcox & Frank]. A
congressional-executive agreement requires approval by a simple majority of both houses of
Congress. For an analysis of historical factors in the development of the practice of using
congressional-executive agreements, see Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 434 (1975).
178. Professors McDougal and Lans have argued convincingly that, save for procedural
aspects, there are "no significant criteria" under international law or United States constitutional law or practice for making terminological distinctions among international instruments. The term "treaty" is thus described strictly in terms of the Senate advice and consent requirement, while the term "executive agreement" is used "as a convenient catch-all
to subsume all other international agreements intended to bind the United States and another government." McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: InterchangeableInstruments of National Policy: 1, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 19899 (1945) (Part II is published in 54 YALE L.J. 534 (1945)), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL &
ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 404 (1960). For a reply, see Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 54 YALE L.J. 616 (1945). The McDougal & Lans article was
itself written in response to an article by Professor Borchard. Note 183 infra.
179. L. HENKIN, supra note 176, at 174, 176.
180. Id. at 175-77.
181. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). Belmont involved the making of
the "Litvinov Agreement" subsequent to United States recognition of the U.S.S.R. Since
recognition is a concern exclusively of the Executive, the agreement was found to be "incidental" to such a power and hence valid. In dicta, however, Justice Sutherland "seemed to
find authority for the Litvinov Agreement not in the President's exclusive control of recognition policy but in his authority as 'sole organ,' his 'foreign affairs power' which supports
not only recognition but much if not most other foreign policy." L. HENKIN, supra note 176,
at 178-79.
182. Professor Henkin provides two examples of interest for present purposes. The
Root-Takahira and Lansing-Ishii Agreements "defined American policy in the Far East,"
much as the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and the Camp David Agreements sought to define United States foreign policy in the Middle East. Second, President McKinley by execu-
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have been made on the limitations on "sole" executive agreements;
among these is the notion that it is effective only for the President who
makes it.'a 3 Professor Henkin asserts, however, that these arguments have
no "apparent basis relevant to the scope of Presidential power generally,
or to the Treaty Power, where any limitations on the power to make executive agreements should lie."'"
Congressional-executive agreements are normally made pursuant to a
ratified treaty or to "either a prior or subsequent grant of authority by
Congress.' 185 They amount, in effect, to "a complete alternative to a
treaty."'8 6 Professor Henkin writes, in sum, that "[olne is compelled to
conclude that there are agreements which the President can make on his
the consent of the
sole authority and others which he can make only with
87
which."'
are
which
us
told
has
one]
[no
but
Senate,
The prospects for President Carter's pledge itself are clearly foreseeable through political, if not legal lenses. Neither the Congress nor a successor Administration is likely to challenge the pledge as ultra vires.
Rather, and this is probably a -major reason why the "Constitutional
processes" phrase was included, the Congress would accept the obligation
as externally binding, but would exercise its legislative and appropriative
authority to play its important role in the making of United States foreign policy."88 Congress could, therefore, preempt the effect of the pledge.
In addition, President Carter or a successor executive would be free to
seek to renegotiate the obligation with Egypt and Israel in light of changing conditions.

tive agreement agreed to contribute American troops during the Boxer Rebellion in China;
President Carter, in his letters to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, agreed to
arrange for multinational troop contributions if necessary. L. HENKIN, supra note 176, at
179-80.
183. Id. at 181, citing Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?
53 YALE L.J. 664, 678-79 (1944).
184. L. HENKIN, supra note 176, at 181.
185. Wilcox & Frank, supra note 177, at 127.
186. L. HENKIN, supra note 176, at 175.
187. Id. at 179.
188. Congress has, in fact, gone on record as neither approving nor disapproving the
United States commitments contained in President Carter's letters. The Special International Security Assistance Act of 1979 reads in part as follows:
§ 3401. Congressional findings and declaration of policy
(a) Policy of support for peace treaty
It is the policy of the United States to support the peace treaty concluded
between the Government of Egypt and the Government of Israel on March 26,
1979 ....
(c) Other agreements, understandings, or commitments
The authorities contained in this chapter to implement certain arrangements in support of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel do not signify
approval by the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch.
22 U.S.C. § 3401 (Supp. III 1979) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 96-35, § 2, 93 Stat. 89).
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3. The Nature of a U.S.-Sponsored Force
It would be overly speculative to attempt to forecast the nature of a
United States-sponsored alternative multinational force. It is quite probable that the United States would find it a very difficult task to organize
such a force,' 9 though there are examples of peacekeeping forces-some
much less successful than others-established outside United Nations
auspices. 190
B. Other Possible Developments
Answers to questions concerning the permanent situation in the Sinai
as envisioned by the Treaty and its accompanying documents must await
crucial upcoming events. Meetings on peacekeeping issues between Egypt,
Israel, and the United States are scheduled for April 1981.'1' Also, the
United States presidential election will predate that event, and Israeli

elections may do so.192

1. A United Nations Force
It is extremely doubtful that by the end of the interim period in
April 1982 the situation will have changed such that extensive United Nations involvement will have become practicable. 9 3 For this to eventuate,
the political climate will have to have improved to the point that the Soviet Union could find itself able at least to abstain in a vote to recreate a
United Nations force in the Sinai. This would probably require one or
more other parties in the overall Middle East dispute to have joined the
process initiated by Egypt and Israel. It is also possible, of course, that a
United Nations force could result from a further outbreak of hostilities.
UNEF itself was an offspring of the 1973 war.
2. Status Quo
Egypt and Israel might find that outside peacekeeping mechanisms,
beyond those established initially at the Washington conference of Sep189. See note 134 supra and accompanying text. An additional complicating factor is
the possibility that the United States, facing the difficulty of organizing an "acceptable"
multinational force, might consider sending U.S. troops as a complete or partial alternative
to a United Nations force in the Sinai. (But see note 121 supra, concerning the agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union that American and Soviet officers would
not serve in the UNTSO Sinai contingent.) In that event, the War Powers Resolution, 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976), and perhaps other statutes might come into play, the Congress
asserting its intention to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President" is applied where United States armed forces become involved in foreign conflicts.
50 U.S.C. § 1541(a).
190. Many of these would not qualify as peacekeeping operations under the standard
definitions of United Nations operations. They include, for example, the peacekeeping mission in Kuwait under the League of Arab States (1961-1963), the Inter-American Armed
(later Peace) Force in the Dominican Republic under the Organization of American States
(1965-1966), the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (1954).
191. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
192. National elections in Israel are due in November 1981 but, depending on political
conditions, may be held earlier.
193. For a brief discussion of the conditions necessary for the creation of a U.N. force,
see note 48 supra.
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tember 1979, are not necessary. If the current status quo, with accomodation as required, were to be maintained in the period following withdrawal to the international border in April 1982, the United States would
continue to "exercise overall supervisory responsibilities."' 4 It would conduct ground and air surveillance, and its Sinai Field Mission and earlywarning system would continue to operate. In addition, UNTSO would
continue to play a role.
V.
A.

THE EFFECT OF THE PASSING OF UNEF ON UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING

The UNEF Consensus

The passing of a United Nations peacekeeping force will always give
rise to questions concerning the future of peacekeeping generally. This
was the case, it will be recalled, upon the withdrawal by Secretary-General U Thant of UNEF I in 1967. In some ways, that event was more
foreboding for the future of peacekeeping than is the termination of
UNEF's mandate. " Peacekeeping has shown remarkable resiliency, indicating perhaps that in the right circumstances it is very much needed and
indeed wanted by states, and that it has simply not yet matured to the
point of becoming fully institutionalized in a form acceptable to states.
UNEF itself is a prime example of this resiliency. One key question on
the matter of the future of United Nations peacekeeping, therefore, is
whether whatever consensus on the use of peacekeeping that may have
emerged in the period following the October 1973 war can survive the
death of UNEF.
The creation of UNEF in 1973 constituted an important revitalization of peacekeeping generally. It came nearly ten years after the establishment of the last United Nations force, that in Cyprus. 96 To some ob197
servers, it appeared that the Cyprus force would be the U.N.'s last.
That feeling was resoundingly shattered when the United States and the
Soviet Union, along with the other Security Council members, decided to
use the Council and the United Nations to seek a settlement of the immediate and ongoing crises in the Middle East. 9 s

194. See text at note 140 supra.
195. "[UNEF I] had remarkable success in maintaining stability in Israel-Egypt relations, and . . . there can be no doubt that it ranked among the most effective of all UN
peacekeeping operations. But the manner and occasion of its withdrawal caused widespread
doubt about the overall efficacy of UN peacekeeping." 1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 481.
196. The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created by the Security
Council by Resolution 186, 19 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 2 U.N. Doc. SJINF/19/Rev.1
(1964). See generally J. STEGENGA, THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS (1968).
197. See, e.g., I. RIKHYE, M. HARBO'rrLE & B. EGGE, THE THIN BLUE LINE 334 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as RIKHYE et al.].
198. The establishment of UNEF
followed a Soviet invitation to the United States to jointly intervene to stop
the fighting . . . with a warning that the USSR might intervene unilaterally if
the United States refused. This threat impelled President Nixon to order an
alert of United States armed forces. Thus the proposal of UNEF II by nonper-
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The Secretary-General submitted his initial report on the implementation of the Security Council's decision to create UNEF only two days
after that decision was taken.'" This document contained a set of "general considerations" to be applied to UNEF. These broad principles,
together with the draft formulae for peacekeeping guidelines contained in
the 197600 and 1977"' reports of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, still constitute the basic working documents of U.N.
peacekeeping. It is to these documents that one must look to find areas of
consensus among states, and most importantly among the major powers.
It has been argued that, owing to the Security Council's acceptance"'0
of the principles set forth in the Secretary-General's report, they should
be thought of as applicable to peacekeeping generally.10 The principles
avoided seriously offending any major power,'0 4 incorporated all elements
agreed upon over a number of years in the forum of the Special Committee, and "[drew] up a modus operandi in which all powers [could] acquiesce even though they would not specifically endorse some of its features."" 5' Professor Finger, a long-time United States representative on
the Special Committee, suggested for these reasons that "the future of
peacekeeping might be better served by using UNEF II as a model or
precedent, as in common law, rather than to attempt to codify
guidelines." 2 "
Desirable as such a course of action might be, the fact remains that
the Special Committee struggles on to codify official guidelines. It is inmanent members of the Security Council... might also have prevented a very
dangerous Soviet-American confrontation in the Middle East.
Finger, The Maintenance of Peace, in THm CHANGING UNITED NATIONS 195, 197 (D. Kay ed.
1977) [book cited hereinafter as Kay].
199. Report of the Secretary-General, note 89 supra.
200. Tenth Report of Working Group, supra note 97, Appendix I (draft articles).
201. Eleventh Report of Working Group, supra note 102, Appendix I (draft articles).
202. The Council approved the Secretary-General's report by its Resolution 341, note
48 supra. The vote was 14 to 0; the People's Republic of China did not participate in the
vote. [1973] U.N.Y.B. 214.
203. A high-ranking U.N. official, James O.C. Jonah, has written (in his private capacity) that "[bly its acceptance of the Secretary-General's report in its resolution 341, the
Security Council endorsed . . ." its terms. Jonah, Peacekeeping in the Middle East, 31
INT'L J. 100, 114 (1975-76). See also Pelcovits, UN Peacekeepingand the 1973 Arab-Israeli
Conflict, 19 ORais 146, 161 (1975), where it is stated that
the UNEF 'terms of reference,' drafted by the Secretary-General and approved
by the Security Council, pragmatically settled certain issues on the conduct of
peacekeeping operations that had long been deadlocked in the UN's
peacekeeping committee.... [Tihe UNEF guidelines provide a practical
model that is likely to become the general pattern for future operations.
But see Wiseman, United Nations and UNEF II: A Basis for a New Approach to Future
Operations, 31 INT'L J. 124, 133 (1975-76): "[A]greement there is on UNEF II, but not necessarily as a precedent for future operations." However, the overall tenor of Wiseman's article is much more optimistic than this isolated statement would seem to indicate.
204. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
205. Finger, supra note 198, at 200.
206. Id.
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teresting, however, to note the similarities in language in several instances
in the Secretary-General's report on the one hand and the Special Committee's draft guidelines on the other. For example, the report reads in
part as follows:
Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. Firstly, it must at all times have the full confidence and backing
of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full cooperation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.
The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement . . .necessary
for the performance of its tasks.
In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality. ... 207

Article 9 of the draft guidelines, which contains no brackets indicating
"absence of agreement,'

s

2

reads:

It is essential that throughout the conduct of a United Nations
peace-keeping operation it shall have the full confidence and backing
of the Security Council. Such forces must operate with the full cooperation of the parties concerned, particularly of the Government of
the host country, due account being taken of its sovereignty. Such
forces must function as integrated and efficient military units and act
with complete objectivity. It is also of the utmost importance to
of movement for each unit irrespective of its
secure freedom
0
nationality.' '
The correspondence in language in other instances varies, and each
document touches on certain aspects of peacekeeping not mentioned in
the other."10 The point, however, is that very substantial progress in institutionalizing the regime of United Nations peacekeeping was made in the
UNEF era, and a good deal of consensus was either established or
identified.
One area of consensus, discussed above, is the relationship between
the Secretary-General and the Security Council."" Other fundamental aspects of peacekeeping operations upon which some degree of consensus

207. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 89, at paras. 3, 4(b), 4(e).
208. Eleventh Report of Working Group, supra note 102, at para. 7.
209. Id. at Appendix I (draft articles).
210. For example, the Secretary-General's report stated that UNEF "will be provided
with weapons of a defensive character only. It shall not use force except in self-defence."
Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 89, at para. 4(d). The Special Committee's
draft guidelines do not yet offer guidance on use of force questions. The draft guidelines go
beyond the Secretary-General's report in numerous respects, as would be expected. See, e.g.,
note 98 supra and accompanying text, on the possible establishment by the Security Council of a subsidiary body to assist it.
211. See text section III(A)(1) supra.
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seems to have been reached include financing and force composition.'1 2
On the question of financing, the Council, in accepting the SecretaryGeneral's initial report on UNEF, agreed that the costs of that force
should be "considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the
Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter."' 1 s
However, this agreement was limited to the case of UNEF when the General Assembly adopted a resolution embodying a Soviet-sponsored
amendment to the effect that UNEF financing was strictly "ad hoc" and
did not constitute a precedent.2 4 Nevertheless, UNEF was the first force
for which the Soviet Union and France agreed to pay proportionate
shares. The People's Republic of China refused to bear any part of the
costs, but did acquiesce in the creation of the force rather than using its
veto as it might have wished to do.' Moreover, the financing arrangement adopted proved workable, as it was reconfirmed in the periodic renewals of UNEF's original mandate ." 6 The Special Committee is yet un7
decided on the question of financing."'
On the matter of composition, UNEF was the first force to achieve

"equitable geographical balance," long demanded by the U.S.S.R. Poland

became the first Warsaw Pact country to serve in a United Nations force,

and it shared, with Canada, the important responsibility for logistic sup-

212. Consensus has not been reached on other matters, including for example the appointment of the force commander. The Secretary-General felt that he ought to make that
appointment, "with the consent of the Security Council." Report of the Secretary-General,
supra note 89, para. 4(a). The Special Committee has not yet been able to agree whether the
commander would be appointed "on the proposal of the Secretary-General," "by the Secretary-General," "with the consent of the Secretary-General," or "by the Security Council."
Eleventh Report of Working Group, 'supranote 102, Appendix I (draft articles), art. 8.
213. Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter reads: "The expenses of the Organization
shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly." Id. The Council's
statement accords with the holding of the International Court of Justice in its Advisory
Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [19621 I.C.J. 151.
214. G.A. Res. 3101, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 122, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
215. In explaining its non-participation in the creation of UNEF, the representative of
China stated:
With regard to the draft resolution before us, the Chinese delegation understands the good desire of the sponsors. However, we deem it necessary to
point out that the dispatch of a United Nations emergency force will be of no
avail....

China has always been opposed to the dispatch of the so-called "peacekeeping forces".... Such a practice can only pave the way for further intervention and control with the super-Powers as the behind-the-scenes boss ....
It is only out of consideration for the requests repeatedly made by the victims
of aggression that China is not in a position to veto the draft resolution. China
has decided not to participate in the voting on that draft.
28 U.N. SCOR (1750th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. S/p.v. 1750 (1973).
216. Wiseman, supra note 203, at 136.
217. Article 11 of the Committee's draft guidelines would establish that the costs of
peacekeeping operations would be governed by Article 17 of the Charter, but additional
clauses still under consideration would allow the Council to decide to employ any other
method of financing. Eleventh Report of Working Group, note 102 supra.
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port. The Secretary-General's report described "equitable geographical
balance" as an "accepted principle," ' and the Special Committee's draft
guidelines termed it "one of the guiding principles" in force composition.219 UNEF also served to clarify, in a positive way, the meaning of
"host country consent." Working from the assumption that Israel, though
not in fact a host country, had to consent to the stationing of the force,
an expansive interpretation might have meant that Poland and the other
participating states which had no diplomatic relations with Israel would
have been barred.22 0 A more permissive interpretation was followed, to
the benefit of the institution of peacekeeping.
Beyond these elements of consensus on peacekeeping furthered by
the UNEF experience, significant new tasks were assigned to UNEF and
to another new peacekeeping unit in the Middle East, the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 2 1 thereby developing the
functions of peacekeeping. It was UNEF that "moved from the concept of
an inter-position force to a buffer force,"'2 meaning among other things
that in addition to manning positions and observation posts, it verified
force and armament limitations in specified areas on each side of the
buffer zone. The success of UNEF, in both its military and diplomatic
roles, helped make possible the separation of forces agreement in the
Golan Heights and the creation of UNDOF. As evidenced by its name,
UNDOF combined the two different types of peacekeeping operations:
forces and observers. The same was true of UNEF.
It is also a "tribute to the conciliatory role played by UNEF"''2 2 that
two states at war for over thirty years explicitly recorded their desire to
employ United Nations forces and observers, and that this intention was
defeated by political events largely unconnected with confidence in
United Nations peacekeeping."' The withdrawal of UNEF did not adversely affect the status of UNTSO, and the use of the latter unit has
served to maintain a United Nations peacekeeping presence in the Si-

218. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 89, para. 4(c).
219. Eleventh Report of Working Group, supra note 102, Appendix I (draft articles),
art. 10. Another "guiding principle," the overall efficiency of the operation, does not yet
enjoy consensus in the Special Committee. Id.
220. States which contributed troops to UNEF were: Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, and Sweden.
221. UNDOF was established by Security Council Resolution 350, 29 U.N. SCOR,
Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 4, U.N. Doc. SIINF/30 (1974).
222. Jonah, Importance of UN Peace-KeepingOperations Emphasized, U.N. CHRONICLE, July 1979, at 78, 81.
223. Sommereyns, supra note 111, at 53.
224. Sommereyns also remarked that:
It would be wrong.. . to interpret UNEF's disappearance as detrimental to
the role of the United Nations in the field of peace-keeping .... The real
measure of success of a temporary United Nations peace-keeping operation is
not the length of time the operation can be maintained, but the fact that the
peace-keeping force can be withdrawn under durable peaceful circumstances.
Id. at 48, 53.
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nai.23 5 Moreover, another United Nations peacekeeping force in the Middle East was brought into existence during the UNEF era. In March 1978,
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established
after the outbreak of hostilities in southern Lebanon. 2 6 This force, in the
words of one U.N. official, "represents the most difficult peace-keeping
2
operation ever launched by the Organization.""
' UNIFIL has encountered serious obstacles, but has performed a very difficult task
22 8
admirably.
One other UNEF-era hopeful sign was the preparation by the International Peace Academy of a pragmatic peacekeeping handbook.2 9 For
some time, a complaint of both participants in and observers of
peacekeeping forces was the lack of a handbook or guide to peacekeeping.
"If the fault lies anywhere," wrote Harbottle, "it lies with the United Nations for not giving member states the information they need to prepare
themselves. 2 3 0 The Academy's handbook was developed by military experts, lawyers, diplomats, and scholars from twenty countries, and is now
used by all governments participating in the UNIFIL operation.
All of these progressive developments, it seems reasonable to say, are
undiminished by the dissolution of UNEF, since the cause of UNEF's
demise was completely unrelated to them. It was not opposition to a
peacekeeping force in the Sinai nor to peacekeeping generally that caused
the blockage of the extension and expansion of UNEF's mandate. Rather,
it was opposition, on the part of the U.S.S.R. and of the majority of the
Arab governments, to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.
B. Prospectsfor United Nations Peacekeeping
To cite progressive developments is not, however, to imply that there
are no problems with peacekeeping. Many of the inadequacies and inefficiencies in the machinery of peacekeeping involve force preparation and
organization, and center on a general conception of peacekeeping as com-

225.
226.
(1978).
227.
228.

See generally text sections III(A)(2) and III(B) supra.
S.C. Res. 425 & 426, 33 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34

Jonah, supra note 222, at 81.
See Sommereyns, supra note 111, at 10-14.
229. INTERNATIONAL PEAcE ACADEMY, PRAcmEzap's HANDBOOK (1978). The Academy's
President is General Indar Jit Rikhye, formerly a military advisor to Secretaries-General
Hammarskjold and Thant. The Academy is technically outside the aegis of the United Nations, but its membership comprises many individuals in the United Nations community.
230. Harbottle, supra note 48, at 549. The writer continues: "The need for such a handbook is strongly supported by almost all those who have a wide experience of international
peacekeeping, particularly those who have held senior command and staff appointments."
Id. at 549-50. See also RIKHEY et al., supra note 197, at 336:
The impression obtained from talking to those who are meeting the responsibilities of peacekeeping for the first time [in service in UNEF] is that a basic
manual of peacekeeping covering all its operational aspects of organization, administration, standing operating procedures, preparation, and training, as well
as status of force agreements and international law as it affects international
peacekeeping, would be of inestimable value to all concerned.
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pletely ad hoc and hence inevitably disorganized." ' Harbottle has written
that "the biggest limitation to the effective implementation of peacekeeping is the Charter itself, 2 3 2 which makes no provision for modern
peacekeeping, and therefore serves as a constraint on the institutionalization of peacekeeping.
Prospects for the future are neither bright nor dim, but uncertain
and largely indeterminable. Like all political-legal institutions, peacekeeping's future is subject to unpredictable developments. In negotiations
on the situation in southern Africa, the possibility of United Nations
peacekeeping machinery has been mentioned. The Western proposals for
settlement in Namibia (South-West Africa) called for "comprehensive
arrangements for a United Nations peace-keeping force in the context of
the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)." s Both
sides in the Namibia conflict-the liberation movements, notably the
South-West Africa People's Organization, and the Republic of South
Africa-"have reconciled to the fact that if a cease-fire is to be maintained in Namibia, United Nations peace-keeping forces will have to provide the guarantees."' 3'
The establishment in the future of other United Nations peacekeeping operations will depend most fundamentally on the existence of the
requisite political will in the given circumstances on the part not only of
the parties in the dispute, but also of the permanent members of the Security Council and of other involved states. There is no particular reason
to expect expeditious and material progress on guidelines in the Special
Committee." 5
While the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty could conceivably have
made a significant contribution to United Nations peacekeeping, it was
not afforded that opportunity.2"6 Indeed, in this case, the political will of

231. Wiseman has coined a phrase to describe "the law of U.N. peacekeeping": "Adhocracy." Supra note 203, at 124.
232. The 1971 Memorial Lecture of the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, reprinted in R. HIGGINS & M. HARBorLE, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING:
PAST LESSONS AND FuTuRE PROSPECTS 18 (1971).
233. Jonah, supra note 222, at 82.

234. Id. The Anglo-American proposals for a settlement of the war in Zimbabwe contained provisions for a United Nations role in the transitional period. As part of the actual
settlement of that conflict, the United Kingdom acceded partially to a demand of the Patriotic Front that an international peacekeeping force be brought into the country by agreeing
to assemble an international force consisting of some 1,000 British and Commonwealth

soldiers. Den. Post, Nov. 11, 1979, at 32, col. 1.
Also, though one might well and rightly be skeptical, news reports from London indicated that the Soviet Union might be willing to accept United Nations troops in Afghani-

stan as part of a plan to "neutralize" the country. The reports specified that these comments were made "unofficially" by "high-level sources close to President Brezhnev." Den.
Post, Feb. 27, 1980, at 4, col. 1.

235. See note 105 supra.
236. It is possible that the Treaty actually contributed to a loss in credibility for United
Nations peacekeeping since, "[a]ccording to UN officials, those who wrote the provisions
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certain states came into conflict with that of certain others, and the result
was the discontinuance of a major United Nations force and harm to the
institution of peacekeeping. In its almost six-year life, however, UNEF
helped make possible the achievement of a measure of consensus theretofore unreachable. Today, there is "sufficient consensus for the United Nations to stay in the business of peacekeeping."" 7 This is encouraging,
since peacekeeping can, as it has proven in practice, offer an invaluable
contribution to the cause of the peaceful settlement of international disputes."' 8 Its contribution in fact goes beyond keeping the peace: it also
constitutes an aid to peacemaking and peacebuilding. 3 9 The future of
peacekeeping is uncertain, but since it is one of the few multinational
institutions states have entrusted with a role in the area of peace and
security, one must hope for positive developments in the years to come.

referring to the UN role in the peace treaty appear to have hastily and inadvertently assumed that the UN would simply go along with their plan." Christian Sci. Mon., Apr. 9,
1979, at 10, col. 2.
237. Higgins, supra note 75, at 12.
238. It has been argued, too, that "[tihe peace-keeping function of international organization is peculiarly appropriate to such an era as our own . .. . The very features of the
contemporary international system and situation that make collective security irrelevant
bolster the relevance of peace-keeping." Claude, supra note 69, at 53-54.
239. See, e.g., Forsythe, United Nations Peacemaking, in Kay, supra note 198, at 206;
Jonah, supra note 203, at 118-19; Gordon, In the Mideast, the UN keeps the peace but
doesn't make it, INTERDEPENDENT, Apr. 1979, at 3; Wiseman, supra note 203, at 553.

DEVELOPMENTS

The Refugee Act of 1980
Although the grand purposes of the Refugee Act of 19801 were to give
statutory meaning to our "history of welcoming homeless refugees to our

shores" and to signify our "national commitment to human rights and

humanitarian concerns,' '1 the American public's reaction to this past
summer's dramatic influx of Cuban refugees coupled with the Carter Administration's decision to use traditional executive parole powers to admit
Cuban and Haitian refugees4 promise to compromise the Act's utility.
The Refugee Act, which became law in March of 1980, 5 was intended
to provide a "permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to
this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern."6 Prior to this
enactment, immigration legislation contained no explicit procedures for
the general admission of economic or political refugees. To the contrary,
previous legislation was expedient in nature and reflected America's geo-

1. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (to be codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.
(1976)).
2. See S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 515.
3. Some immigration lawyers forecast that the resettlement difficulties of the Cuban
refugees, such as the riots of 1 June 1980 at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, will prompt Congress to
reevaluate U.S. refugee policy. See Slonim, Freedom Flotilla from Cuba: Will the Harbor
Stay Open?, 66 A.B.A.J. 823, 825 (1980). Although local resentment of those in Arkansas,
Idaho, and other resettlement states primarily may be related to a fear of economic competition and the sentiment that "charity begins at home," racial opposition to the admission of
Latin and Vietnamese refugees has been noted. Doris Meissner, Deputy Associate Attorney
General, has expressed concern that the Cuban/Haitian refugee dilemma will reinforce negative racial attitudes toward U.S. immigration policy in the future: "I'm quite worried about
a heavy-handed approach because of the political atmosphere. It think the long-range impact is going to be to add to the already strong fear that most Americans have about lots of
new people of other colors being in the United States." Id. at 824.
4. On 19 June 1980, the administration announced that the 114,000 Cubans who arrived between 21 April and 19 June and those Haitians who arrived before 19 June would be
classified as Cuban/Haitian Entrants (Status Pending). This allows them six months admission on a parole basis under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 212(d)(5)
(1976). This admission route, however, is only a stopgap measure which requires that special
legislation be passed to normalize the status of these immigrants. Senator Kennedy, chief
architect of the 1980 Refugee Act, has argued that the administration's reluctance to use the
admission procedures of the Act will compromise its future. See Slonim, Cuban Refugee
Crisis: Quick Test for New Law, 66 A.B.A.J. 826 (1980).
5. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102.
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political position rather than our humanitarian concerns. For example,
prior to 1965, all refugees were admitted under such special legislation as
the 1948 Displaced Persons Act (for a limited number of "eligible displaced persons"), 7 the Refugee Relief Act of 1953 (for three classes of
displaced Eastern Europeans),$ or the 1960 Fair Share Act (for "refugeeescapees").' In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act was revised so
that, to be admitted, a refugee had to prove that he departed from a communist or communist-dominated country or that he came from a country
in "the general area of the Middle East."' Because these sharp geograph-

ical and ideological limitations allowed limited political flexibility, the
majority of refugees during these years were admitted through the Attorney General's special parole authority, i.e., special admission "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed in the public interest."'"
The use of parole authority as the mainstay of the United States refugee policy, however, has been criticized as being ad hoc, discriminatory,
and inefficient.'2 As was demonstrated by the case of Uganda in 1972, the
requirements of U.S. immigration law often stymie executive desire for

7. Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 411 (1953)(expired in 1956).-The act permitted the special admission of 205,000 displaced persons. Id. § 20.
8. Pub. L. No. 86-648, 74 Stat. 504, amended by Migration and Refugee Assistance Act
of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, § 6, 76 Stat. 124 (1962), repealed by Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-326, § 16, 79 Stat. 919.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976).
10. Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(a)(7), 79 Stat. 913 (1965).
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). Over one million refugees have been admitted under the
Attorney General's parole authority
HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF REFUGEE PAROLE ACTION
Year
1956 ............
1957-57 ..........
1960-65 ..........
1962 ............
1962-79 ..........
1973-79 ..........
1975-79 ..........
1975-77 ..........
1975-77 ..........
1976-77 ..........

Country and Class of people

Total

Orphans from Eastern European countries .........
925
Refugees from Hungary ..........................
38,045
Refugees-escapees from Eastern European countries
19,754
Chinese refugees from Hong Kong and Macao ......
14,741
Refugees from Cuba .............................
692,219
Refugees from the Soviet Union ...................
35,758
Indochinese refugees .............................
208,200
Chilean detainees ................................
1,310
Chilean refugees from Peru .......................
112
Latin American refugees (Chileans, Bolivians, and
U ruguayans) ....................................
343
1978-79 .......... Lebanese refugees ...............................
1,000 (est.)
1979 ...........
Cuban prisoners and families .....................
15,000 (est.)
Total:
1,027,407
S. Rop. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1979). For an excellent survey of the role of parole
authority under previous immigration legislation, see Evans, The Political Refugee in
United States Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204 (1968).
12. See, e.g., Mackler, Fleeing PoliticalRefugee's Final Hurdle-The Immigration and
Nationality Act, 5 N. Ky. L. REv. 9 (1978); Note, Immigration Law and the Refugees-A
Recommendation to Harmonize the Statutes with the Treaties, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 129
(1975); Note, Refugees Under United States Immigration Law, 24 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 528
(1975).
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expeditious parole admission. Because Uganda was neither communist
nor in the Middle East, the 1,550 Orientals who were expelled upon General Amin's threat of extermination were admitted only after great procedural difficulties and, upon entry, they enjoyed fewer resettlement privileges than they would have had they been refugees from such "preferred"
countries as the Soviet Union of Lebanon."'
In an attempt to redirect this muddled policy, the Refugee Act seeks
to accomplish five objectives. First, it repeals the current immigration
law's discriminatory treatment of refugees by providing a new definition
of refugees, drawn from the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,14 that recognizes the plight of homeless people all over the world
regardless of their national, regional, or political origin. This definition is
significant because it recognizes the obligations of the United States
under the 1967 Protocol. Prior to the new act, the government's attitude
had been that accession to the Protocol did not enlarge our immigration
responsibilities toward refugees.18 Second, the Act raises the annual limitation for admission of regular refugees ("normal-flow refugees") from
17,400 to 50,000." Third, it provides an orderly procedure for meeting
emergency refugee situations if the needs of displaced people cannot be
met within the regular 50,000-person limit.' It is hoped that these last
two revisions will add needed flexibility to the Immigration and Nationality Act and reduce the need for ad hoc parole admission. Fourth, to ensure congressional control over the admission and resettlement process,
the Act requires that Congress be consulted before refugees are admitted.18 Lastly, the Act provides for federal support for the resettlement of
refugees - including cash and medical benefits for up to a two-year period
following admission.1 9
The Refugee Act was designed to provide maximum flexibility to
cope with both political asylum and "emergency refugee situations,"
which have been considered by the legislative committees as "an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action."' 0 The unexpected arrival of more than 114,000 Cuban
refugees during the three months following the bill's enactment severely
tested the utility of the new law. Although the Act outlines admission

13. For a general discussion of the treatment of expellees under international law, see 2
§ 244 (1972).
14. Done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. The Protocol entered into
force with respect to the United States on 1 November 1968.
15. See Letter of Transmittal From President Johnson to the Senate (Aug. 1, 1968), S.
EXEC. K., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1968). See also Note, Political Asylum in the United
States: A Failure of Human Rights Policy, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 133, 147-49 (1977).
16. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207(a)(1), 94 Stat. 103.
17. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 207(b), 94 Stat. 103.
18. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat. 104.
19. Pub. L. No. 96-212, Titles III-IV, 94 Stat. 109-18.
20. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 524.
A.
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procedures for refugees who are either of "special concern" or who seek
admission because of a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion"' (which is a definition certainly broad enough to include
the Cuban and Haitian refugees), President Carter chose to bypass these
asylum provisions on the assumption that "[olur laws never contemplated
and do not adequately provide for people coming directly to our shores
the way the Cubans and the Haitians have done recently. ' 22 The administration instead chose to admit the refugees on a six-month parole basis
which will require special legislation to be passed in the future to normalize the status of those immigrants."
Although it is understandable that the administration would wish to
delay use of the Refugee Act in an election year, especially considering its
potential expense and probable conflict with current immigration sentiment, President Carter's interpretation of the Act runs contrary to the
intention of the drafters. The Senate Judiciary Committee defines an
emergency refugee situation in terms of a sudden exodus of people from a
country where there had been no refugee flow before, a substantial increase in the number of people from an area where normal-flow refugees
were never expected, or a flow of refugees resulting from any catastrophic
circumstance." Despite having flexible legislation tailored for such emergency situations, the Carter Administration refused to use the new law
and has thus, in the eyes of its drafters, imperiled its usefulness for the
coming years.
President Carter's indecisiveness is not the only factor endangering
the bill, however. The hardening political atmosphere within the United
States toward illegal immigration from Mexico and elsewhere promises to
spawn a legislative movement to reevaluate our asylum policy. Senator
Kennedy's euphoric rhetoric of 1977 that it is our "national commitment
to welcome homeless refugees to our shores"' 5 may not be shared in the
1980's by many of his fellow senators such as Arkansas Democrats Dale
Bumpers and David Pryor who have had to cope with strong local resentment toward refugees in the wake of the riots at Fort Chaffee.26 Moreover, the Presidential-Congressional Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy, which will issue its report in March of 1981, has preliminarily indicated that it will propose various programs to inhibit the
flow of immigrants-including stricter border enforcement, sanctions
against those hiring illegal aliens, and an employee identification card to
21. Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 202(a), 94 Stat. 102.
22. Statement of President Carter, May 14, 1980, quoted in Slonim, supra note 4, at
826.
23. Id.
24. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWs 524.
25. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE
& AD. Npws 515.

26. Slonim, supra note 3, at 824.
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be carried by all Americans. 1 Given this changing political situation and
the Carter Administration's refusal to utilize the flexibility offered by the
Refugee Act, it is probable that the new law is already antiquated and an
inaccurate statement of our refugee policy.
Peter T. Moore

27. Id. In 1980 alone, an estimated two million people migrated to the United States.
Although 800,000 of this number came legally as immigrants and refugees, at least 1,200,000
violated U.S. laws to enter. No country has ever absorbed as many new residents in one year
during peacetime. Accordingly, it is understandable that many Americans feel threatened
under a seeming barrage of legal and illegal immigration. The report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy is expected to reflect this hardened attitude. See
Goldenberg, Bursting through the Golden Door, Rocky Mtn. News, Jan. 19, 1981, at 43, col.

Rosado v. Civiletti Tests the United StatesMexico Prisoner Transfer Treaty
The United States-Mexico Prisoner Transfer Treaty' has spawned a
handful of habeas corpus suits in its short life.2 One of the most recent
cases is Rosado v. Civiletti, which concerned the situation of three United
States nationals imprisoned in Mexico who were transferred to the
United States under the Treaty and who subsequently petitioned for
habeas corpus relief from United States custody. The petitioners' case
was ultimately rejected in the face of overwhelming policy considerations.8 This decision displays a critical weakness in the Treaty as it is
applied by the courts.
In response to public concern for the treatment of American prisoners in Mexico, Congress undertook extensive hearings and eventually approved a treaty proposed by Mexico, under the terms of which nationals
of either nation would be allowed to serve out the remainder of their
prison terms in their state of nationality. Although the transferred prisoners may benefit from amelioration of the condition of their incarceration under the Treaty,' the transferring state retains exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings to challenge, modify, or set aside a conviction
6
or sentence. 5 Primarily, the prisoners must consent to the transfer.
In this case, the petitioners were arrested for alleged narcotics offenseS7 in various Mexican airports as they were starting on their respective vacations. For several days, they were violently tortured in order to
draw out confessions. Transferred to prison after interrogation, they paid
large sums of money extorted for the basic necessities of life, for protection, and for "dormitory fee[s]," in addition to suffering continual torture9 and lack of heat and toilet facilities. Their imprisonment in Mexico
lasted about twenty-five months. They lived "in daily fear of bodily harm

1. Prisoner Transfer Treaty, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico, 28 U.S.T. 7399,
T.I.A.S. No. 8718 [hereinafter cited as the Treaty]. The enabling statute is contained in 18
U.S.C. § 3244 (Supp. II 1978).
2. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Pfeifer v.
Bureau of Prisons, 468 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. Cal. 1979), affd 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980).
3. 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir. 1980).
4. Advantages to the prisoner also include: (1) being held in a familiar cultural setting
with better accessibility by families; (2) the receiving state's law governs parole, which is
unavailable to drug offenders in Mexico; and (3) challenges to the constitutionality of the
Treaty will be heard by the receiving state.
5. Treaty, art. VI, 18 U.S.C. § 3244(1).
6. Treaty, art. VI(2), 18 U.S.C. § 3244(2).
7. No evidence was ever found or produced against any of the petitioners.
8. 621 F.2d at 1185 n.12.
9. Velez v. Nelson, 475 F. Supp. 865, 870 n.12 (D. Conn. 1979).
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and believ[ed] that they would be killed if they remained incarcerated in
Mexico.""0
The petitioners were accorded minimum legal process. One week and
a half after their arrest and interrogation, they were briefly informed of
the cocaine importation charges as they stood crowded in a pen "separated from the courtroom by a chain link fence."" A sort of arraignment
followed, and the officiating law secretary offered to help them at that
time for a fee, but they did not have enough money."' Next, there was an

appearance, without the opportunity for confrontation, by the officers
who had arrested just one of the petitioners.1 8 Seven months later the
petitioners were sentenced to nine years imprisonment.'
Petitioners initiated habeas corpus proceedings in the United States
after their return, challenging that their consent to custody in the hands
of the United States was obtained under extreme coercion and duress.
The district court granted their petitions,Velez v. Nelson," extensively
reiterating testimony regarding conditions of their Mexican imprisonment, and saying that "under the unique facts of this case, petitioners'
consents were not truly voluntary, and are therefore, invalid."'16 On appeal by the United States, the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, reversed,
holding that: (1) access to a United States Court is available where petitioners are incarcerated under federal authority pursuant to foreign convictions and make a persuasive showing that their convictions were obtained without benefit of any process whatsoever;'" but, (2) petitioners
were denied habeas corpus relief, on the principle of estoppel, by their
consent to the Treaty's assignment of jurisdiction.
The court's rationale was threefold. First, a desire to protect our relations with Mexico colors adjudication of the question since Mexico would
not have accepted the Treaty if the United States had required the right
to review Mexican criminal convictions. 8 Second, the statutory requirement that prisoners' consents be given freely and knowingly was fulfilled
to the satisfaction of the United States magistrate after interviewing the
prisoners." And third, in the interest ("of paramount importance"20 ) of
10. 621 F.2d at 1183.
11. Id. at 1185.

12. Id.
13. Id. at 1186.
14. "At no time did they see the judge who sentenced them, obtain the assistance of
counsel, or confront the witnesses against them." Id.
15. 475 F. Supp. at 865.
16. Id. at 874.
17. The court expressly declined to impose the United States standard of process on
foreign systems. 621 F.2d at 1197-98. Cf. United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507
F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974) (normally a court will not inquire into internal legal procedures
which await an offender upon extradition).
18. 621 F.2d at 1200.
19. 621 F.2d at 1187. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4108.
20. 621 F.2d at 1200.
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other Americans imprisoned in Mexico, now and in the future, the petitioners can and must be held to their original agreements since their consents were found free from coercion."'

Problems in this decision rest in large measure with the Treaty itself
and its enabling legislation. Congress was concerned with obtaining consents, or waivers, that would stand up to constitutional challenge in order
to ensure the validity of the Treaty" and the smooth processing of the
transfers. The intention was to place transferring prisoners in an estoppel
posture by their acceptance of the stated conditions, especially regarding
Mexican jurisdiction over challenges to convictions. 8 They therefore approved a "voluntary and with full knowledge of the consequenses
thereof""" standard by which to judge validity of consent. This court applied the standard very strictly, whereas the district court had found as a
matter of fact that petitioners' consents were the result of duress produced by brutality and were thus constitutionally suspect.2 ' Under the
"unique" facts of the case, the consents were invalidated in the district
court and writs granted.2 ' But the Second Circuit, taking their authority
from North Carolina v. Alford,1 7 said of these petitioners, "[i]f [their)
consents to transfer are viewed in light of the alternatives legitimately
available to them, it cannot be seriously doubted that their decisions were
voluntarily and intelligently made."28 The Alford standard they asserted
was: "not whether the defendant's decision reflected a wholly unrestrained will, but rather whether it constituted a deliberate, intelligent
choice between available alternatives."' In contrast, the district court
had said the extent of duress was so great that "petitioners would have
signed anything, regardless of the consequences, to get out of Mexico,"'' s a
fact recognized by the Second Circuit, but given no weight by them. In
light of their acceptance of this finding by the lower court, the appellate
court's holding amounts to a rule that a criminal defendant who is offered
a choice between two alternatives, and chooses either, waives his right to
relief on the ground of duress, no matter what the circumstances.' It

21. "We refuse to scuttle the one certain opportunity open to Americans incarcerated
abroad to return home, an opportunity, we note, the benefit of which [the petitioners] have
already received." Id.
22. Id. at 1198.
23. Id.
24. Treaty, art. V,para. 1, 18 U.S.C. § 3245.
25. 475 F. Supp. at 873. See also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
26. 475 F. Supp. at 874.
27. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
28. 621 F.2d at 1191.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1183.
31. 621 F.2d at 1190.
If, here, the conduct of Mexican officials on Mexican soil were held to be determinative of the voluntariness of an American prisoner's consent to transfer,
those prisoners most desperately in need of transfer to escape torture and
extortion, including the petitioners at bar, would never be able to satisfy a

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 10:161

must follow that if no consent or waiver of constitutional rights can be
found to be involuntary, under its own facts, then no consent can be
found to be voluntary. To that extent, the Treaty's standard is applied
unconstitutionally by this court. By limiting the possibilities of an invalid
consent, the holding impairs the protection that the Treaty provides by
requiring a valid consent for waiver of challenge to the Mexican conviction in other than Mexican courts. It seems especially unfair to use consent in this context against a habeas corpus petitioner on the basis of a
theory of estoppel .3
The causes of international human rights and of the fundamental
rights of persons in foreign prisons would be better served if the United
States assiduously pursued other nations' acknowledgement of and adherence to those rights rather than by such application of this particular
treaty. Although the idea is a good one, its execution leaves unchallenged
a gross violation of rights by avoiding the issue and thus keeping it out of
international focus. Perhaps the other treaties entered into in this same
area3 3 will be administered so as to vindicate Americans' rights, but in the
case of the Mexican treaty, as Rosado v. Civiletti shows, there is just too
much strain on the law's integrity for it to stand as is.
Katharine J. Kunz

magistrate that their consents were voluntarily given.

Id.
32. The estoppel theory requires reliance by the United States to its detriment. Granting that there is no law enforcement interest claimed by the government, the court upheld
two other interests: (1) the government's interest in relations with Mexico by honoring its
criminal convictions and recognizing the integrity of its criminal justice system (but cf.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of state doctrine)); and (2)
the interest of those who will similarly become victims in the future. 621 F.2d 1190.
33. In addition to the treaties with Mexico and Canada, the Senate has approved a
similar treaty with Bolivia. Treaties with Panama, Peru, and Turkey have been approved
for ratification, but have not yet become effective. Each of these treaties contains a provision similar to article VI of the Mexican Treaty, which confers exclusive jurisdiction over
challenges to convictions and sentences to the courts of the transferring nation. See, e.g.,
Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Feb. 10, 1978, United States-Bolivia, T.I.A.S.
No. 9219, reprinted in S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).

The European Convention on Contractual
Obligations
On June 19, 1980, seven of the nine members of the European Economic Community' signed the Convention of the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.' The purpose of the Convention is to establish uniform rules on conflicts of law within the Community and to help solve
commercial disputes between businesses and individuals from different
states. A Joint Declaration attached to the Convention declares that
member states are ready to examine the possibility of conferring jurisdiction on the European Court of Justice over matters covered by the Convention.8 After the Convention is ratified by at least five national parliaments (which from past experience may take a number of years), it will
4
become the law for the E.E.C. countries.
The Convention has a broad scope with world-wide application. The
courts of the member states will have to apply the rules of the Convention to decide the applicable substantative law for an individual case, or a
choice of law between several member states, or of several non-member
states, or of both member and non-member states.5 Certain categories of
matters are excluded from the scope of the Convention because there are
other international conventions already in existence covering the subject,
or because the excluded matter does not fall within the scope of a European Economic Community, or because instruments are already in force
or being prepared which directly relate to the subject matter excluded. s
1. Although the United Kingdom and Denmark were not among the original signatories, they are expected to sign shortly. [19801 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), The Euromarket
News, July 1, 1980, at 3.
2. [1980] 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) T16311 [hereinafter cited as the Convention].
3. Id. Common Declaration No. 3.
4. The Convention will enter into force on the first day of the third month after the
seventh instrument of ratification has been deposited. For signatory states ratifying at a
later date, the Convention will enter into force on the first day of the third month after
deposit of the instruments of ratification. Id. art. 29.
5. This general rule is found in Article 1(1) of the Convention, which provides that
"[tihe rules of this Convention shall apply to contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different legal systems." Article 2 adds that "[a~ny law
specified by this Convention shall be applied whether or not it is the law of a Contracting
State."
6. The Convention does not apply to the status or legal capacity of natural persons; to
contractual obligations arising out of wills and succession; to property rights arising out of a
multinational relationship; to rights and dutines duties arising out of a family relationship
or marriage, and the maintenance of illegitimate children; to bills of exchange, checks,
promissory notes, and other negotiable instruments; to arbitration agreements or agreements on the choice of court; to the creation, organization, and dissolution of companies or
to the relationship between agent and principal; to the creation of a trust and the relationship between settlors, trustees, and beneficiaries; or to contracts of insurance convering risks
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The basic rule of the Convention is that the parties themselves may
select the substantative law that is to be applied to their contract, or part
of it, except where all the elements relevant to the situation are connected with one country only. 7 In this instance, the fact that the parties
have chosen a foreign law should not prejudice the application of the
mandatory rules of the law of that country. This rule is particularly innovative since it may result in the application of rules of law other than the
Convention rules being applied to a contract.8 Article 3(2) provides that
the parties at any time may agree to make their contract subject to some
law other than the one that previously governed it, provided that any
variation made after the agreement shall not adversely affect the rights of
third parties.
If the parties have made no election as to the applicable law, the
contract will first be governed by the law of the country with which it is
"most closely connected," and it allows for severance of any severable
parts of the contract.' Thus, if a severable part of the contract has a
closer connection with another country, it may be governed by the law of
that other country. Second, the Convention provides, as a rebuttable presumption, that the "country with which the contract is most closely connected" is presumed to be the country where the party performing the
contract has his habitual residence, or, if a firm, its central administration
or principal place of business.10 Third, if the subject matter of the property is immoveable property, the "close connection" is presumed to be
with the country where the immoveable is situated." Fourth, in a contract for the carriage of goods, the "close connection" in such contracts is
presumed to be with the country where the carrier has his principal place
of business if that country is also the country in which the place of loading or the place of discharge, or the principal place of business of the
consignor is located.' 2 In the absence of any of the previous rules being
applicable, the contract may be deemed to be more closely connected
with another country if the circumstances as a whole so dictate."
Specific provision is made for choice of applicable law in the case of
contracts of employment and certain contracts involving the interests of
consumers." In both cases, the choice of law made by the parties may not
have the effect of depriving the employee or consumer of the protection
he receives under the law that would normally be applicable or of the
protection of the laws of the country in which he has his habitual resi-

within the territory of the European Economic Community. Convention art. 1(2), note 2
supra.
7. Id. art. 3(3).
8. See Hartley, Beyond the ProperLaw, 4 EUROPEAN L. REv. 236 (1979).
9. Convention art. 4(1), note 2 supra.
10. Id. art. 4(2).
11. Id. art. 4(3).
12. Id. art. 4(4).
13. Id. art. 4(5).
14. Id. arts. 5, 6.
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dence.15 With respect to the burden of proof and other legal presumptions, they are to be governed by the law applicable to the contract under
the Convention.' 6 Rules of evidence may be admissable under the law
governing the substance of the contract or the law of the place where the
7
contract was performed.'
Article 20 provides that the Convention shall not impair the application of the acts adopted by the institutions of the European Communities
or harmonized national laws. In addition, the Convention does not bar
the application of other Conventions that the member states may have
entered into or may enter into in the future. 8 If a member state wishes to
become a party to another convention that covers matters dealt with in
the Convention, it may do so.1"
The text of the Convention is the result of more than thirteen years
work by the Commission of the European Communities and experts in
private international law from the member states. The idea of a unification of private international law and codification of the rules on the conflicts of law within the Community date from about 1967, when the
Benelux countries suggested to the Commission that conflicts of law rules
in the then six member states should be unified.20 A preliminary draft
convention on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual obligations was completed in 1972 and submitted to the governments of the
member states, but the accession of three new member states necessitated
its renegotiation."' The preliminary draft of the Convention was subsequently revised so as to limit its scope to contractual obligations.22
Article 3(h) of the Treaty of Rome states that the activities of the
Community shall include "the approximation of their respective municipal law to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market.""8 Chapter Three of the treaty ("Approximation of Laws") which
comprises Articles 100-102, provides that directives issued by the Commission are the instruments most commonly used to fulfill the objectives
of Article 3(h). Article 220 implicitly provides for the use of Conventions," with an eye towards "the simplification of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and execution of judicial decisions and

15. Id. arts. 5(2), 6(1).
16. Id. art. 14.
17. Id.

18. Id. art. 20.
19. Id. art. 24.
20. See 0. LANDO,

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (1975);
250 (1973).
21. Sollins, Contractual Obligations-The E.E.C. Preliminary Draft Convention on
Private InternationalLaw, 25 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 35 (1976).
22. Thus, the original convention became two draft conventions, the first relating exclusively to contracts, and the other relating exclusively to non-contractual obligations. The
latter draft convention is still in a preliminary stage. Id.
23. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 15 (1958).
24. See id. art. 220.
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of arbitral awards."2 5
In the past, the difference in private international law rules has given
rise to discrimination and consequent hardship in individual cases, in the
sense that two identical problems could be solved in two different ways,
depending on the country or legal system in which each problem had
been considered. The Convention aims to avoid such hardship by introducing in all member states a set of uniform rules governing conflicts, and
thus, to standardize the method of determining the proper law to apply.
Identical rules of conflicts will apply in the member states' relations both
with one another and with non-Community states. By virtue of these sets
of uniform rules, confidence in the stability of European legal relations
will be strengthened, agreements on jurisdiction will be facilitated, and
civil and commercial acts occurring in the context of this economic framework and containing a foreign element will become legally more certain.
In the absence of the approval of the European Court of Justice as the
final interpretative body, a substantive provision of the Convention risks
being interpreted in different ways by national courts in the different
member states.
S. Hadley Ruston
John H. Works, Jr.

25. Id.

The Proposed United States-Canada
Income Tax Treaty
A new income tax treaty between the United States and Canada was
signed on September 26, 1980,1 culminating a seven-year effort to revise
the current treaty which dates back to 1942. While there are notable advantages to both American and Canadian taxpayers with the new treaty,
Senate ratification of the treaty in its present form is far from certain."
Natural resources companies and real estate developers with holdings in
Canada are potential losers under the 1980 treaty and can be expected to
lobby intensively for modification when the treaty comes up for approval
in 1981.
All sides agree that a new treaty was needed because the old one is
outdated.' Current investment attitudes of individuals and businesses differ dramatically from the pre-World War II investment attitudes expressed in the current treaty. Yet, while the new treaty may be welcomed
as more reflective of the investment climate of the 1980's, one expressed
concern with the new treaty is that it is a "labyrinth of detail, far more so
than most tax treaties."'s Nevertheless, the 1980 treaty contains numerous
potential benefits and losses to be enjoyed and suffered by investors.
In many respects, the new treaty does not significantly change the
existing treaty. The 1980 treaty continues the joint American-Canadian
effort to avoid double taxation and to prevent fiscal evasion with respect
to taxes on income and capital.4 In addition, the treatment of income
1. Income Tax Treaty, Sept. 26, 1980, United States-Canada, reprinted in [1980] 12
FED. TAX TRiEATIES (P-H) 22,030 [hereinafter cited as 1980 Treaty]. See also Treas. Dept.

Release M-678, Sept. 26, 1980.
2. Hurdles Ahead for the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 27, 1980, at 125.
Current law consists of the original 1942 treaty and three supplemental treaties. Convention
and Protocol for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in the
Case of Income Taxes, March 4, 1942, United States-Canada, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983
[hereinafter cited as 1942 Treaty]; Convention Modifying and Supplementing the Convention and Accompanying Protocol of March 4, 1942 for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion in the Case of Income Taxes, June 12, 1950, United
States-Canada, 2 U.S.T. 2235, T.I.A.S. No. 2347 [hereinafter cited as 1950 Treaty]; Convention Further Modifying and Supplementing the Convention and Accompanying Protocol of
March 4, 1942 for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
in the Case of Income Taxes, as modified by the supplementary convention of June 12,
1950, Aug. 8, 1956, United States-Canada, 8 U.S.T. 1619, T.I.A.S. No. 3916; Convention
Further Modifying and Supplementing the Convention and Accompanying Protocol of
March 4, 1942 for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
in the Case of Income Taxes, as modified by the supplementary conventions of June 12,
1950 and August 8, 1956, United States-Canada, 18 U.S.T. 3186, T.I.A.S. No. 6415.
3. Hurdles Ahead for the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, note 2 supra.
4. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, Preamble with 1942 Treaty, supra note 2,
Preamble.
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from government sources, 5 income for educational maintenance, 6 exempt
organizations, 7 capital,' and the income of artists and athletes9 remains
virtually unchanged. The treaty also preserves the important goal of cooperation between the United States and Canada, particularly with the
exchange of tax-related information.10 However, despite these similarities,
important articles of the current treaty have been altered-these changes
warrant close scrutiny by existing and potential investors on both sides of
the border. The areas that have been changed include income derived
from pensions and life annuities, pension fund income, capital gains, royalties, interest, branch office profits, and dividends.
Income derived from pensions and life annuities
Under the existing treaty, income from pensions (including government pensions) and life annuities derived from within one of the contracting states by a resident of the other contracting state is exempt from
taxation in the former state."' The 1980 treaty, on the other hand, provides that pensions and annuities arising in one contracting state may be
taxed in the other state." The new treaty does, however, place a fifteen
percent limit on the tax of the gross amount of pension income. 3 This
provision of the 1980 treaty will probably encourage Americans and
Canadians to seek pension and annuity sources which are on their own
respective side of the border. If the 1980 treaty is ratified in its present
form, potential investors looking for a pension or annuity investment opportunity will be forced to consider not only financial but also geographical factors.
Pension fund income
The 1980 treaty exempts interest and dividends paid in one contracting state to a pension fund resident in the other contracting state if
the fund's income is generally exempt from tax in the other contracting
state." Canadian dividends, for example, which are paid to an American
pension fund would be exempt from any Canadian tax if the American
fund is a United States Treasury-qualified pension fund. This is a notable
change from the existing treaty which contains no such provision for pen-

5. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIX with 1950 Treaty, supra note 2, art.

VI.
6. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XX with 1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX.
7. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXI with 1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art. X.
8. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXIII with 1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art.

V.
9. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XVI with 1950 Treaty, supra note 2, art.

VII.
10. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXVII with 1942 Treaty, supra note 2,
arts. XX, XXI.
11. Compare 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI with 1950 Treaty, supra note 2, art.

VI(A).
12. 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XVIII.
13. Id. art. XVIII, para. 2.
14. Id. art. XI, para. 3.
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sion dividend and interest income exemption. This particular exemption
should increase the movement of investment dollars across the border, 15
and it is unlikely that this aspect of the 1980 treaty will meet any Senate
resistance.
Capitalgains
The 1942 treaty provides that "gains derived in one of the contracting states from the sale or exchange of capital assets by a resident
• . .of the other contracting state are exempt from taxation in the former
state, provided such resident.., has no permanent establishment in the
former state.' Therefore, most capital gains realized in Canada by American investors are exempt from .Canadian taxation. The 1980 treaty,
meanwhile, divides capital gains into real estate gains and gains derived
from the sale of securities. Real estate capital gains will be hit hard by
the new treaty which states that "gains derived by a resident of a contracting state from the alienation of real property situated in the other
contracting state may be taxed in that other state." 7 There is no limit on
the amount of such taxation, and real estate capital gains will be subject
to the maximum Canadian and American capital gains tax.
Real estate capital gains will probably be one of the more contested
issues when the treaty comes before the Senate. Real estate developers
with American and Canadian holdings would be subject to taxation on
both sides of the border for real estate capital gains under the new treaty
and will undoubtedly lobby for modification. This aspect of the 1980
treaty, if passed would certainly slow the amount of American dollars invested in Canadian real estate.
Capital gains from the sale of securities is generally exempt from
double taxation under both the current and new treaties.'6 The new
treaty, however, does change the treatment of such capital gains in one
important area: capital gains derived from the sale of shares of real estate
companies are subject to double taxation."9
Royalties
Royalties are exempt under the 1942 treaty if the party was not engaged in trade or business in the foreign state through a permanent establishment.'0 However, if an American did carry on a trade or business
in Canada at a permanent establishment, then royalties from either personal or real property could be taxed at a maximum of fifteen percent."
Income from royalties receives a different treatment under the 1980
treaty. Royalties derived from personal property "arising in a contracting

15.
16.
17.
18.
XIII.
19.
20.
21.

Hurdles Ahead for the U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty, note 3 supra.
1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIH.
1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIII, para. 1.
Compare 1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII with 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art.
1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XIII, para. 3(a).
1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XIII(C).
Id. art. XI.
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state and paid to a resident of the other contracting state may be taxed in
that other state, '2 but this tax cannot exceed ten percent of the gross
amount of the royalties.2 3 Personal property royalties taxation, then,
would decrease five percent if the new treaty is ratified.24 This should
encourage American companies to view Canada as a more attractive
ground for licensing.
Royalties from real property, meanwhile, are taxable at the maximum Canadian rates under the new treaty.2 5 Natural resources companies
which derive income from oil and mineral royalties will be subject to the
Canadian tax in addition to the American tax. American oil companies
with land holdings in Canada will likely lead an intensive lobbying effort
to change this portion of the treaty.
Interest
Under both the existing and new treaties, interest accruing in a contracting state and paid to a resident of the other contracting state may be
taxed in the accruing state at a rate not to exceed fifteen percent.26 However, the 1980 treaty exempts interest paid on government, provincial,
and local bonds.2 7 Since a United States investor who buys Canadian government bonds will now receive interest payments not subject to Canadian or American taxation, and at the same time, interest paid to Canadians on United States Treasury, state, and local bonds is to be exempt
from United States, as well as Canadian, taxation, this change could help
broaden the American and Canadian markets for such issues.
Branch office profits
Branch office profits receive a more favorable treatment under the
new treaty, with the maximum tax lowered from fifteen to ten percent
with the first $500,000 exempt.2 8 The 1980 treaty provides that this exemption applies if one company "directly or indirectly controls the other,
or both companies are directly or indirectly controlled by the same person or persons, or if the two companies deal with each other not at arm's
length."2 9 This decrease of five percent realized under the 1980 treaty
may lead to the expansion of companies across the United States-Canada
border.
Dividends
At present, dividends paid by a Canadian corporation to an Ameri-

22. 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII, para. 1.
23. Id. para. 2.
24. For example, an American company that licenses patents in Canada will be taxed in
Canada at 10%, instead of the present 15% of income received from the patent.
25. 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII, para. 4.
26. 1950 Treaty, supra note 2, arts. XI, XII.
27. 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 3.
28. Compare 1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII, with 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art.
X, para. 6.
29. 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. X, para. 6(d).
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can are subject to Canadian taxation of fifteen percent."0 However, dividends paid by an American corporation whose business is "not managed
and controlled" 1 in Canada to a non-Canadian recipient is exempt from
all taxes imposed by Canada.3 2 The new treaty provisions state that dividends paid by a Canadian company to an American investor may be
taxed in the United States and in Canada, but if an American is the
beneficial owner of such dividends, the rate charged shall not exceed:
(a) 10 percent of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial
owner is a company which owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock
of the company paying the dividends;
(b) 15 percent of the gross amount of the dividends in all other
33
cases.
Several general comments about the new Canada-United States income tax treaty should be made. The new treaty changes the treatment of
income derived in various ways from real property. Real estate capital
gains, royalties from real property, and capital gains derived from the sale
of real estate company stock are all subject to some form of double
taxation. This will obviously encourage Canadian and American investors
looking across the border to seek non-real estate investment
opportunities.
The treaty is indeed a "labyrinth of detail." Extreme caution should
be exercised when the treaty is read because different articles interact in
subtle ways, for example, dividends and capital gains treatments make
investment decisions difficult to make. It is suggested that this treaty be
read only after the earlier ones are studied and understood.
Finally, until the treaty is ratified and its final form ascertained,
great care should be used by potential investors. For example, a decision
to speculate in Canadian securities because of the adverse treatment that
real property capital gains receive might later prove to be the incorrect
financial decision if the Senate modifies the real estate capital gains section of the treaty. Indeed, the hurdles ahead for this treaty should place
the potential investor on guard and possibly cause him to postpone any
decisions until ratification.
Bernie M. Tuggle

30. 1942 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII.
31. In a letter from the Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to the
American Ambassador, the Under-Secretary wrote that "so long as the stock control of the
corporation is not in Canada, its directors' meetings and shareholders' meetings are not held
in Canada and its 'management-control' is not in Canada, ;he corporation is not managed
and controlled in Canada." Letter of Feb. 20, 1951, reprinted in 2 U.S.T. 2246.
32. 1950 Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII.
33. 1980 Treaty, supra note 1, art. X, para. 2.

The European Monetary System and the
European Currency Unit
Probably the most significant event in the European Economic Community in 1978 was the decision to enact the European Monetary System
(EMS) in 1979.1 During the long, technical arguments in the autumn of
1978, all nine heads of government of the European Community moved to
and fro across the continent in the most intensive period of bilateral diplomacy in at least six years.2 In fact, the efforts that went into the preparation for the EMS kept the European Commission so occupied during
the second half of 1978 that it fell behind in proposing major legislation it
had planned to submit.3 The EMS could be the most significant development in the world of international finance since President Nixon officially
launched floating exchange rates in 1971 by cutting the dollar free from
gold.'
The EMS is the European Community's latest effort to come to grips
with exchange rate stability as a means toward full integration and harmonization of the economies of the member states.5 It is three steps in
one towards a European central bank, a European monetary union, and a
common European currency. The EMS aims to replace national control
over domestic economic policy, particularly monetary policy, within the
European Economic Community by multinational control. Each country
will surrender a part of its sovereignty in economic affairs in return for
help from, and a say in, the policies of the others.
The EMS is composed of a parity grid, a divergence indicator, and
credit mechanisms. The parity grid defines the bilateral central rates' and
the permitted margins of fluctuation on either side of these central rates.
The EMS specifies a band of 2.25 percent above and below the central
rates for all EMS currencies, except for the Italian Lira, which is permit-

1. [1979] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), The Euromarket News, Jan. 4, 1979, at 1.
2. EUROPE, Jan./Feb. 1979, at 8.
3. [1979] COMM. MKT. REP., supra note 1, at 1.
4. BusINEss WEEK, Nov. 6, 1978, at 68.

5. The United Kingdom decided not to join the EMS as a full member. However, it
forms a part of the ECU, it has transferred its share of its reserves to the European Monetary Fund, and it has pledged to maintain a "stable" exchange rate. THE EcONOMIST, Mar.
17, 1979, at 74. Ireland is also a member of the EMS. The move was particularly interesting
because it marked the end of the one-for-one parity between the British and Irish pounds, a
relationship that had been unbroken for nearly 160 years. Wall St. J., Dec. 18, 1978, at 19,
col. 1.
6. Bilateral central rates are defined by governments. Market exchange rates are those
at which currencies are actually traded against one another by banks, corporations, or indirectly in foreign exchange markets. To keep market exchange rates where they want them,
governments must influence their supply of and demand for their currencies by intervening
directly in the foreign exchange markets.
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ted a six percent band.' When the market rate for any currency pair
reaches its limit, both central banks are obliged to intervene in participating currencies, to keep the currency within the band.8 The system expressly provides for adjustments of exchange rate relationships between
participating countries by means of changes in central rates, which are
subject to the consent of all participants.9
The European Currency Unit (ECU) is at the heart of an alternative
exchange rate mechanism to the parity grid system, called the divergence
indicator. The ECU is not a true currency, but rather a "basket" of currencies, containing specific quantities of the European currencies. They
are chosen according to criteria that supposedly reflect the relative size of
their economies, of their intra-European trade, national productivity and
quotas in support mechanisms. 10 These accounts are also subject to
change by unanimous agreement of the member states. The maximum
divergence represents an outer limit of permissible foreign exchange rate
movement, and the EMS has fixed a "trigger" at seventy-five percent of
the maximum. The divergence indicator obliges no government to take
specific action, although there
is a "presumption" that adequate correc11
tive measures will be taken.
The EMS also provides for credit mechanisms in order to intervene
in the foreign exchange markets. Credit to support the EMS is dispersed
through three mechanisms ranging from very short-term credit to medium-term financial assistance. About twenty-five billion ECU's are effectively available for credit." To create an initial stock of ECU's, each
member was required -to deposit at least twenty percent of its holdings of
dollars and gold in a "European Monetary Fund," against which it receives and equivalent amount of ECU's.13
In its two-year history, the EMS has performed rather well. Despite
the sharp crude oil price rises, the average fluctuation of each national
currency in 1979 amounted to only 1.9 percent compared to 5.2 percent
during the preceding six years. That made 1979 the most stable year for
EEC currencies since 1972.14 Aside from two minor adjustments in the
exchange rates in September and November 1979, there have been no
other events to mar the system's operation. 5 Additionally, the New Coin-

7. Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1978, at 10, col. 3.
8. Intervention in participating currencies is compulsory when the intervention points
defined by the fluctuation margins are reached. Res. No. 32/1978, Dec. 8, 1978, of the European Council, [1978] 3 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH), I 10,095.
9. Id.
10. Carreau, Vers Une Zone de Stabilito Mon~taire: la Creation du System montaire
Europeen au Sein de la CEE, REvUE DU MARCHt. COMMUN, Sept. 26, 1979, at 413.
11. See note 8 supra.
12. MONETARY REPORT OF THE DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK, Mar. 1979.
13. See note 8 supra.
14. THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 8, 1980, at 56.
15. The finance ministers of the EMS raised the value of the Deutsche Mark two percent against six other EMS currencies and five percent against the Danish Krone in the first
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munity Instrument (NCI or the Ortoli Facility), was officially instituted
by a decision of the European Council on October 16, 1978.6 It was decided to allow less prosperous member states to borrow a maximum of
five million ECU's for a period of five years, divided into annual installments of one million ECU's, and to allow member states a three percent
interest rate subsidy. The first loans from the resources of the NCI were
signed in Brussels on December 17, 1979, and were made to Ireland, Italy,
and the United Kingdom. The loans are for investments in energy
schemes, water and sewerage infrastructures, and road and telecommunication improvements.
The concept of a European monetary system is neither new nor
novel. Informal arrangements linking European currencies have existed in
one form or another since the beginning of the twentieth century, and
more formal arrangements have existed since the Second World War. In
fact, one of the ultimate goals of the European Economic Community,
which came into existence on January 1, 1958, was the attainment of a
European Monetary System. But one of the fundamental obstacles in examining the Articles of the Treaty of Rome relating to monetary policy is
the very limited nature of the commitments they contain in contrast to
other often exacting obligations of other sections of the Treaty. Article
107 is the only treaty provision relating directly to foreign exchange rate
17
policy.
The EMS is a sign that Europe's slow march toward greater economic unity has not yet been arrested. By tying their currencies together
and by creating a new reserve unit, the Europeans may hope to build a
new global monetary order composed of three currency blocs: the dollar,
the ECU, and the yen."8 In addition, a common currency, which will undoubtedly become attractive to others for private transactions and official
reserve purposes, might enhance Europe's bargaining strength in international monetary discussions. To do this, the ECU would have to move
from its present status as an accounting unit, designed to help the eight
members maintain a reasonably stable exchange rate system, and into the

realignment of the six-month old EMS, on September 24, 1979. Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1979,
at 4, col. 1. The second realignment of the EMS currencies took place on November 30,
1979, when the Danish government devalued its krone by five percent against the other
currencies of the EMS. BuLL. EuR. COMM. (CCH), Nov. 1979, at 30.
16. O.J. EUR. COMM. 298, Oct. 25, 1978.
17. Article 107 provides:
Each member state shall treat its policy with regard to rates of exchange as a
matter of common concern. If a member state makes an alteration in its rate of
exchange which is inconsistent with the objectives set out in Article 104 and
which seriously distorts conditions of cooperation, the Commission may, after
consulting the Monetary Committee, authorize other member states to take for
a strictly limited period the necessary measures, the conditions and details of
which it shall determine, in order to counter the consequences of such
alternatives.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 57.
18. LE NouvL OnsEvATmu, Mar. 12, 1979, at 44.
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hands of commercial banks. From there it would not be a large step for
the ECU to become real money. It would, however, be a considerably
larger step for it to become a world-wide reserve currency. The development in the past fifteen years of various units of account (official ones like
the Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund, and a
number of privately computed ones) for such purposes has not been particularly encouraging; acceptance has been slow and halting on the whole.
Yet, the possibility cannot be ruled out that after a certain lead-in period
the ECU might do better.
Though timely exchange rate adjustments will be required to make
the EMS work in the medium term, over a longer period the ambition is
to move forward to a system requiring fewer and fewer adjustments and
eventually into a ture monetary union. Real progress toward that goal will
require a very considerable harmonization of economic policies, of which
the coordination of monetary policy will be paramount. The real bar to
European economic integration is the fact that the currencies of the
member states are still not fully convertible with each other. The strength
of Western Europe as a political and economic entity depends upon their
ability of member states to perceive common problems and to act together toward their solution, and to create in a concrete way a factual
solidarity among them to establish common bases for their economic, social, and political development. In view of the instability in the world
economy, it seems that full economic and monetary integration in Western Europe will remain a long-term aim, rather than a practical consideration in the 1980's.
John H. Works, Jr.

BOOK REVIEWS

Human Rights and World Public Order
Reviewed by George W. Shepherd
Human Rights and World Public Order, subtitled The Basic Policies
of an International Law of Human Dignity, by Myres S. McDougal,

Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen. Yale University Press, 92A
Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520 (1980). ISBN
0300023448, LC 79-18149. Pages xxiv, 1016. Preface, footnotes, appendix, table of cases, name index, subject index. $45.00 (clothbound).
Despite the enormous amount of attention given to the gross violation of human rights, there is a broad basis of respect for an implementation of human rights throughout the world. One of the reasons we fail to
perceive this greening of the globe in human rights is that our perception
is too restrictive and ethnocentric.
Much of the past and contemporary literature on human rights attempts to document the way in which international law or ideology applies to certain rights and the way in which governments or international
authorities fail to uphold human rights commitments. A cynical view of
human rights perceives it as a definition of human freedom applicable to
only a few privileged Western nations. This view disputes the possibility
of making the enhancement of human rights a viable public policy goal
for people other than the citizens of one's own state. It is especially regarded as dangerous and misleading for a major power like the United
States to include human rights goals in its foreign policy.' Another inhibited view is propounded on the left by those who see the major Western
powers, especially the United States, hopelessly committed to the use of
human rights ideology either as an anticommunist crusade or as a legitimization instrument for its own nonsocial and individualistic perceptions of human rights.2

Both of these perceptions are narrow because they view, from different perspectives, human rights as essentially the projection of the nationGeorge W. Shepherd is Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.
1. Buckley, Human Rights and Foreign Policy: A Proposal, 58 FolRIGN AFF. 775

(1980).
2. For a discussion of this perspective, see Falk, Comparative Protection of Human
Rights, Capitalist and Socialist Third World Countries, UmNvsAL HUMAN RIGHTs, AprilJune 1979, at 3.
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state or the class struggle. Professors Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell,
and Lung-chu Chen, in a major integrated work on human rights,' succeed in going beyond the limits of the national cultural and class perceptions to a global standpoint of theory and implementation. They do this
by basing human rights primarily on universal values with individuals as
the direct recipients of the dignity and respect derived from these values.
The state and social groups are not the origins of these values and this
basic respect, but they are the instruments for the realization or the repression of human rights. The authors maintain that there is a rising demand for these rights throughout the world today. This is stimulated by
the findings of modern science which add to our comprehension of the
legitimacy of the increasing claims of various movements from the Renaissance to the abolition of slavery, the foundation of democratic states,
the inauguration of egalitarian movements, and the recognition of demands for self-determination. These demands, human and historical in
origin, are brought to bear against the state and its international dimensions in world order:
The important fact is that the people of the world, whatever their
differences in cultural traditions and styles of justification, are today
increasingly demanding the enhanced protection of all those basic
rights, commonly characterized in empirical reference as that of
human dignity, by the processes of law in all the different communities of which they are4 members, including especially the international
or world community.
The book has an enormous compass and demonstrates the growth of
human rights demands in eight major value categories: "respect, power,
enlightenment, well-being, wealth, skill, affection, and rectitude . . . accompanied by a detailed specification of the content of these categories in
terms of particular institutional practices (as in terms of participation,
perspectives, situations, bases of power, strategies, and outcomes)." 5 This
is a staggering intellectual task, particularly since it details implementation by various authoritative actors, including nongovernmental organizations, states, and international authorities. Yet all this is done convincingly and with precision.
One of the most important discussions concerns a "policy-oriented
perspective," distinct from other, eschewed frameworks. The authors
point out the limitations of the historical, positivist, and scientific approaches to the analysis of human rights. It is not surprising to find Professor McDougal expounding the limitations of the positivist view, which
cannot define human rights by law because "the fatal weakness of the
positivist approach is in its location of authority in the perspective of

3. M. McDOUGAL, H. LAsswm.L, & L. CEN, HuiAN
(1980).
4. Id. at 6.
5. Id. at 143.
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established officials."" It is interesting to note, however, that Professor
Lasswell concurred in the judgment of
exponents of the social science approach [who] characteristically underestimate the importance of deliberately postulating and clarifying
human rights goals, as distinct from justifying those goals by transempirical postulates of faith or by outright incorporation of community preferences. . . .Obviously, the most conspicuous task is that of
scientific enquiry, but lacking a comprehensive map of human rights
and a realistic conception of the interrelations between law and social
process, it is impossible to perform even this task adequately.'
One problem, however, is that the authors' "policy-oriented approach" is not sufficiently delineated or defended. It is basically a global
perspective incorporating several procedural approaches. As important as
the perspective of the "whole of humankind" is, the authors do not specify how this provides a unique historical or philosophical insight lacking
in other perspectives. One can agree that "[it is indispensable that both
the scholarly inquirer and the established decision-maker achieve an observational standpoint, as free as possible from parochial interests and
biases, which will enable them to ascertain and clarify for the active participants in the different communities common interests that they themselves have not been able to perceive. ' ' This universality, however, has no
better claim than the historical materialism the authors reject.
Both Marxism and the scientific approach are narrow in their claims
to rights based on either a class perception or verifiable community acceptance. However, elements of these approaches might well be incorporated into the authors' global policy orientation in a way which would
give it both a greater relevancy to contemporary issues and a method of
distinguishing between rhetorical proclamations about the rights of man
and reality. If a concern for human rights in policy is to emerge from the
shadows of academia into the central offices of policymaking in this nation-state era, it has to become something more than morality or even
law. These two worthy concepts are often proclaimed by states as the basis of policy when in fact the reality of rule is the repression of human
rights. The strength of Human Rights and World Public Order is that it
is a major step in the direction of demonstrating that human rights grow
and proceed in spite of government and nation-state repression. The authors provide a map showing how political and social rights are finding
global expression and limited recognition. They do not, however, fully
provide the intellectual equipment needed to establish priority and direction or a point by point progression to higher ground. This is the task of
others.
There is, for example, a Third World perspective on human rights

6. Id. at 74.
7. Id. at 81-82.
8. Id. at 83.
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represented by such writers as Fouad Ajami9 and Ali Mazrui, 0 both with
the Institute for World Order. Neither of these writers are Marxists but
they give primary attention to the economic and social basis of the global
demands of Third World peoples who believe that the right to eat is more
important that the right to dissent."
While the authors are fully cognizant of the important Third World
dimension to human rights, they do not give it the priority of emphasis
that Ajami and Mazrui do. For example, a great deal of attention is given
to racial discrimination and apartheid,which is very appropriate particularly since United Nations bodies and instruments have made these issues
a modern priority. However, detailed attention is not given to such basic
human rights as employment, social security, and health. These are rights
which, from the Third World and socialist perspectives, are as fundamental as freedom from racial discrimination. There are of course Western
theorists who have long maintained that such rights are of a different
category because they can only be provided by the state." Such rights are
really privileges, it is argued, which may or may not be provided depending upon the circumstances of economic prosperity. This view is not limited to Western philosophers. A prominent Ghanaian educator who coordinated the rewriting of Ghana's Constitution, went to great pains to see
to it that such social rights were not incorporated into the Constitution.
He believed that the state could not always be expected to provide these
costly necessities to its citizens. s
This is not the view of Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen,
who assert that the dichotomy is false and that social rights are on a par
with political rights. Yet the authors fail to demonstrate fully how this is
the case with reference to the worldwide movement in this direction. Although it is hard to see how they might have added to this 1,016-page
volume, a second volume will be needed. Social rights have begun to be
codified in the constitutions of many Third World and socialist states
and, of course, in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights."4 The means by which these rights can be provided, and
9. Ajami, Human Rights and World Order Politics, 3 ALTERNATIVES 351 (1978).

10.

A. MAZRUI, A WORLD FEDmRATION OF CULTURES: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE

(1976).

11. Fouad Ajami has four major priorities:
(1) The right to survive;
(2) The right not to be subjected to torture;
(3) The condemnation of apartheid;and
(4) The right to food.
Ajami, supra note 9, at 378-79.
12. See, e.g., M. CRANSTON, HuMAN RIGHTS, REAL AND SUPPOSED (1978); POLITICAL THEORY OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN (I. Raphael ed. 1967).
13. Comments of Prof. B.D.G. Fulson, Vice Chancellor of the University of Legon,
Ghana, at a panel discussion on human rights in Accra, November 1979, attended by the
author of this review.
14. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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the resulting priorities established remain controversial, but the global
demand for them is unquestionable. Movement towards implementation
of these rights through various political forms of world order will undoubtedly take place during the next century.
One of the most useful aspects of the empirical approach to human
rights is the capability it offers for assessing progress towards realization
of the demands of people throughout the world for greater human rights.
The Carter Administration dramatized the way in which a major power
can place human rights achievements at the center of its foreign policy
goals, but this remains in the realm of rhetoric until the extent of its
reality is tested by empirical analysis. This has been begun by a number
of social scientists and has proven to be very useful in policy assessment. 8 It has helped set aside the argument that such values cannot be
meaningful in policy, and has also shown the limitations of this policy to
date. The work of social scientists like Richard Claude 6 and John McCamant7 has helped transform human rights from simply "doing good" into
the practical realm of enhancing the national interest-through advancing
the rights of man.
Human Rights and World Public Order is primarily concerned about
world order, and this focus is its greatest strength. Discussions of topics
such as intervention are especially timely and useful. In the last analysis,
the power of the state has been employed to carry out particularly gross
violations of human rights, such as in South Africa and Uganda. There
will likely be numerous situations in the future such as the seizure of
hostages by Iran, in which the humanitarian doctrine of human rights
protection expounded by the authors may be needed to comprehend the
limits and possibilities of action "until there is a better world."
The book is a major landmark in that it brings social science and law
back together again in the investigation of one particular subject. It is
high time for resources to be combined in common substantive concern
for this immense human task. This is a new era, as Professor Ved Nanda
has commented,18 and the challenge to younger scholars to continue the
work so ably begun by Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen is
unmistakable.

15. See, e.g., Part II, Comparative Measures, edited by James Scarritt, in GLOBAL
(V. Nanda, J. Scarritt, & G. Shepherd eds. 1981).
16. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS (R. Claude ed. 1976).
17. See, e.g., E. DuFF & J. MCCAMANT, VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA
(1976).
18. Nanda, Book Review-Human Rights and Public World Order, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503 (1980).
HUMAN RIGHTS

The International Law and Policy of
Human Welfare
Reviewed by Ved P. Nanda
The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare, edited by
Ronald St. John Macdonald, Douglas M. Johnston, and Gerald L.
Morris, Sijthoff & Noordoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den
Rijn, The Netherlands (1978); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff,
20020 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767. ISBN 9028608087.
Pages xviii, 690. $92.50 (clothbound).
The InternationalLaw and Policy of Human Welfare,' a collection
of twenty-five essays, is a thoughtful and probing commentary on many
critical issues the world community is likely to face during the last two
decades of the twentieth century. The editors, Dean Macdonald and
Professors Johnston of Dalhousie and Morris of Toronto, are all distinguished Canadian international lawyers.' They and their associates from
various disciplines, most of them also from Canada, present an all encompassing study of "human welfare," a concept they interpret broadly as
referring to "all the psychic aspects of individual welfare, such as those
normally encompassed under the international law of human rights, as
well as to physical needs and aspirations now placed at the center of concern with the development of the new international order."' Their purpose is "to provide, chiefly for the benefit of international lawyers, a conspectus on the overlapping areas of human rights, national development,
'4
social welfare, and human needs."
The editors join a select group of contemporary scholars who can be
singled out for their visionary approach to the role of international law
and institutions in meeting individual and societal needs. Their inquiry
extends beyond the widely accepted perception of traditional international law as a body of rigid rules governing relations among states and of
rather limited relevance to individuals and groups. They explore, in an
interdisciplinary context, major issues which are likely to be of immediate
and long term concern to all those who seek solutions to global problems

Ved P. Nanda is Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Pro-

gram, University of Denver College of Law.
1. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston and G. Morris eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF
HUMAN WELFARE].
2. Ronald St. John Macdonald is Weldon Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law at
Dalhousie University, Douglas Johnston is Professor of Law and director of the marine and

environmental programs at Dalhousie University, and Gerald Morris is Professor of Law at
the University of Toronto.
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related to human rights and basic human needs, food and population, environment, and national development. Their search is for creative use of
international law in furtherance of the twin objectives of ensuring human
survival and establishing an international order under which human
needs are met and human dignity is secured.
The most perceptive essay in the book is the introductory essay in
part one, written by the editors and entitled The International Law of
Human Welfare: Concept, Experience, and Priorities."The writers provide a historical perspective and draw upon various disciplines in relating
the concept of welfare policies and programs in Britain, Sweden, the
United States, the Soviet Union, and India, "five countries which have
produced a more than usually voluminous literature on welfare theory
and practices." 6 These countries' national experiences are compared primarily to examine if and how the "welfare state" can be elevated to a
"welfare world."
The authors review the last three hundred years of international law,
focusing their inquiry on the "capacity of the international legal system
to respond appropriately to welfare demands and aspirations in the world
community."' They conclude that "it is very difficult to arrive at other
than pessimistic conclusions, if it is assumed that amelioration of human
welfare at the international level can be effected only within the existing

structure of intergovernmental agencies." 8 Their study leads them to consider the desirability of acting outside current international organizations
in order to provide effective international planning for the advancement
of human welfare. Specifically, they propose "the establishment of an
agency which, above all, would exist and operate entirely outside the system of the United Nations, free from all the inhibitions, complexities, and
distortions which have sapped that organization's vitality in recent
years." 9 They envisage combining in this agency the best features of the
presently available alternative semi-official sources: the "accredited" nongovernmental organizations, the academic community, and independent
research agencies.10 The funding for the proposed agency would come
from public and private sources, and the agency would have technical and
advisory links with established U.N. bodies. Its purposes would include
"legal planning" for the world community, and it would presumably be
able to draw upon a similar pool of scholars and distinguished citizens, as
do other privately initiated organizations of a comparable nature, such as
the Club of Rome, The World Academy of Arts and Science, the World
University, and the Independent Commission on International Develop-

5. Id. at 3-79.
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at 46-47.
8. Id. at 63.
9. Id. at 64.
10. Id. at 64-65.
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ment Issues (the Brandt Commission)."
In the second essay in part one, entitled "The Elusiveness of Development and Welfare, ''la Professor Timothy Shaw analyzes inequalities in
the Third World and sets the stage for the subsequent discussion of the
issues of equity and justice in international law by Professor Johnston
and for the following chapters on the structure and process necessary to
achieve it. Shaw describes the dilemma caused by the elusiveness of welfare and cautions that "changes in international and internal relations are
inevitable; the question is whether these will be pacific or violent, ready
or tardy." His basic proposition is that "the beneficiaries of any new
world order will be limited both between and within states. The poverty
of the resource-poor Third World states will probably be intensified by
increased prices of oil and minerals, manufactures and food, unless [they
are accorded] preferential treatment."1 4 He observes that "[u]neven development in the Third World has made general propositions and prescriptions about international human welfare hazardous."1 5
In Johnston's words, his essay "The Foundations of Justice in International Law""6 is an attempt "to respond to the demand by exploring
the ethical basis of international law through theories of justice in moral,
political and legal philosophy, and in particular by applying the concepts
of retributive and distributive justice to the welfare deficient states. 17 He
makes a strong plea for not abandoning "entirely the traditions of natural
right and positive law in the search for international justice" 8 and concludes that "an integration rather than a selection of values is more likely
to provide the best mix of ideas to save mankind from the ultimate failure." 9 Copithorne, legal advisor to the Canadian Department of External
Affairs, paints with a broad brush a view of the existing structural law of
the international human welfare system at the United Nations, including
the U.N. human rights laws and institutions, ECOSOC, U.N. Specialized
Agencies, and UNEP.'0 He identifies the inadequacies of the existing institutions and mechanisms and foresees continued uncertainties about the
shape of these structures "as the world community seeks to pursue
human welfare on a universal scale." 1
Eric Suy, the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, outlines some of
the innovative processes of international lawmaking, such as lawmaking
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. at 81-109.
13. Id. at 82. This assertion is by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania whose views
Professor Shaw endorses.
14. Id. at 85.
15. Id. at 83.
16. See id. at 111-46.
17. Id. at 111.
18. Id. at 134.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 147-85.
21. Id. at 171.
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by the General Assembly and proceeding by concensus." He offers useful
suggestions for (1) involving the sixth committee (legal committee) of the
General Assembly in substantive work on all draft treaties, and (2)
strengthening the work of the Codification Division of the Office of the
Legal Affairs of the United Nations, for the International Law Commission and Codification Conference rely heavily on research done by the
3
Codification Division.'
The second part, entitled "Human Dignity," consists of seven studies
on selected aspects of human rights. It opens with an essay by Dean Macdonald offering a comprehensive overview of the broad range of activities
undertaken by the United Nations since its inception toward the promotion and implementation of human rights:"' setting standards; performing
advisory and educational services; conducting studies; and engaged in the
implementation of the International Covenants on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights' and Civil and Political Rights' and the International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid.7 He asks the pertinent question: "What is the relevance of
human rights to governments coping with energy shortages, crises of raw
materials, and 'north-south' confrontations?"' 8 Noting that "human
rights are of the essence because they have to do with the type of society
we are seeking to build,"" he urges practitioners of human rights to get
the message across that human rights are not fringe issues but core issues
by taking initiatives and seeking "to put across at major international
conferences the central relevance of human rights to issues of development, disarmament, maintenance of peace and security, and environment.' 0 The sections on integrating the implementation procedures 1
and exploring new approaches for further promotion and encouragement
of human rights,"2 contain useful suggestions. For example, he endorses a
review of the U.N. Charter and a restructuring of the economic and social
structure of the United Nations." He recommends that the "search for
universality" be encouraged, existing procedures be improved, procedural
propriety and elements of due process be introduced into human rights
bodies which are called upon to investigate allegations of human rights
violations, "a genuine partnership" be sought with the nongovernmental

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
(1973).
28,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

See generally id. at 187-200.
See id. at 195-200.
Id. at 203-37.
G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
G.A. Res. 3068(XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE,

Id.
Id.
See id. at 215-23.
See id. at 223-31.
Id. at 231.

supra note 1, at 231.
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organizations, and better coordination be achieved between the United
Nations, the specialized agencies, and regional intergovernmental organizations concerned with human rights.'" This thirty-five page essay provides a most cogent and incisive account of the challenges and prospects
of international human rights.
In a historical context, Professor L.C. Green discusses selected contemporary efforts to control actions of barbarism against groups and individuals, such as genocide, apartheid, war crimes, hijacking, torture, and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals.3 5 He points to the
ineffectiveness of the United Nations machinery in controlling many of
these reprehensible acts, and emphasizes that "the whole idea of 'barbarism' is highly subjective and depends upon one's ideological approach." s
Drawing upon his expertise as the Canadian delegate to the recently concluded Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 87 he
illustrates the inadequacies of the current efforts to control barbarism.
Contrasting the universal efforts with a regional approach such as the one
offered by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, he
suggests that "multilateral action on a more restricted scale, when the
participants have somewhat similar views as to moral conduct, the rule of
law, standards of civilization, and the like," show a more hopeful prospect.3 8 He offers a sobering thought: "Those countries which believe in

the possibility of real international legal control of barbarism may have to
pursue simultaneously less grandiose but effective schemes confined to
themselves, even though the number participating be extremely small."'
Concluding on a pessimistic note, he suggests that it is perhaps time to
acknowledge that we are moving into an area of two international laws:
that which we have to subscribe to for the sake of universal public opinion, though we know it will never operate as law; and that more restricted
collection of rules of law that we believe in and will carry out, ensuring
a
40
reduction and suppression of barbarism at least among ourselves.
"Migration and Resettlement under International Law" 4' is the subject of John Hucker's essay. A discussion of the right of a citizen to leave
and return to his or her country, constraints on states regarding expulsion
and detention, and multilateral and regional laws and institutions concerned with refugees and asylum leads him to conclude that "divergent
political and socioeconomic perspectives have hampered the development
34. Id. at 234.
35. See id. at 239-71.
36. Id. at 258.
37. For recent commentaries on the outcome of the conference, see Green, New Law of
Armed Conflict, [1977] CAN. YB. INT'L L. 3; Symposium issue on Law of War, 9 CAsE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 7-116, 175-424 (1977); Law of War Panel, Directions in the Development of
the Law of War, 82 MiL. L. Rav. 3 (Fall 1978).
38. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HuMAN WELFARE, supra note 1, at 267.
39. Id. at 267-68.
40. Id. at 268.
41. See id. at 327-45.
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of international institutions exercising any degree of effective control over
transnational population movement."' 4 2 While he is not optimistic about
"the emergence of a system of world order which would curtail in any
fundamental way the exclusive competence of states to decide who will be
admitted or allowed to remain in their territory,"4 3 he echoes Professor
Green's thoughts about the prospects of success for regional systems, for
he does envisage a gradual surrender of authority, primarily confined to
regional groupings such as the European Economic Community "in which
the members share compatible political systems, a reasonable equivalence
in economic development, and a largely homogeneous ethnic and relatial
composition." 4 This is followed by an overview of the recent efforts toward ensuring international protection of the welfare of migrant workers
by Professor John Claydon.46 He identifies areas which demand further
attention, such as, preparation for integration in the country of origin;
special needs in housing, health and education; social security benefits;
reunification of families; and security and duration of stay in the receiv'
ing country."6 Other chapters in this part are concerned with education,
48
women's rights,' and the right to travel."
The opening essay in the third part, a series of seven essays on legal
and economic aspects of national development and entitled, "Economic
Development," is by Louis Sabourin, president of the OECD Development Center in Paris."e He discusses theories, methods, and prospects of
international economic development, concluding that "no matter what
measures the developed countries accede to, most of the responsibility
lies ultimately with the countries of the Third World themselves [which]
can only expect as much co-operation from the industrialized nations as
they are prepared to exhibit among themselves."5 1 This is followed by two
perceptive essays5 ' which specifically address the myriad of political,
economic, and legal issues associated with the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in a historical setting.5' The authors
outline significant trends and discuss major problems, both perceived and
real, which must be addressed before the NIEO concept could be translated into concrete actions. Each of the four other studies in this chapter

42. Id. at 340.
43. Id.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
See id. at 347-71.
See id. at 362.
See id. at 273-90.
See id. at 291-325.
See id,at 373-96.
See id. at 399-424.
Id. at 421.
See id. at 425-69.
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examines an important aspect of economic development-international
law and foreign investment," producer cartels," labor and employment, 56
and the international transfer and promotion of technology.5 7 Obviously,
it is not easy to suggest solutions to the formidable problems the world
community faces on these issues, but to the credit of these authors the
studies provide a balanced appraisal of the controversial issues and suggest specific recommendations in each area.
The fourth part, comprising six essays, addresses issues in the promotion of physical welfare. The opening essay" is by Professor Nathan
Keyfitz, a Harvard sociologist who offers a demographic perspective and
concludes that based on present trends, "the majority of the population
will have to wait long years, perhaps generations, until prosperity trickles
down to them. They will be increasingly impatient, of course, and one
must hope that their impatience will be channeled along peaceful and
constructive lines."5 ' Professor Mary Ellen Caldwell examines the legal
factor in the food-population equation," concluding that only multidisciplinary and multinational solutions will work."1 This is followed by
essays on public health and the human environment," energy and international economic welfare," and the 1975 U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders." The concluding essay is
by Professor J.W. Samuels, an advisor to the Canadian Red Cross Society, on "Organized Responses to Natural Disasters."" Based on the
trends of the last sixty years he suggests that at the international level,
"there must be coordination through the U.N. Disaster Relief Office and
the League of Red Cross Societies. The former would be primarily responsible for direct government assistance, the latter for aid from nongovernmental institutions." Essays in this part address several issues on
which the United Nations has sponsored many international conferences
in the recent past. Some of these essays, unlike those in parts one to
three, however, offer no more than a survey of the events of the recent
past without delving into major problems and appraising alternatives and
discussing specific recommendations. Perhaps constraints of space were
responsible, for it is not easy to discuss such wide-ranging subjects in just
a hundred pages.

54.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE, supra note 1, at 471-500.
55. See id. at 501-23.
56. See id. at 525-48.
57. See id. at 549-81.
58. Nation, City, and the World Community: A Demographic Perspective, in id. at
585-600.
59. Id. at 600.
60. See id. at 601-14.
61. See generally id. at 610-14.
62. See id. at 615-38.
63. See id. at 639-57.
64. See id. at 659-74.
65. See id. at 675-90.
66. Id. at 687.
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It is impossible to do justice in a short review to the wealth of material presented by the twenty-seven authors, a reason responsible for my
not taking account of each contribution. I would reiterate, however, that
the overall quality of the collection is remarkably high, the credit for
which goes to the editors. I concur with the hope expressed by the editors
that "the cumulative effect of these essays will be a contribution to the
organization of the field, which might be designated as the international
law and policy of human welfare."' 7

67. Id. at vii.

BOOK NOTES
ARANGIO-RUIZ, G., THE UN DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND
THE SYSTEM OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; Sijthoff & Noordhoff
International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1979);
available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd.,
Germantown, MD 20767; $27.50 (cloth); ISBN 902860149x; available in
Italian and French; xiii, 301 p.; footnotes, bibliography, appendix, index.
The second of three Hague Courses. Revised edition.
This is a revised edition of The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Declaration of Principles of
Friendly Relations, published in Volume 137 (1972-II) of the Collected
Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law. The revision is
justified, according to the author, first because some general problems
have been recently reconsidered by the author. Second, the resultant variations in his views are of such a kind as to increase the weight of the data
upon which he based his 1972 conclusions with respect to the nature of
international organization and the normative role of the United Nations.
The book analyzes the theoretical basis in customary law and other
sources of international law of United Nations General Assembly declarations. Chapter I is devoted to a critical analysis of the view that General
Assembly declarations are a special, new lawmaking process, contemplated as such by custom and the views otherwise implying a special lawmaking force of the declarations. Chapter II discusses the material role of
General Assembly resolutions within the framework of the main conventional "sources" (custom and treaty) or alleged "sources" (general principles), and the role of General Assembly resolutions in legal determination. Chapter III discusses, in the light of the results achieved thus far,
the status of General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV), which embodies
the principle of "Friendly Relations." Chapter IV, devoted to the contents of the declaration, consists of the proposed first reading and commentary of the formulations of the seven principles. Chapter V discusses
the function of the declaration in the light of the objectives assigned to it
by the General Assembly and by some member states and in the light of
some of the scholarly assessments of that function. In particular, the
chapter considers the doctrine and law of peaceful coexistence. The essay
is devoted to the illustration of some of the juridical problems raised by
the "Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations" (the document unanimously adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 2625(XXV) on 24 October 1970).
The book contains the text of General Assembly Resolution
2625(XXV) approving The Declaration on Principles of International
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Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in an Annex. Fully
indexed, the book also contains a rather extensive bibliography of over
300 references.
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz is Professor of International Law at the University of Rome, and Legal Consultant with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has taught at the Universities of Padua and Bologna, and
was the representative of Italy on the United Nations special committee
which drafted the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States.
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Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The
Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff,
20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $48.00 (cloth); ISBN
9028603395; foreword, footnotes, texts of documents, charts, bibliographies, index. In French. No. 6 in the series Collection de Droit International, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.
The aim of this book, The Law of Socialist Economic Integration,is
to explain economic integration among the member countries of the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). Professor Bystricky
examines theoretical and practical issues of economic integration in the
socialist countries of Eastern Europe, working from the premise that terminological similarities do not hide the fact that the community of socialist countries pursue fundamentally different political objectives than do
the Western states. According to the basic documents of socialist economic integration, all aspects of social life are bound up in the process of
integration. Therefore, while the book is primarily concerned with juridical issues, the analysis includes certain economic, political, and social
problems. Law, politics, and economics are said to be inseparable in the
process of socialist economic integration.
The basic documents reproduced as annexes in the book are the
Comecon Charter (including the 1962 and 1974 amendments), a detailed
organizational chart of Comecon, and the complete text of the 1971 Complex Program for Socialist Economic Integration.
The analysis is in five parts. The first part deals with the definition,
origins, causes and objectives, and sources of socialist economic integration, and with the participation of the member states of Comecon in the
integration process. Second, the ideological bases and juridical characteristics of socialist economic integration are discussed. The place of the law
of socialist economic integration in the international legal system is also
treated. The third section concerns juridical principles. The principles of
the 1971 Complex Program are analyzed in light of public international
law; this includes a discussion of Soviet doctrines towards general inter-
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national law and towards the principle jus cogens in particular. The discussion then centers on the principle of socialist internationalism, including the evolution and contents of the concept and divergences within and
among Western communist parties. The Soviet conception of the principle of sovereignty is also discussed. Finally, the supranationality of economic integration-from both Western and socialist perspectives-is
treated.
The fourth part of the book deals with ways and means for economic
collaboration and planning within the socialist group. This discussion
covers the juridical aspects of cooperation in science, technology, industrial property, monetary and financial relations, agriculture, transport,
and other areas. It also describes the organs of socialist economic integration. The fifth section provides perspectives for the future. Relations between Comecon and the European Economic Community and between economics, politics, law, and social life from Western and socialist
viewpoints are discussed.
This book will be of interest to students and teachers of international
law, economics, and international relations, practicing professionals in
these fields, diplomats, and others interested in the juridical, economic,
and political problems facing the Comecon countries.
Rudolf Bystricky, Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of
International Studies in Geneva and at the Law School of the University
of Fribourg (Switzerland), is a former professor of international law at
Charles University in Prague. He served as chief of the Czechoslovak economic service and as Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

CAMPBELL,

D.L. (editor), COMPARATivE LAW YEARBOOK (Volume III-

1979); Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den
Rijn, The Netherlands (1980); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff'&
Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $52.50 (cloth);
ISBN 9028603409, LC 79-649337; v, 287 p.; footnotes. Issued by the
Center for International Legal Studies.
The thirteen papers collected in this third volume of the Comparative Law Yearbook are diverse in author-background and subject matter.
The editor has selected such international topics as the international impact of United States antitrust laws, international commercial arbitration, a comparative analysis of employee creditor's rights, and Western
legal efforts to suppress terrorism. In addition, a discussion of recent law
reform in China by Professor Chiu of the University of Maryland School
of Law, recent Polish constitutional developments by Professor Garlicki,
visiting Professor of Law at Saint Louis University from Warsaw University, and German merger controls and the oil industry by Patrick J.
Hines, Professor of Law at McGeorge School of Law, University of the
Pacific are included. The editor's own paper analyzes the English Sunday
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Times Case, based upon the American doctrine against prior restraint,
which may have been structured on a misreading of English law and history. Another article by Phiroza Anklesaria, an Indian advocate and English soliciter, describes the Indian law of contempt. Two other articles
discuss the practicality of the Hague Sales Law of 1964 and the similarities and differences between the development of English and Scottish
contract law and Continental contract law.
Dennis Campbell is Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific, and Director of European Programs at that
institution.

CARREAU, D., JUILLARD, P., & FLORY, T., DROIT INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIQUE; Librarie G6n~rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 20 & 24,
Rue Soufflot, Paris 5e (1980); ISBN 2275011439; xx, 631 pp.; footnotes,

bibliographies, tables, index. Second edition. In French.
The second edition of InternationalEconomic Law updates and expands the earlier version, and certain sections have been eliminated. The
aims of the authors remain the same: to present in a synthesized form a

judicial study of contemporary problems of the international economy,
and to render that presentation as accessible as possible, so that it would
be useful to law students and practitioners and to adherents of other related disciplines. The book illuminates the practical importance of international economic law.
The introductory section of the book concerns the legal structure of
the international legal order. Topics include alternative definitions of international economic law, the multidisciplinarity and diversity of the subject, and the contents of its norms. Sanctions, actors, organizations, historical developments, and the "new international economic order" are

also discussed.
The first section of the text proper deals with the economic interdependence of states. The world monetary system is treated in terms of the
limits of the monetary sovereignty of states and the law of international
monetary cooperation. The monetary systems of the European Economic
Community and of the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation are also
discussed. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is treated in
depth. Other commercial regimes, including the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries, the "Stabex" system of the Lom6 Convention, and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, are also covered.
The second broad section deals with the residual economic sovereignty of states. Legal aspects of private investment are discussed at
length. Topics include nationalization and transfer of technology.
Dominique Carreau is Professor of Law and former Dean of the
Faculty of Law, University of Paris X and is a member of the Advisory
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Board of the Denver Journal of InternationalLaw and Policy. Patrick
Juillard is Professor of Law, University of Paris. Thi6baut Flory is Charge
de Conf6rences in the Faculty of Law, University of Paris.

t
CASSESE, A. (editor), U.N.
INTERNATIONAL

LAW;

LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS:

Two Topics

IN

Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers,

Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767;
$38.00 (cloth); ISBN 9028608281; x, 258 p.; footnotes.
This is a collection of lectures delivered at the Faculty of Political
Science at the University of Florence in 1976-77. The fifteen guest lecturers were international law professors and United Nations officials from
twelve Eastern, Western, and Third World Countries. The editor has organized their work into two broad subject areas of international law: the
legal principles affected by the existence and functioning of the United
Nations, and the international protection of human rights and of the
rights of peoples.
Within these two general areas the topics treated and the approaches
taken are as diverse as the authors' nationalities. Professor Richard Falk
of the United States analyzes the response of the 1976 Algiers Declaration
of the Rights of Peoples to the structure of internal political repression
around the world. Mr. Youri Rechetov, United Nations Division of
Human Rights Senior Human Rights Officer, a citizen of the Soviet
Union, describes state responsibility for the violation of the rights of citizens as being strictly limited to obligations of convention. Professor Jean
J. A. Salmon of the University of Brussels, constructs an academic model
of the political nature of judicial and administrative fact finding in international conflict resolution. Judge Jos6 Sette Camara of the International
Court of Justice, who served as the President of the Florence symposium,
reviews the negotiating history and the principal provisions of the 1975
Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations
with International Organizations. Other contributors include: Bertrand G.
Ramcharan of Guyana, and Adjunct Professor of Law at Dalhousie University; Dan Ciobanu of Romania, Lecturer in International Law at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and Bert V.A. R61ing, Professor
of International Law and Peace Research at the University of Gr6ningen,
who was a judge in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, a
member of the Dutch delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, and co-founder and Secretary-General of the International Peace Research Association.
Each article is from twelve to twenty-five pages in length. Because of
their lecture format they are not heavily footnoted, but they do provide
for a succinct and convenient survey and synthesis of each area.
Antonio Cassese is Professor of International Organization, Univer-
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sity of Florence. He has been a member of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as
well as a member of the Italian delegations to the United Nations General
Assembly and the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Development of
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict.

ELIAS, T.O., NEw HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW; Sijthoff &
Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, and Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. (1979); available
in the U.S. from Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. or from
Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767;
$32.50 (cloth); ISBN 0379204991 (Oceana), ISBN 9028600396 (Sijthoff);
xxii, 206 p.; footnotes, bibliography, appendices.
This book consists of a series of studies designed to highlight a number of the more significant aspects of public international law that have
emerged in the past thirty years. Written by Judge Elias of the International Court of Justice, the book endeavors to explore new trends in the
horizons of public international law.
The theme of the book is presented in three main divisions. In the
first part, certain aspects of the new trends in contemporary international
law are examined. The contributions made by the Third World, especially
Asia and Africa, to international law are outlined with regard to the new
initiatives taken by the United Nations in establishing the International
Law Commission and certain economic bodies like the UNCTAD and the
UNCITRAL, which have been called into being largely by the needs of
the developing countries. An attempt is made to look at the growth of
modern diplomatic law within the framework of the International Law
Commission and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Probably
the most significant development of the period has been the adoption by
a Diplomatic Conference of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is important because of its reformulation and progressive developments of aspects of the Law of Treaties. An interesting aspect of the
same subject is the draft Convention on State Succession which attempts
to modernize the law of the rights and duties of new States in relation to
the Treaties they inherited at independence. Lastly, an important new
development is the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, which is an attempt to recodify existing law and to codify new law of
the sea.
The second part of the book is devoted to the judicial process. Examined are present trends and future prospects of the International Court of
Justice, especially the problem of the varied composition of the Court, the
jurisdiction of the Court in regard to whether it should be expanded to
entertain entities other than sovereign states. Another development
which is analyzed is the judicial review function of the International
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Court of Justice, made important in view of the development of new
areas, such as international constitutional law and appeals from other
tribunals like the United Nations Administrative Tribunal.
The third part of the book is devoted to the development and analysis of human rights and humanitarian law. The question of human rights
is discussed in the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the two Protocols adopted in Geneva in December 1977 to update the
inadequacies of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. A brief outline of the
development of international humanitarian law concludes the study.
Judge Taslim Olawale Elias of Nigeria is Vice President of the International Court of Justice, and is a member of the Curatorium of the
Hague Academy of International Law. As a supplement to New Horizons
in International Law, Judge Elias will publish an article entitled New
Perspectives and Conceptions in Contemporary Public International
Law in volume 10, number 2 (Winter 1981) of the Denver Journal of InternationalLaw and Policy.

EXTAVOUR, W.C., THE EXCLUSIVE EcONOMIC ZONE: A STUDY OF THE
EVOLUTION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
THE SEA; Graduate Institute of International Studies, 132, Rue de Lau-

sanne, Geneva, Switzerland (1979); $30.00 (cloth); ISBN 9028608389; xv,
369 p.; footnotes, tables, bibliography, appendices.
The author traces the development of the concept of the exclusive
economic zone from its inception through its expansion. He begins with
an introductory chapter dealing with the earliest forms of state jurisdiction over adjacent seas, the concepts of territorial seas and the contiguous
zone. He emphasizes the use by the"major maritime states of the concept
of the contiguous zone to restrain seaward expansion of state jurisdiction.
Part I deals with state practice, and how it has contributed to the
evolution of the exclusive economic zone. Included are a unilateral declaration and a bilateral treaty, and the Truman Proclamations. Following is
a discussion of the progeny of the Truman proclamations and their early
codification in the framework of the United Nations.
Part II deals with the expansion of the concept of the exclusive economic zone itself. Beginning with its emergence within the United Nations, the author discusses the concept in terms of the draft treaty before
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. He also
treats the present validity of the draft principles as rules of customary
international law.
In later chapters the author describes the state of the law as it existed at the date of the writing, and what the future of the exclusive economic zone may be should the Conference not approve the principles of
the zone.
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The appendices contain the Revised Standard Negotiating Text draft
articles on the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The
bibliography is impressive, and is organized by type of authority, such as:
cases, conventions, regional declarations, books, and articles.

KLEPACKI, Z., THE ORGANS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; Sijthoff
& Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, and PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, Warsaw, Poland (1978);
available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd.,
Germantown, MD 20767; ISBN 9028602283; available in Polish; xii, 137
p.; footnotes, bibliography.
This work describes the structure and workings of the organs of public international organizations in four chapters, which deal with classification, history and development, composition, and present functions. Each
chapter contains a detailed outline, so that the reader can quickly reference to a subtopic. Since the work is primarily descriptive, with few footnotes, it serves as a general introduction to the institutional aspect of
foreign relations.
In the conclusion, the author highlights the evolution of international
organizations since World War II as consisting of, first, the explosion in
the number, size, and functions of such organizations, and second, the
relatively greater importance of the administrative organs within such or-

ganizations. International administrators now not only have far more re-

sources at their disposal, and many more tasks to address, but they also
have acquired a degree of legislative power from the "top" organs.

Zbigniew Klepacki is Professor of Law at the Polish Institute of
International Affairs in Warsaw. He is a frequent representative of the
Polish Government at international conferences, and has served as Editor-in-Chief of Encyclopaedia of InternationalOrganizations (1975) and
of Socialist Economic Integration (1974).

KOHLS, S. (editor), DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS; Sijthoff
& Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Nether-

lands (1976); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $32.50 (cloth); ISBN 9028605053;
619 p.; indices.
This dictionary has been compiled for all those concerned with the
practice and theory of external economy in foreign trade enterprises, as
well as those learners who desire to acquire some specialized knowledge in
foreign economic terms. This dictionary offers the user over 9,300 English
economic terms and their equivalents in German, French, Spanish, and
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Russian. The main entries have been chosen with a view towards providing the user with the most essential and frequently used terms.
The main text is alphabetically offered in German, followed by indices in Russian, English, French, and Spanish. An abbreviations table
shows the user the correct form of the word or phrase he or she desires to
use. To enable the user to safely find the correct technical term, numerous word phrases have also been included. The vocabulary has been chosen from trade journals, manuals, lexicons, and other reference works as
well as from various documents employed in the external economy. Currently in its third printing, many of the misprints and lexicographical inaccuracies of previous editions have been corrected and some important
words have been added in this edition.

McGOWAN, P. & KEGLEY, C.W., JR., (editors), THREATS, WEAPONS,
AND FOREIGN POLICY; Sage Publications, Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive,

Beverly Hills, CA 90212 (1980); $20.00 (cloth); ISBN 0803911548, ISBN
0803911556 pbk., LC 79-266659; 324 p.; bibliography, index of persons.
Fifth volume of Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies.
This volume integrates the theoretical and empirical divisions presently existing between scientific foreign policy and national security/defense studies. "By focusing on Threats, Weapons, and Foreign Policy Behavior, our intention was to bring together. . . studies by foreign policy
and defense experts on the interface between national security and' foreign policy behavior that were unique because of their application of
newer social science methodologies to the perennial questions of defense
and security."
Part I, Threats and Foreign Policy, defines threats as the conceptual
link between foreign and defense policy studies. Threats are anticipations
of aproaching harm triggering feelings of stress that lead to adaptive behavior. The three chapters in this section center upon threat with respect
to overt behavior of states in conflict, Soviet perceptions of international
crises (1946-75), and United States public opinion and military spending
(1930-90).
Part II, Weapons and Foreign Policy, presents four chapters that
examine the impact of weapons and weapons systems procurement on
foreign policy and the policymaking process. Important areas addressed
include security implications of arms sales by France, legislative control
in the United States and the United Kingdom of weapons systems acquisition, military hardware production in the Third World, and the proliferation of nuclear armament through the growing availability of nuclear
technology.
Part III, Modeling Arms Races, concludes the study with two chapters on arms races from different perspectives. The first article analyzes

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 10:193

military spending by the United States and the Soviet Union over the
period 1950-76. The second article develops a model of an optimal defense policy incorporating national goals and objectives for any nation involved in an arms race.
Part IV includes a bibliography of recent foreign policy studies covering the period 1975-79.
Pat McGowen is Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. is Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina.

MCWHINNEY, E., THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF DETENTE, ARMS CONTROL,

EUROPEAN

SECURITY,

AND

EAST-WEST

COOPERATION;

Sijthoff &

Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands (1978); available in the U.S. from Sijhoff & Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $37.50 (cloth); ISBN 9028603387; xi,
254 p.; footnotes and index.
This book is an in-depth legal, philosophical, and historical analysis
of detente. As a formal judicial concept, detente originated in the 1960's.
General de Gaulle offered the concept as the keynote of a new period in
intra-European relations succeeding the Cold War era. But detente is
more than a mere political platitude. The concept of detente, while descriptive of the general relaxation of tension in Europe across the old
Cold War territorial frontiers, is philosophically dynamic: envisioning itself as a transitory stage towards a larger, Pan-European spirit of entente
and cooperation. The special Gaullist conception of detente has ceased to
be a viable operational idea. Detente has emerged under a number of different rubrics, in a number of different problem areas, and at different or
varying levels of generality and philosophic abstraction. The author offers
this study in the firm belief that the spirit of detente, at its moment of
apparent greatest success as demonstrated in a plethora of highly concrete East-West accords that are actively being followed up and implemented, is being contested and challenged either out of a sense of misunderstanding of the detente concept or a sense of desuetude through
unfamiliarity with the concept's parameters.
The book is the result of three years of lectures given by the author
from 1975 through 1977. The ideas were preliminarily presented to the
Institute of International Public Law and International Relations at the
Aristotelian University in Thessalonica. The ideas presented in this book
took their final form as graduate course lectures at the University of Nice,
in the Institut du Droit de la Paix and at the Institut Europ6en de
Hautes Etudes Internationals. In exploring the philosophy, methodology,
and sanctification of detente, the author seeks to reveal why detente is
still a viable concept capable of transforming East-West relations to the
betterment of all the world and not just Europe in the short run.
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Chapter I explores the comparative (Soviet and Western) philosophy
of detente. Chapter II examines the legal theory of the methodology of
detente through the interaction of its legal method and its legal objectives. Chapter III reveals the road to detente through nuclear disarmament coupled with arms control and Chapter IV follows through with the
key to detente-Strategic Arms Limitations (SALT I and SALT II).
Chapter V shows the relationship of detente to the legitimation of territorial frontiers in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter VI shows the conservative face of detente by discussing Europe's intra-bloc solidarity and
the formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Chapter VII discusses the positive aspects of detente in East-West cooperative efforts in space. The
sanctification aspects of detente are explored through the formulation
and application of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. The book closes with a chapter on the normalization of
detente followed by a historical retrospective and prospects.
The breadth and scope of detente are explored through the analytical
devices of theory, law as enacted, philosophical foundations, and historical rewards and frustrations. Such an approach yields a balanced analysis
of the concept of detente and, coupled with the author's desire to keep
detente a viable forum in which to continue East-West cooperation and
negotiations, a timely study of detente's continuing utility.
Edward McWhinney is a member of 'Institut de Droit International.

t
RAMAZANI, R.K., THE PuaStN GULF AND THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ;
Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The
Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff,
20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $35.00 (cloth); ISBN
9028600698; 180 p.; footnotes, maps, appendices, documentary index.
Third in the series InternationalStraits of the World.

This work is the third in a series of studies organized and edited at
the Center for the Study of Marine Policy on the topic of international
straits. The purpose of the series is to explore the political, economic and
physical characteristics of certain straits, in light of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which will promulgate rules affecting such straits.
The author describes the importance of the Strait of Hormuz to
Western and Soviet foreign policy, and to the foreign relations of the
states adjacent to the Persian Gulf. He calls the Strait of Hormuz a
"global checkpoint," closure of which would disrupt oil supplies and bring
economic disaster to the Western world and Japan. He predicts that such
closure would lead to military actions, creating far-reaching consequences
for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf states.
The author discusses the historical evolution of the present crises
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and conflicts, highlighting the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. He shows how domestic issues are intertwined with foreign rations. relations. Conservative
Arab states being sometimes aligned with and sometimes at odds with
more radical Arab states, but over all the local rivalries looms the threat
of world war between the United States and the Soviet Union. He describes several oil disruption scenarios and the effect of military forces on
them, while arguing for the peaceful settlement of disputes and political
stability.
Concluding, the author examines the prospects for conflict or cooperation in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz in particular, reviewing the options of the superpowers. The documentary appendices contain
twelve bilateral and multilateral agreements between the Persian Gulf
states relating to the boundaries of the Continental Shelf, marine pollution, security of the Strait of Hormuz and other topics.
Rouhollah K. Ramazani is Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. He was winner of the 1964 prize of the
American Association for Middle East Studies, and in 1967 was the Aga
Kahn Professor of Islamic Studies at the American University of Beirut.

SHAKER, M.I., THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND
IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979, Volume I; Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry,

NY (1980); ISBN 0379204703, LC 80-17359; xxiv, 470 p.; footnotes.
This first of two volumes describes the history of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) beginning with the "Irish Resolution"
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1959. It then analyzes General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) which contains the five
principles upon which the NPT was to be negotiated. In discussing the
negotiations themselves, Shaker relates the procedures, occurences in the
international community, General Assembly resolutions, and other factors
which had an impact on the negotiations.
The author analyzes the provisions of the NPT and their implementation, on the basis of the first two principles of General Assembly Resolution 2028 (XX) (the other provisions relating to the last three principles
are discussed in the second volume). Principle (a), requiring that there be
no loopholes allowing nuclear or nonnuclear powers to proliferate nuclear
weapons in any form, is discussed in light of the relevant NPT provisions,
and especially the plan for nuclear sharing within NATO and the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). Extensive treatment is given to the positions of the states potentially involved in nuclear sharing.
The provisions of the NPT dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy, application of nuclear explosions, and the nuclear security guarantees as handled by Security Council Resolution 255 are discussed in
light of Principle (b), which states that the Treaty should embody an ac-
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ceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear
and nonnuclear powers.
Mohamed I. Shaker is Minister and Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United States. He was a member of the Egyptian delegation to the Conference of the Eighteen Nation
Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva from 1965 to 1968, and
was a participant in the 1975 NPT Review Conference.

SIMONS,

W.B., (editor), THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST

WORLD; Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den
Rijn, The Netherlands (1980); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, 20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $92.50 (cloth);
ISBN 9028600701, LC 80-65005; xvii, 644 p.; footnotes, comparative
index.
This book contains a collection of constitutions adopted by communist states. Included are the constitutions of Albania, Bulgaria, China,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Kampuchea (regime of Pol Pot), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the U.S.S.R., Viet-Nam, and Yugoslavia.
The editor notes in -his preface that most of the states listed have
promulgated new or revised constitutions in the last decade, 'allowing this
book to retain its usefulness for some time. Only the new or revised texts
are included in this volume.
The majority of the constitutions contained in the book were especially translated by jurists. Each translator has supplied an introduction
to each constitution, briefly describing its elements. The book is a useful
reference work, offering numerous communish constitutions in a single
volume translated into English.
A valuable addition to this volume is the systematic index, which
cites provisions of each constitution comparatively. For each of many
subjects, such as military service, treason, deprivation of citizens' rights,
and centralized economy, the applicable provisions of each constitution
are listed, permitting easy reference to the documents themselves.

WEIS, P., NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW;
Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, Alphen aan den Rijn, The
Netherlands (1979); available in the U.S. from Sijthoff & Noordhoff,
20010 Century Blvd., Germantown, MD 20767; $62.50 (cloth); ISBN
9028603298, LC 79-89781; xiii, 337 p.; footnotes, bibliography, appendices.
Revised Edition. Forward by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht.
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This is the second revised edition of a work that looks at nationality
from an international as well as national viewpoint. The book contains a
study of the relationship between municipal and international law in the
area of nationality, and reviews restrictions on the sovereign jurisdiction
of states, including bilateral and multilateral treaties. In the author's view
it is the conflict among nationality laws, resulting from the domestic character of those laws, which creates statelessness. The author predicts that
the United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,
adopted in 1961 but as yet ratified by only a few states, may result in a
decline in statelessness. Further evidence of this trend is found in recent
nationality laws in several countries. Throughout the book, the celebrated
Nottebohm case decided by the International Court of Justice is
discussed.
The appendices include many new treaties and legislative enactments
affecting nationality in over fourteen countries. Also included are two important United Nations Conventions, one relating to the nationality of
married women, the other to statelessness. In addition to thirty-five entries of general works on nationality published since 1955, the bibliography lists fifty-five books specifically on the Nottebohm case.
Dr. Weis has worked with the International Refugee Organization
and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

